“Building Co-operative Commonwealth”

“BUILDING THE CO-OPERATIVE COMMONWEALTH”

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Essays on the Democratic Socialist Tradition in Canada

Edited by J. William Brennan

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J. William Brennan.

Introduction

J. William Brennan

The twelve essays in this volume were initially presented at a conference, sponsored by the Canadian Plains Research Center in June 1983, to mark the fiftieth anniversary of the adoption of the Regina Manifesto, the political platform of the newly-created Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF). The founding of that new party itself marked a turning point in Canadian political history. Parties espousing socialist principles had begun to appear at the turn of the century, but it was not until the 1930s, with the formation of the CCF, that Canadian socialists could boast a vigorous national party. Its political philosophy could best be labelled as democratic socialism, an amalgam of ideas drawn largely from Great Britain and the Labour party. The task of drafting the CCF's political manifesto was entrusted to the League for Social Reconstruction (LSR), an organization of Canadian intellectuals modelled on the British Fabian Society. The LSR was only slightly older than the CCF itself, but the document which it prepared, and which delegates approved at the party's first national convention in Regina in 1933, remained the political creed of the CCF for more than twenty years.

Although its survival was precarious at first, the CCF became and remained the dominant force in left-of-centre Canadian politics. In the early 1940s it gained sudden popularity across the nation, sweeping Saskatchewan in 1944 to form the first socialist government in North America, and surging to the threshold of power in Ontario and British Columbia. In 1945 the party's fortunes began to ebb, however, and despite the occasional resurgence and an unbroken hold on Saskatchewan, CCF strength thereafter began to recede slowly but steadily. The CCF came officially to an end in 1961 when, with the support of the Canadian Labour Congress, it helped to found the New Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP has enjoyed much greater success than the CCF, at the provincial level at any rate, forming governments in British Columbia, Saskatchewan, and Manitoba during the past two decades.

As the CCF grew in size and strength over the years, it became an object of increasing interest to sociologists, political scientists and, more recently, historians. Believing that the study of the CCF - NDP has benefitted in the past from such a variety of approaches, this conference sought to bring together scholars from a variety of disciplines to examine aspects of the democratic socialist tradition in Canada which hitherto have been overlooked. In addition to the twelve formal papers, the conference also included a panel discussion on "Building the Co-operative Commonwealth in Saskatchewan." It brought together George Cadbury, Carlyle King, and Allan Blakeney to share their experiences in the CCF and in the government during the dynamic years after the party came to power in that province. T.C. Douglas, Premier of Saskatchewan from 1944 to 1961, and then leader of the national NDP, wound up the conference with an eloquent address on the accomplishments of Canada's democratic socialist parties and the challenges that lie ahead. Unfortunately, the informal presentations by the panel members and by Tommy Douglas did not lend themselves to reproduction in this volume.

What do the essays which follow tell us about the CCF - NDP and, more generally, about the democratic socialist political tradition in Canada? Alan Whitehorn begins by reviewing the literature dealing with the CCF - NDP and he offers a critical and provocative assessment of the current state of Canadian scholarship in this field. He specifically takes issue with those academics who see the CCF (and to a lesser extent the NDP) as being both a social movement and a political party, with the two elements in constant conflict with each other. According to this "protest movement becalmed" hypothesis, the movement was eventually displaced by the party, and the CCF's doctrinaire ideology gave way to a bland platform designed simply to garner votes. Such an interpretation is too simplistic, in Whitehorn's opinion. Even in the 1930s the CCF was primarily a political party and not a social movement. There was therefore a much greater degree of continuity in the CCF from the Depression through to the 1950s than those who subscribe to the "protest movement becalmed" hypothesis admit.

Michiel Horn's essay covers more familiar ground. He discusses the background of the political charter which the CCF adopted at Regina in 1933, and analyzes its main features in comparison with the LSR manifesto prepared in 1932 and the provisional programme adopted at the founding convention of the CCF in Calgary that same year. (It is clear that it borrowed rather more from the former than from the latter.) Horn also enumerates the intellectual influences on, and the main characteristics of, the democratic socialism embraced by the LSR and the CCF. As for the Regina Manifesto itself, Horn concludes that it was not rigidly doctrinaire, but was born of mutual accommodation among farmers, trade unionists, and intellectuals who did not always agree.

The trend towards biography so evident in Canada during the past three decades has produced a number of studies of prominent socialists, most notably J.S. Woodsworth, the first national leader of the CCF. Nonetheless, David Walden and Thomas Socknat demonstrate in their contributions to this volume that there is scope for further study both of Woodsworth's political philosophy and of the pacifist principles which Woodsworth shared with others in the early CCF. His political philosophy was a unique blend of the social gospel and socialism, Walden argues, but its most distinctive characteristic was its sense of immediacy. Woodsworth was far less concerned with abstract theoretical debates over socialism than he was with finding solutions to the immediate problems faced by working people. As for Socknat's essay, it clearly demonstrates that the CCF at its inception represented a democratic socialist movement shaped in varying degrees by a pacifist emphasis upon co-operation and human understanding, the peaceful settlement of disputes, and the then revolutionary concept of passive resistance.

Joan Sangster explores another aspect of the CCF that has to date largely escaped the attention of Canadian scholars: the place of women in the party. Focussing on the period 1933 - 1940, she shows why women were drawn to a socialist party and describes the roles they played in it. Although some women assumed high profile leadership roles at the national or provincial level, most were active only at the grass-roots, performing indispensable tasks as educators, organizers, and electioneers. Sangster devotes special attention to the emergence of CCF Women's Committees in Ontario and the West, which sought to train women for leadership positions and addressed issues of special interest to them.

The remaining essays in this volume examine the democratic socialist tradition, and the political success (or lack of success) of the CCF - NDP in provinces or regions which have not yet attracted much scholarly interest. Alvin Finkel traces the origins of the Alberta CCF as a loose coalition of the provincial wing of the Canadian Labour Party and the United Farmers of Alberta, and describes the tensions within that coalition which made it impossible for the CCF to directly enter the 1935 provincial election. Party reorganizations in 1939 and 1942 gave the CCF a broader base and a distinct identity, but the CCF was never able to pose a serious challenge to the Social Credit government first elected in that mid-Depression election.

Christina Nichol discusses the experience of the CCF in British Columbia during a critical period in the party's history there. The increase in popular support for the CCF during World War II brought with it the expectation that the party might soon form the government at Victoria, but victory eluded the CCF in 1945. It seemed clear that the intervention of the communists in marginal ridings had cost the CCF seats, and the party swung to the right in the hope that this would improve its electoral fortunes. The shift was supported by that segment of the British Columbia trade union movement which supported the CCF, but the results of the 1949 provincial election proved even more disastrous than that of 1945 had been.

Four essays focus upon Saskatchewan, where the CCF formed the government after 1944, and where the serious scholarly investigation of democratic socialism in Canada can be said to have begun with the work of Dean McHenry and Seymour Lipset. Of the two, Lipset has had the more enduring impact. More than thirty years have passed since his *Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1950) was first published, yet it remains the standard monograph on the Saskatchewan CCF. However, Lipset devoted scant attention to the accomplishments of the new government, writing as he did only a few years after the CCF had come to power, and his treatment of party organization and electoral strategy was similarly truncated. Georgina Taylor contributes to a fuller understanding of the latter phenomenon. Her essay is more narrowly focussed than Joan Sangster's. Taylor concentrates on the political careers of eight women who sought the party's nomination as candidates for provincial or federal office in Saskatchewan. Although one of them, Gladys Strum, became the first woman in Canada to be elected president of a provincial CCF executive, Taylor shows that it was much more difficult for women to obtain party nominations, particularly in ridings where the prospects of success were good.

Jean Larmour, Ian MacPherson, and Jim Pitsula each examine some aspect of the record of the first, and only, CCF government elected in Canada. Larmour describes the Douglas government's changing emphasis on public, private, and co-operative ownership; MacPherson explores its relationship with the province's co-operative movement in greater detail; and Pitsula traces the evolution of social aid policy under the CCF - NDP from 1944 to 1964. Some common themes run through the three essays, most notably a recognition that while the Douglas government was innovative and progressive, it was also pragmatic. Party policy might emphasize public and co-operative development, but the government early recognized the importance of private enterprise in fostering economic growth and generating the revenues necessary to finance the hospitalization scheme, the improved educational facilities, and the other social programmes it wished to provide to the people of Saskatchewan. For Douglas and his colleagues these social objectives assumed the highest priority after 1944, higher even than their philosophical belief in public ownership. Nevertheless, public funds were limited and, as Pitsula demonstrates, this fact also acted as a constraint on the Douglas government's innovative instincts in such areas as welfare reform.

In the final essay Patrick Smith and Marshall Conley examine the impact of democratic socialism in Atlantic Canada, and challenge the orthodox view that it is a politically backward region. An ongoing democratic socialist political presence in the region can be dated perhaps from J.S. Woodsworth's tour of the Cape Breton coal fields in 1922, and certainly from the CCF's attempts to establish a foothold there in 1937. Turning to the contemporary scene, they argue that politics in Atlantic Canada is clearly changing. In three of the four provinces, popular support for the NDP has begun to approximate the national standing of the party, and the future prospects for democratic socialism seem most favourable.

Some of the contributors to this volume have impressive records of publications, while others are just beginning their careers. The end result of their collective efforts has been to provide a reappraisal of some of the considerable research already completed on the CCF - NDP, and to mark out new and profitable avenues for future scholarship.

J. William Brennan
Regina, August 1984

An Analysis of the Historiography of the CCF-NDP: The Protest Movement Becalmed Tradition[1]

Alan Whitehorn

Despite being a third party the CCF-NDP has been the focus of considerable attention by academics. Indeed, proportional to its size more has been written about the CCF than either of the major parties.[2] Some might question why anyone should choose to add to the already sizeable literature on the subject. While there have been numerous writings on the CCF and, to a lesser degree the NDP, there has not been sufficient diversity in the themes presented. In fact in recent years some conceptual models and hypotheses, which once were innovative and fruitful, now have become excessively inbred and increasingly unproductive for future research. In analyzing the historiography of the CCF-NDP, this essay will attempt to outline the reasons for this conclusion and offer some suggestions as to possible alternative directions for analysis.

By far the dominant, best researched, and most enduring theme on the CCF-NDP is that of the "protest movement becalmed." This paper will focus on the following five representative works from this tradition: Walter Young's Anatomy of a Party, Leo Zakuta's A Protest Movement Becalmed, Michael Cross's The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea, John Smart's "Populist and Socialist Movements in Canadian History," and Robert Hackett's "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP."[3] Since Walter Young's study of the national CCF is the most extensive and articulate source utilizing this approach, it will necessarily become the focus of much of the discussion in this paper.

"Socialists belong to movements, capitalists support parties."[4] With this bold assertion, Young commences his major study of the CCF with an outline of his major theme "...the party-movement distinction is a useful one....It is the general distinction that is applied throughout this study."[5] Here then one can see the first of the protest movement becalmed tradition's two primary hypotheses--there exists a dichotomy between a social movement and a political party. Young defines a movement as "a group venture extending beyond a local community or a single event and involving a systematic effort to inaugurate changes in thought, behaviour, and social relationships."[6] A political party is not actually defined per se but its purpose is stated as "...winning elections in order to control the government."[7] This is a narrow statement of a party's purpose, and seems to omit unjustifiably both non-electoral oriented parties which exist even in democracies and ideological parties which may be strongly committed to articulating policy differences in addition to the obvious goal of the acquisition of political power. Many communist parties offer examples of revolutionary parties committed to both social change and the acquisition of power. As such, any definition which cannot embrace both of these important dimensions seems to provide only a partial picture and may provide problems later in data analysis.[8] This is so for communist and socialist parties alike.

Young and others attempt to get around these problems by suggesting that both the CCF and to a lesser extent the NDP are a combination of social movement and political party.[9] Here then one has the basis for the second general assertion of the protest movement becalmed tradition--the movement eventually is displaced by the political party. Historically there is a shift from group behaviour that is committed to social change to a political organization seeking simply power. It is elaborated in a succinct summary by Zakuta in the following passage:

> Sweeping internal changes, many of which continued thereafter, originated during the CCF's momentous rise. Broadly, they were: in *ideology*, a diminishing hostility to the social order, modification in the proposals to change it, and a shift of time perspective towards the present; in *structure*, an enormous increase in size and prosperity, a more formal and uniform organization, a larger, more specialized and more professional leadership, a flow of power from the branches to the centre, the establishment of firmer roots in the community, and a less cohesive informal organization; in *motivation*, a change from sectarian to more worldly incentives, centring on a greater desire for immediate victory. Briefly, they add up to a shift from the character of a political movement towards that of a conventional party.[10]

With these two primary themes in mind, this essay will now attempt to outline in substantial detail the series of related arguments put forward in the protest movement becalmed literature. Assertions such as Young's "socialists belong to movements, capitalists support parties" and Smart's "the traditional party is the opposite of a socialist movement"[11] provide the opening argument of a vivid and comprehensive outline of the traits of two polar entities--the social movement and the political party. Each pole in Manichaean fashion seemingly is in opposition to the other, with the battleground being the CCF itself. For example, Hackett states: "Tension between the social democratic or *party* organization and the socialist or *movement* orientations has been endemic to the CCF-NDP." Young hastens to add: "Where movement and party combine...the aims of one frequently frustrate the aims of the other...." and "[the CCF] struggled to prevent the demands of the party from overwhelming the ethic of the movement." Smart even goes so far as to suggest that the conflict reached the ultimate level. "The membership of the CCF allowed its organization to be taken away from it and killed."[12] While a substantial degree of this analysis of the two terms, movement and party, is descriptive, much is also prescriptive. The manner in which each is judged by the writers will be apparent as each of the two clusters of propositions are enumerated.

Smart commences his discussion of the contrasts between movement and party by suggesting "in my view a socialist movement is decentralized...." while "A party is always strong on unity and discipline." As the CCF was gradually transformed from a movement into a party so "step by step, centralization...was achieved." Increasingly the party executive was able to "monopolize communications."[13]

The protest movement becalmed authors stress the growing centralization of political power within the CCF in conjunction with a related hypothesis. Stated simply it is that "the CCF provided an example of the operation of Michels' Iron Law of Oligarchy." These authors draw upon Gaetano Mosca's *The Ruling Class* and Robert Michels' *Political Parties* and postulate a somewhat idyllic characterization of a movement as a collective of committed amateurs and volunteers who form a relatively egalitarian and polycentric organizational structure which is characterized by a minimal amount of intervention from senior figures. In the words of one of the authors, "A movement turns people on to the idea of their own power and responsibility as individual members of the collective."[14]

Examples of "New Harmony," it is argued, rarely last for long. "The executive officers quickly became a separate body in the party." "The leaders of the CCF gradually centralized control...." The result is that "the party was ruled by a[n]...oligarchy" or "party establishment."[15] These "...party leaders...use their power in such a way as to ensure their continuance in office, even if this means ignoring or perverting their [movement's] goals."[16] Young, the author who has done the most detailed and original archival research on the CCF, identifies "...the ruling elite in the CCF [as one which] consisted of no more than twelve people: Woodsworth, Coldwell, Lewis, Scott, Grace and Angus MacInnis, Knowles, Andrew Brewin, George Grube, Lorne Ingle, Carl Hamilton, and Th r se Casgrain." Even amongst this strata, power is not shared equally for "...Lewis dominated the socialist elite, as he did the whole party."[17]

Much of the protest movement becalmed literature dwells upon the enormous amount of power accumulated by such figures. These authors warn that "the influence of this small group cannot be exaggerated." Much attention is given to elite versus mass confrontation. Evidence cited is usually in the form of resolutions passed or party rebels purged. Young's assertion that "...the CCF executive had always emerged triumphant from struggles with the rank and file...." is echoed by Cross's conclusion that "the party bureaucrats and their labour supporters were able to steamroller any opposition...."[18] Young, a "right-wing" analyst of the party, and Cross, a "left-wing" author, seemingly agree on what ails the party. Their cures, needless to say, differ!

The difference between the movement and the party is not simply a question of a decentralized versus a centralized social system. It is also a question of size and intimacy. The movement placed emphasis upon the club--a relatively small, highly intimate form of association. The consequence was that "many...found the movement so close to the centre of their lives that no clear distinction existed between politics, sociability, entertainment and even work."[19] The movement's clubs are portrayed as a natural and supportive environment. In contrast, "The party establishment tended to believe that better organization was the answer to all problems." Better meant bigger. Thus, the party's emphasis was upon the larger and inevitably more impersonal riding association. Zakuta notes, "Unlike the clubs, the larger and more formal riding associations met monthly instead of weekly and relegated discussion of socialist theory and international affairs to the background, concentrating instead on organizational matters." Instead of the movement's sense of personal integration within a community (i.e. the club), the individual increasingly felt alienated amidst a more bureaucratic organization.[20] The movement-party dichotomy becomes in effect a microcosm of the gemeinschaft/gessellschaft dualism of Toennies[21] and others. Curiously, Zakuta fails to draw the parallel to the more general theoretical literature on the subject of community versus society.

Along with the changes in size and intimacy, a corresponding shift in rewards and motivational structure occurred. Zakuta suggests "...a change from sectarian to more worldly incentives [took place], centering on a greater desire for immediate victory." The movement's emphasis was upon the faithful masses, led by a charismatic figure, undergoing immediate sacrifices for some future common good. Their only short-term rewards were symbolic in nature. The party's stress, in contrast, was upon material benefits, paid party employees and a "leadership [which increasingly] grew larger [and] more professional."[22] As the party secretary and, to a lesser degree, the leader were more likely to be administrators and bureaucrats, they become the personification of the shift in the CCF-NDP as a whole.

The protest movement becalmed authors generally agree that the movement's emphasis is upon an ideology whereas the political party's orientation is geared more to the image manipulation of public relations tactics and shifting electoral strategy. Indeed, Hackett summarizes the CCF-NDP's history in the following fashion: "Most writers have viewed conflict within the CCF-NDP...as one between 'purists' and 'pragmatists,' between those who view the CCF-NDP as a movement pursuing ultimate ideals and goals, and those who see it as a party concerned primarily with electoral success."[23] Even Young notes admiringly that "one of the characteristics of a movement is the dogged determination with which it clings to its ideals."[24] The New Left authors, Smart and Cross, are more harsh in their criticisms of the party. Smart suggests that "the party became more and more an electoral machine, which debated nothing fundamentally and became more and more irrelevant to the real problems of Canadian society."[25] One is not likely to find comments more critical than this from even political opponents!

In as much as the movement was committed to an ideology favouring social change, it followed that it was necessarily dedicated to the re-education of the population.[26] In contrast a political party, it is postulated, is more committed to the status quo and seeks only political power, not social transformation of society.[27]

While there appears to be substantial consensus on the main traits of the protest movement becalmed model, there is, as one would expect, less agreement on the actual application of the model. The authors concur with Young's assertion that "at the beginning the CCF was more a movement than a party," and Cross's suggestion that "pragmatism grew ever stronger in the party." Not all, however, would agree with Young's and Zakuta's claim that the movement in the 1930s was socialist, while the party in the 1950s was closer to being social democratic in nature. Cross, with a more left-wing viewpoint, argues "The CCF had never been a socialist party in the orthodox sense but rather a moderately left-wing social democratic movement. The NDP was created as a liberal party."[28] All, however, would agree that the shift over time has been from the left of the political spectrum to a position further to the right. The starting and ending points differ, but the shift is from left to right and, for most of the authors, the change is for the worse.[29]

To a substantial degree the protest movement becalmed overlaps with another shift in the locus of power in the CCF-NDP--away from the western farmer to the eastern labourer. Note, for example, Hackett's speculation that "...'pragmatic' unionism coincides more closely with the social democratic party than the leftist movement orientation." The protest movement becalmed is also the protest movement "Easternized," as can be seen from statements such as the following: "The new direction in policy...came from the leaders in the East."[30] To what degree these two processes are interrelated and can be analytically separated is not clear. How much one is the cause of the other is also unexplained. Certainly the shift in the ideology from the populist social gospel to that of "unionism" is documented as an example of this evolution.

The protest movement becalmed authors often attempt to suggest two figures who best personify the sociological manifestations of the movement/party dualism. Usually the two individuals chosen as contrasts are J.S. Woodsworth and David Lewis. Cross writes:

> The polarities of the social democratic party were amply illustrated at Ottawa. On the one hand was the revered leader, Woodsworth, who tended to the "education-movement" side of the debate. On the other side was David Lewis. ...David Lewis, the supreme bureaucrat....came to represent the practical, political pole of the party spectrum. Power, for him, was the name of the game.

In contrast to Lewis, adds Young, "...Woodsworth's emphasis was not on power, it was on change."[31] Woodsworth was a prophet;[32] Lewis was a mere politician, it seems.

In any evaluation of the protest movement becalmed literature, three questions ought to be asked. Is the movement/party dichotomy valid? Did the change from movement to party occur and did it occur in the manner suggested by these authors? What impact, if any, did the protest movement becalmed model have?

Turning to the first question, "Is the movement/party dichotomy valid?" one can observe that at least two of the authors, Young and Smart, attempt to qualify the model. Young notes for example that "the distinction between norm-oriented parties and value-oriented movements, like all such typologies, suffers if pressed too hard." Not surprisingly, there is an attempt to broaden the definition of a political party beyond the narrow one of simply seeking power.[33] Young notes that "...it is possible to argue that all parties are ideological...."[34] This enables the author to narrow the distance between the two polar terms--movement and party. Now some of the traits of a movement can be attributed to a political party and thus movement and party need not always be in opposition.[35] Hence, he can assert: "The relationship between the CCF *qua* movement and the CCF *qua* party was close and interdependent....As the argument is pursued it is increasingly difficult to disentangle one from the other, because, of course, the CCF was a *party-movement*." The result is a more complex pattern of relationships than that which the movement/party dualism offers. Young, with his extensive knowledge of the CCF documents, in part acknowledges this failing in the model when he states "The movement and party aspects intermeshed, one aiding the development and aims of the other while at the same time hindering its development and distorting its aim."[36]

Simplicity is a virtue in any theoretical framework. Any model which necessitates extensive qualifications might be best dropped altogether. It is not clear that the data on the CCF fit satisfactorily into the movement/party dualism. One might be better served starting with a more comprehensive definition of a mass political party in which it is accepted that such a party has the following traits: has a mass following, can engage in extraparliamentary activity such as education, and may possess an ideology such as socialism.[37] Utilizing the above in such a way means that one does not need to start juggling two terms--movement and party--to explain events in the CCF. A comprehensive definition of a mass party-- i.e., one variable--will suffice.

The questions "Did the change from movement to party occur?" and "Did it occur in the manner suggested by the protest movement becalmed literature?" are pivotal. If there is nothing from which to change (i.e., if the CCF began largely as a party, not a movement) then much of the protest movement becalmed model falters. Thus, one should begin an investigation by determining to what degree, if at all, the CCF in the 1930s was primarily a political party and not a movement.

The archival evidence, I believe, suggests that the CCF was very much a political party in the 1930s.[38] It was founded as a party precisely to overcome the pitfalls of the protest movements and the quasi-parties of the 1920s.[39] Among those groups which attended the 1932 founding Calgary

Conference were a large number of political parties: the United Farmers of Alberta, the Canadian Labour Party, the Dominion Labour Party, the Independent Labour Party, and the Co-operative Labour Party. In the main, the CCF was a federation of political parties.[40] During these early years, the CCF founders were very clear in their desire to create a political party and much of the intra-party documentation reveals that members frequently referred to the CCF as a party.[41] Such references during this period are usually ignored or downplayed by the protest movement becalmed literature.

One interesting phenomenon occurs in the protest movement becalmed histories. Great emphasis for the 1930s is placed upon the manifestoes and policy statements (i.e., the movement aspect) but little attention is given to the constitution (i.e., the party attribute). Not one of the authors, three of whom utilize full reprints of primary documents, includes a copy of any CCF constitution in his appendices. Here one can see that the model has induced researchers away from important facts about party political structure and "guided" them to place their focus on one aspect of the CCF--its ideology. The 1933 CCF constitution has an entire section (#10) devoted to discipline of deviant members.[42] Yet this feature, very much a trait of a political party, is largely ignored.

While the theme of "iron law of oligarchy" is repeatedly emphasized for the later so-called party-period, stress on the 1930s as a movement-period results in a failure to significantly dwell upon any authoritarian aspects of the CCF during this time. The prime example occurred when J.S. Woodsworth, the "prophet in politics," purged the entire Ontario CCF provincial council in 1934.[43] It is not clear that he had the legal right to pursue such a draconian act.[44] Certainly no equivalent deed was performed by later CCF leaders. Yet, the protest movement becalmed literature dwells on the presence of centralized oligarchic rule for the later period, not the earlier one. Here is another case of the model re-directing authors away from important events in archival sources.

In the attempt to locate personifications of the movement-party dualism, another weakness arises. Woodsworth is repeatedly portrayed as one who encouraged a pluralist and diverse anti-capitalist movement. Yet perusal of CCF documents reveals that in 1935 Woodsworth remarked to M.J. Coldwell that: "I'm not strong on discipline but I think no cause can serve two masters...."[45] The record of a meeting between the CCF and the LSR in 1936 reveals that: "Mr. Woodsworth contended that loyalty to the decisions of the CCF must be disciplined," and "Mr. Woodsworth stressed the need for greater discipline, and, if necessary, expulsion of disloyal members." Woodsworth, having observed at close hand the demise of the Progressives, was firm in his insistence upon building a strong party with some semblance of ideological unity. Communists need not apply for membership in the CCF. In contrast, Lewis at this same 1936 meeting "...thought that the present policy of the C.P. [Communist Party] had a definite appeal, and that if it proved to be genuine, there should be a reconsideration of CCF policy." In response to Woodsworth's suggestion for greater discipline, "Mr. Lewis pointed out the difficulties of such discipline, and its undesirability."[46] In effect, at times the protest movement becalmed model's role expectations for Woodsworth and Lewis are misleading. Only Young, the most meticulous of the researchers on the CCF, is perceptive enough to caution that "Both [radical movement and moderate party] elements were mixed in varying proportions in all the CCF leaders."[47]

The 1930s, the so-called movement era, also saw discussion on the need for ideological moderation and compromise for electoral reasons.[48] In 1934 the Saskatchewan branch of the CCF dropped its radical doctrine of the "use-lease" for farm land.[49] The 1936 joint meeting of the CCF parliamentary caucus and the LSR national executive also discussed the question of altering the wording of the Regina Manifesto. They chose to avoid further action on this thorny issue and instead sought to draw up a completely new "Immediate Programme."[50]

In summary, there is substantial evidence to legitimize the assertion that the CCF was quite clearly a political party and less of a movement even in the 1930s. This provides a basis for noting a considerable degree of continuity in the CCF from the 1930s through to the 1950s. This continuity is often missed by the protest movement becalmed literature. This is not to suggest there was no change. Politics is very much involved with the process of social change. The CCF was no different from any other political entity in this regard. However, to utilize a model which outlines certain types of change may cloud aspects of genuine continuity in the CCF. In this sense, a broader based definition of a political party might aid in providing new empirical insights into the CCF.

In addition to problems of archival documentation ignored by the protest movement becalmed model, a question arises as to whether the data cited by the literature can be explained only by the protest movement becalmed hypothesis. Data may not disprove the movement/party characterization of the CCF, but they need not necessarily confirm it either. Other explanatory hypotheses might be available.

The so-called "iron law of oligarchy" hypothesis can be misleading in that it leads researchers to infer from data conclusions that are not necessarily justified. The "iron law of oligarchy" suggests emphatically that as power is centralized so the power of the local rank and file diminishes. Here power is perceived as a classical zero-sum game. In as much as power is acquired by the party leadership, the general membership loses power. Is this assumption, however, always valid? Is the central party office always parasitic? A CCF report by Harold Winch may provide a partial answer.

> [I]...draw to the attention of the National Office the positive necessity of early action in Nova Scotia to set up proper organizational machinery. As the situation now exists there is actually no real C.C.F. Party. There are only units all over the Province with no central office; no Provincial Organization, no hook-up to other units, or a central body; no one to whom they can turn for advice or encouragement; no body to contact all units; to assist where necessary; no speakers, no organizers....A proper form of organization must immediately be established so as to link the various units into a cohesive whole.[51]

The National Office of the CCF frequently acted as a catalyst for local CCF organizations, particularly in the weaker East, by providing literature, organizational advice, and financial assistance. In this sense a strong central office could act as a positive, not a negative force. It could help to create new local CCF units. As such it would be adding to the power of local CCFers, not diminishing it, since to be scattered and disorganized is to have no power at all. One can, therefore, suggest that in a number of circumstances a plus-sum game seems a more suitable framework than a sinister portrayal of Machiavellian national officers usurping the power away from rank and file members.

Another alternate interpretation of growing centralization of power in the party is to see it less as caused by intra-party developments and to place the cause outside the party in the general environment in which the party operated. It may be very difficult for a party to remain decentralized while the society at large is tending towards centralization. The net effect of world-wide depression and World War II was to increase dramatically the role of the central government. Under such circumstances it is perhaps unrealistic not to expect a corresponding centralization in the sub-sytem (i.e., in the political party).[52]

Environmental influence upon ideology is another area in which one can question the ubiquity of the effects of the "iron law of oligarchy." It is frequently suggested in the protest movement becalmed literature that the party leadership was the major force in toning down the socialist tenets of the Regina Manifesto. There seems to be an assumption in such literature that in a protest movement the ideology should remain as permanent as granite. An ideology, however, is a dynamic entity. No ideology is ever perfectly static. As the socio-economic environment changes, surely it is not unreasonable to expect that the ideology might follow suit.[53] Here one wonders about the Marxists who accept the protest movement becalmed hypothesis and seemingly ignore the socio-economic base/superstructure nexus. The so-called "erosion of ideology" which is noted by all five authors, and which seems to alarm Smart and Cross particularly, is assumed as being permanent. Here the dualism of a linear shift from movement to party may have caused some conceptual over-generalization. The protest movement becalmed literature, while not stating so directly, seems to assume a unilinear direction from a movement to a party. As such the change la Toennies from gemeinschaft to gessellschaft is seemingly irreversible. Without the burden of such a cumbersome dualism, it is possible to perceive that the shift in ideology need not be a permanent and strategic one but can be one of tactics as well.[54] Tactics can be as important to survival as strategy. Whether or not the transformations in the CCF-NDP doctrine are short-term or long-term is not as easy to know as some might suggest.[55] Social scientists do not yet have the capacity to predict the future.

Operating in a culture and polity that are predominantly pro-capitalist, imperialist and anti-socialist, left-wing parties such as the CCF-NDP may have to respond at times with defensive tactics and strategy during the "long march" to power.[56] Not to do so could mean the decimation of a socialist movement. As Larry Zolf so aptly states: "Despite the Hartzian 'fragment' theories of Gad Horowitz, there was no historical inevitability about the continued existence of socialism on Canadian soil; no more historical inevitability than, say, the continued existence of liberalism on British soil."[57] To this one might add the more germane example of the Socialist Party in the United States.

In 1945 the federal CCF declined after having once led, albeit briefly, in the national public opinion polls two years earlier. While the shift to welfare liberalism by Mackenzie King's Liberal party has frequently been cited as the key factor in the decline of the CCF's electoral fortunes, increasing archival evidence suggests that a much underemphasized factor in the loss of CCF public support was a massive barrage of anti-socialist (i.e., anti-CCF) propaganda.[58] Led by authors such as B.A. Trestrail and Gladstone Murray, this scurrilous propaganda was successful in part because of its ability to draw on the frightening language of a few polemical CCF figures (such as Harold Winch). Given the anti-left bias of the press in Canada at the time, such statements by a few prominent CCFers were quickly distorted as being representative of the party as a whole and given a prominent place in editorials hostile to the CCF.[59]

CCFers badly bruised from previous anti-socialist campaigns, not surprisingly, analyzed the 1950s somewhat cautiously. The postwar depression had not materialized. The 1950s was clearly a boom period for American and Canadian capitalism. Unemployment in Canada had gone from a record high 19.3 percent in 1933 to 3.4 percent in 1956.[60] It would have been extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the CCF to survive in any meaningful sense as a political organization without moving CCF doctrine to a position less harsh, less pessimistic, and less sweeping in its denunciations of capitalism. This was after all the age of Cold War hysteria and bipolar confrontations. This shift can be perceived as either a strategic retreat or a tactical withdrawal. In as much as no resurgence of more radical, uncompromising doctrine occurred during later more positive circumstances, policy change can be seen as a strategic shift. In as much as radical doctrines resurfaced within the party in less difficult times, the shift should be labelled tactical.[61] The emergence of the Waffle in the NDP during the less restrictive 1960s and 1970s suggests that in some ways the party's alteration of its ideology need not be irreversible[62] and may in the long run be considered, therefore, as tactical moves.

Some of the effects of the protest movement becalmed model have already been noted. It should also be evident that the protest movement becalmed literature has implications that go beyond a simple descriptive account of the CCF-NDP. The literature often has an implicit, if not explicit, value judgement that the movement is morally superior to the party. The movement reflects the force of good, the party that of evil.[63] Strong evaluations frequently emerge from the movement/party dichotomy. Cross, for example, outlines the "decline and fall of a good idea" (i.e., social democracy betrayed). His portrayal is, of course, complete with quislings, class collaborators, and malevolent Machiavellian figures. This is the basis upon which morality plays are written and in which there is a complete cast of characters representing good and evil.[64] We are all fans of morality plays. Indeed, we may need them at times.[65] Who has not felt the cathartic release of tension by watching a Greek tragedy? A Greek tragedy, however, Canadian history and politics need not be! We need fewer caricatures, shibboleths, and would-be theologians.

Part of the reason for such a heavy reliance on a good/bad dichotomization of the movement/party phenomenon in the literature on the CCF-NDP is the insufficient attention devoted to the general theoretical literature on political parties. It is interesting to note, for example, that the authors who subscribe to the protest movement becalmed thesis do not cite the relevant literature on party development in modernizing societies.[66] Had they done so, they would have observed that much of this literature suggests that the formation or institutionalization[67] of political parties is seen as being essential for political development. The alternative is mal-integration, instability, and the long term decline of democratic political structures.[68] Political parties, in short, need not be the antithesis of democracy as seems to be the suggestion of the protest movement becalmed literature.

No overall conclusion would be complete without some estimation of the effect, if any, the protest movement becalmed literature has had upon the CCF-NDP itself. Any discussion of this sort must of necessity be highly speculative and controversial but still perhaps useful in provoking thought. The historian and political scientist cannot be unobtrusive. The academic, whether by intent or not, is an activist in so much as his writings do influence people's thoughts and behaviour. This is particularly evident in the fact that most CCF-NDPers have relied on academics for a history of their party.

The protest movement becalmed literature has dwelt extensively on the theme of the "iron law of oligarchy." While difficult to estimate, it seems likely that use of this anti-"party establishment" theme has had an effect upon the NDP. Many rank and file NDPers exhibit an attitude of cynicism, despair, and fatalism on organizational matters. How much of this is induced by models of "us" versus "them" in intra-party affairs? In as much as academics' writings accentuate the separation of party leadership from its members and infuse a greater sense of mistrust into party affairs,[69] academics are influencing the political process. Social scientists, for the most part middle class in lifestyle and thought, may be in a biased position and too quick to raise the spectre of the alleged authoritarianism of the working class and parties such as the CCF-NDP. A party of the weak and the "have-nots" may lack the organizational finesse and public relations techniques of more affluent and high status-based organizations. Underfunding and lack of sufficient full-time, paid, professional staff may create communications difficulties. The academic should not be mesmerized by style over substance. The onus on the scholar is to go beyond the mere appearances of oft-repeated phrases and to analyse carefully. Less simplistic, repetitive, and one-sided party histories might foster, albeit perhaps in a very small way, a further step in the path to the diversification and democratization of Canadian culture.

The purpose of this essay has been to present a case for a better balance in the historiography of the CCF-NDP.[70] The protest movement becalmed framework can be a useful one. It should not, however, be belaboured.[71] The "iron law of oligarchy" should not become a fetish. Any analytical model has advantages and disadvantages. The protest movement becalmed authors have repeatedly stressed the advantages of their model. This essay has sought to outline some of the disadvantages.

There is still a great deal of fruitful work that can be done on the CCF. More frequent use of alternative hypotheses, I believe, would hasten such research. The historiography of the CCF-NDP is at a watershed. The NDP papers are now available for careful scrutiny by academics.[72] A definitive work on the NDP, as meticulous in archival research as Walter Young's *Anatomy of a Party* is for the CCF, is yet to be written. It is my hope that the theoretical frameworks used in such future writings will match the excellence of the data collection that we have sometimes seen in the past.

NOTES

1 This paper is a preliminary portion of a larger study on the CCF-NDP. The conclusions are based on four years of archival research of the documents on the party from a variety of national and regional archives. I would like to thank the following for their helpful comments over the past several years: David Lewis, Ian McClymont, David Walden and John Smart. I hope the latter will forgive me as a friend for some of my comments made as an academic. I thank the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council for funding. An early version of this paper was presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 2-4 June, 1980.

2 Note, for example, these works written on either the CCF or NDP: Ivan Avakumovic, *Socialism in Canada* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1978); Gerald L. Caplan, *The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism: The CCF in Ontario* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973); Gerald L. Caplan, "The Failure of Canadian Socialism: The Ontario Experience, 1932-1945" in S.D. Clark, J.P. Grayson, and L.M. Grayson, eds., *Prophecy and Protest: Social Movements in Twentieth-Century Canada* (Toronto: Gage, 1975); Michael Cross, *The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea* (Toronto: New Hogtown, 1974); Michiel Horn, *The League for Social Reconstruction: Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada, 1930-1942* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980); Gad Horowitz, *Canadian Labour in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1968); Lorne Kavic and Garry Nixon, *The 1200 Days* (Coquitlam: Kaen, 1978); Stanley Knowles, *The New Party* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1961); Seymour Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation in Saskatchewan* (Berkeley: University of California, 1950; rev. ed. 1971); Dean E. McHenry, *The Third Force in Canada: The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, 1932-1948* (Berkeley: University of California, 1950); Desmond Morton, *NDP: The Dream of Power* (Toronto: Hakkert, 1974); Norman Penner, *The Canadian Left: A Critical Analysis* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1977); Walter Young, *The Anatomy of a Party: The National CCF, 1932-61* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969); Leo Zakuta, *A Protest Movement Becalmed: A Study of Change in the CCF* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1964).

To this list one can add the substantial number of biographies and autobiographies: Th r se Casgrain, *A Woman in a Man's World* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1972); Maurice Hodgson, *Squire of Kootenay West* (Saanichton: Hancock House, 1976); David Lewis, *The Good Fight: Political Memoirs, 1909-1958* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981);

Diane Lloyd, *Woodrow: A Biography of W.S. Lloyd* (Woodrow Lloyd Memorial Fund, 1979); Anthony Mardiros, *William Irvine: The Life of a Prairie Radical* (Toronto: Lorimer, 1979); Grace MacInnis, *J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1953); Kenneth McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics: A Biography of J.S.Woodsworth* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959); Doris Shackleton, *Tommy Douglas* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1975); Dorothy Steeves, *The Compassionate Rabel: Ernest E. Winch and His Times* (Vancouver: Evergreen, 1960); Margaret Stewart and Doris French, *Ask No Quarter: A Biography of Agnes Macphail* (Toronto: Longmans, 1959); Lloyd Stinson, *Political Warriors* (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1975); Lewis Thomas, ed., *The Making of a Socialist: The Recollections of T.C. Douglas* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1982); Susan Mann Trofimenkoff, *Stanley Knowles: The Man From Winnipeg North Centre* (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1982); J.F.C.Wright, *The Louise Lucas Story* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1965); Olive Ziegler, *Woodsworth: Social Pioneer* (Toronto: Ontario Publishing, 1934).

3 Smart's article may be found in Robert Laxer, ed., *Canada Ltd.* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973); Hackett's is published in Hugh Thorburn, ed., *Party Politics in Canada* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 4th ed., 1979). A far longer publication on the NDP is his "Pie in the Sky: A History of the Ontario Waffle," *Canadian Dimension*, October-November 1980, special edition.

Examples of other publications which employ or refer to this theme but which are not discussed at length in this paper include the following: N.H. Chi and George Perlin, "The New Democratic Party: A Party in Transition" in Thorburn, *Party Politics in Canada* (4th ed.); Ronald Landes, *The Canadian Polity* (Scarborough: Prentice-Hall, 1983), pp. 263-64; Jo Surich, "Purists and Pragmatists: Canadian Democratic Socialism At the Crossroads" in Howard Penniman, ed., *Canada At the Polls: The General Election of 1974* (Washington: American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 1975), p. 132; Errol Black, "What's Left? The NDP After Regina," *Canadian Dimension*, November 1983, pp. 14, 16.

One does not wish to suggest that any single author asserts every proposition. What is of interest here is the general pattern of propositions, not the arguments of a single author. Individual authors are of interest primarily in so far as they reflect general patterns of historiography.

4 Young, p. 3. One wonders where the communists fit into such a sharp dichotomization.

5 Ibid., p. 11. See also Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP," p. 188.

6 This definition is taken from Wendell King, *Social Movements in the United States* (New York: Random House, 1956), p. 27. For a more recent general theoretical analysis of social movements, see Paul Wilkinson, *Social Movement* (London: Macmillan, 1971), particularly p. 27 in which he outlines the three "quintessential characteristics of social movements" involving (1) a deliberate collective endeavour to promote change; (2) based on a conscious volition and active participation of members, and (3) including a certain degree of organization. The latter trait is important for without it there is a tendency to ignore the organizational aspect of movements and thereby permit an easier contrast to that of the political party.

7 Young, p. 4. This definition resembles the more general and satisfactory one by Joseph LaPolambara, "...a formal organization whose self-conscious, primary purpose is to place and maintain in public office persons who will control...the machinery of government." (*Politics Within Nations* [Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1974] p. 509.)

8 The policy emphasis in the definition of political parties can be seen in Alfred de Grazia's description "...a *party* is a group framing general issues and putting forward candidates in elections." (Section on "Party" in Julius Gould and William Kolb, eds., *A Dictionary of the Social Sciences* [New York: Free Press, 1964] p. 509.) My own preference for a party such as the CCF-NDP is for the following definition: "A group of individuals acting collectively within some *organizational* framework for the purpose of winning political offices with a view toward changing public *policy*." (Leon Blevins, *The Young Voter's Manual* Tottawa: Littlefield, Adams, 1974], p. 129.)

9 See, for example, Young, pp. 6, 9, 116, 302. See also Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP," pp. 188, 190.

10 Zakuta, p. 70 (emphasis in original).

11 Young, p. 3; Smart, p. 204.

12 Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP," p. 190 (emphasis in original). See also his remark that "...key points of contention include whether the CCF-NDP should be primarily a socialist movement or an electoral party ...." ("Pie in the Sky," p. 14); Young, pp. 6, 3; Smart, p. 206.

13 Smart, pp. 204-205.

14 Young, p. 140; Smart, p. 204. The movement period which supposedly characterizes early socialist attempts at self-help seems to be the socialist equivalent of Rousseau's state of nature in which harmony and justice prevail at least within the movement.

15 Smart, p. 205; Young, pp. 67, 156; Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict in the NDP," pp. 189, 193.

Here Walter Young differs from the other four protest movement becalmed authors discussed in this paper. Young at times qualifies his criticism of the "oligarchy" by suggesting it is a benevolent one; the others suggest it is malevolent.

16 Young, p. 4. As early as 1956 Fred Englemann suggests this theme in the following passage: "In addition to their dominant role in the initiation of policy, C.C.F. leaders show a tendency to perpetuate themselves." ("Membership Participation in Policy-Making in the C.C.F.," Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, XXII, 2 [May, 1956], p. 168.)

17 Young, pp. 168, 163.

18 Ibid., pp. 169, 238; Cross, p. 14. It should be noted that since their time frames differ, Young refers to the CCF and Cross to the NDP.

19 Zakuta, p. 53. Here the literature on the close bonds created in communist party cells is germane. See, for example, Maurice Duverger, Political Parties (New York: Wiley and Sons, 1963), and James Townsend, Political Participation in Communist China (Berkeley: University of California, 1969).

20 Cross, p. 13; Zakuta, pp. 62, 70.

21 Ferdinand Toennies, Community and Society (New York: Harper and Row, 1963).

22 Zakuta, pp. 70, 109. See Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons (New York: Free Press, 1964), pp. 358-72, for an elucidation of the concept of charisma.

23 For Hackett of course "...in contrast to the Waffle's insistence on a 'movement' organization, other New Democrats tended to be more concerned with the party's [sic] electoral fortunes." ("The Waffle Conflict in the NDP," p. 192.)

24 Young, p. 4. Note that he chooses the evaluative term "ideals" not the more neutral term "ideas".

25 Smart, p. 210. See Cross, p. 17, for a similar comment.

26 Young, pp. 3-4; Cross, p. 10; Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict," p. 201.

27 Young, pp. 3, 58.

28 Ibid., p. 9; Cross, p. 11; Young, p. 11.

29 This is clearly the conclusion of Hackett, Cross, Smart, and Zakuta. Young's attitude is less clear-cut. He seems generally to favour the change but occasionally looks upon the early CCF years with a somewhat nostalgic perspective. Note, for example, "the New Democratic Party, successor to the CCF, is less democratic than the CCF because it is much less a movement than the CCF." (p. 175.)

30 Hackett, "The Waffle Conflict," p. 202 (emphasis in original); Young, p. 124.

31 Cross, pp. 10, 16; Young, p. 10.

32 McNaught, passim.

33 Young, p. 11. This is one of Lorne Brown's criticisms of *The Anatomy of a Party* in his lengthy review in *Canadian Dimension*, April-May 1970, p. 40.

34 Young, p. 39.

35 This is the essence of Smart's comment that "Young insists on posing the two aspects as necessarily opposite and at war by definition whereas the two are complementary in a parliamentary system." (p. 204.) Smart, in fact, is inaccurate in his characterization of Young.

36 Young, pp. 301-302 (emphasis in original). See also his comments "The party-movement both gains and loses because of the combination....The relationship between the two is both beneficial and corrosive." (p. 7) and "The movement may hinder the party; it may also keep it alive." (p. 6) [emphasis in original].

37 Maurice Duverger, passim. For an example of two innovative case studies on such parties see Richard Crossman, ed., *The God That Failed* (New York: Bantam, 1965) and Robert Lifton, *Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism* (New York: Norton, 1963).

38 On this I agree with P. Sinclair who writes "The history of the CCF [in Saskatchewan] is best understood by emphasizing that it was more a political party than a social movement." ("The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism," *Canadian Historical Review*, LIV, 4 [December, 1973], p. 419.)

39 See W.L. Morton, *The Progressive Party in Canada* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1967).

40 Actually initially it was closer to being a confederation of parties.

41 For example, note the following resolution passed at the 1933 Convention: "Therefore be it resolved that all C.C.F. representatives...in no way enter into collusion with the other [*sic*] political parties...." (Public Archives of Canada [PAC], CCF Records, volume 1, file 1.) A letter from Woodsworth to Coldwell, dated 28 September 1935 states "I am not strong on discipline but I think no cause can serve two masters....Otherwise our Party [*sic*] at Ottawa will be seriously encumbered--..." (*Ibid.*, volume 107, file 1.) See also Underhill's "Mr. Good's Political Philosophy," *Canadian Forum*, August 1933, reprinted in W.C. Good, *Farmer Citizen* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1958) pp. 186-88.

42 PAC, CCF Records, volume 1, file 10, "A Constitution of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation," Regina, 1933, p. 3.

43 See Caplan, *Dilemma of Canadian Socialism*, Chapter 4.

44 David Lewis notes "It was done, of course, in consultation with the National Executive, but the decision was made without express constitutional authority." (*The Good Fight*, p. 125.) Even Woodsworth described the decision being taken by "...available members of the C.C.F. Executive here in Ottawa...." (PAC, CCF Records, volume 107, J.S. Woodsworth to N. Priestley, 6 March 1934.)

45 PAC, CCF Records, volume 107, file 1, J.S. Woodsworth to M.J. Coldwell, 28 September 1935.

46 Ibid., volume 168, file 7, "Confidential Report. Summary of Discussions Between CCF Parliamentary Group and the L.S.R. National Executive," 28 March 1936, pp. 11-12 (emphasis in original).

47 Young, p. 116.

48 George Hoffman makes a similar point regarding the Saskatchewan CCF. See "The Saskatchewan Farmer-Labor Party, 1932-1934: How Radical Was It At Its Origin?" Saskatchewan History, XXVIII, 2 (Spring, 1975), pp. 52-64; and "The Entry of the United Farmers of Canada, Saskatchewan Section into Politics: A Reassessment," Saskatchewan History, XXX, 3 (Autumn, 1977), pp. 99-109.

49 See Lipset, Agrarian Socialism for a discussion of the term "use-lease."

50 PAC, CCF Records, "Confidential Report," p. 2.

51 Ibid., volume 106, file 5, report by Harold Winch (emphasis in original).

52 Joseph Levitt has made a similar point about the CCF success in the 1940s as contrasted to CCF failures in the 1930s. He has suggested the cause need not lie in internal changes in the CCF but rather in a shift in the environment. The war clearly outlined that central government planning and deficit financing were feasible. (Private interview with author, 1978.)

53 Even J.S. Woodsworth at the Regina Convention in 1933 advised the newly created CCF: "We do not believe in unchanging social dogma. Society is not static. Knowledge grows, and each age must work out a new and higher synthesis. Such growing knowledge is dependent upon experience and action. Each new development, each new member of our organization should mean a fuller content in our body of Socialist doctrine." ("President's Address" in Edith Fowke, ed., Towards Socialism: Selections From the Writings of J.S. Woodsworth [Toronto: Ontario Woodsworth Memorial Foundation, 1948], p. 39.)

54 Perhaps the Greek notion of cyclical rather than the Judeo-Christian notion of linear change might be useful to academics studying the CCF.

55 For example, one could well imagine party doctrine taking a more radical slant should the Canadian economy continue to falter. In this sense there is nothing inevitable about consensus politics or the "end of ideology." See Charles Taylor, The Pattern of Politics (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1970), Chapter 1.

56 The analogy to Mao Tse-tung is deliberate to reiterate that it is important for a progressive party to correctly analyze the objective conditions. At some point tactical retreat may be the only alternative to annihilation. This is no less true for a democratic socialist party than it is for a guerrilla army.

57 Larry Zolf, Dance of the Dialectic (Toronto: Lewis and Samuel, 1973), p. 63.

58 See, for example, PAC, CCF Records, volume 361, "Anti-CCF Propaganda File"; George Drew Papers, volume 96, file 928 and volume 130, file 1317. See also Chapters 12 and 14 of David Lewis's The Good Fight and David Walden "'When Monopoly Capital Took Fright...': the Anti-CCF Campaign of 1943-45" (paper presented to the annual meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, Montreal, 2-4 June 1980).

59 It is this author's conviction that whenever a socialist party appears on the brink of power, extensive anti-socialist campaigns, employing a variety of legal and illegal means, will emerge. The Ontario provincial election of 1977 in many ways was reminiscent of the 1945 election in terms of its rationale, means employed, and its apparent success in thwarting socialism.

60 Robert Sterling and Denise Kouri, "Unemployment Indexes--The Canadian Context" in John Fry, ed., Economy, Class and Social Reality (Toronto: Butterworth, 1979), p. 174.

61 Please note that it may be labelled tactical for the history of a party as a whole even though individual party members might see and defend the shift as one of strategy.

62 One party member once suggested "A protest movement cannot be becalmed. It may lose direction and focus, but the protest, the alienation, and the sense of injustice about the structural inequality and violence of capitalism cannot be destroyed. It simply forms into smaller pockets of discontent. The protest, to continue the analogy, is simply redirected into local squalls that will at a later date, during a future crisis of capitalism, re-emerge reunited with greater force."

63 Zakuta notes the tendency of Michels's Political Parties to have "an excessive flavour of disenchantment and of exposé" (p. 142), but paradoxically fails to observe it in his own writings.

64 Presumably the dedicated rank and file socialist members of the movement reflect the good. The corrupt party officialdom eager to compromise with capitalism, private property, and imperialism in order to gain power reflect the evil. On the dust cover of The Decline and Fall of a Good Idea, for example, David Lewis is portrayed as smiling mischievously as the prospect of achieving socialism diminishes.

65 Charles Osgood in The Measurement of Meaning (Urbana: University of Illinois, 1957) outlines the very strong tendency for people to utilize in their language good/bad dichotomies. The protest movement becalmed is just one such specific example of this general phenomenon. See also Charles Osgood, "From Yang and Yin To and Or But In Cross Cultural Perspective," International Journal of Psychology, 14, 1 (1979), pp. 1-35.

66 It should be noted that for the most part all societies are modernizing societies.

67 Zakuta does occasionally use the term "institutionalization" as, for example, in this passage: "'It [the CCF] simply went the way of all organizations.' In technical language, it became institutionalized." (p. 141.)

68 See for example Joseph LaPalombara and Myron Weiner, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton: Princeton University, 1966), p. 405, and Samuel Huntington, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven: Yale, 1968).

69 For a similar comment on this group of writers, Epstein offers the following: "... he [Michels] belongs to that substantial and once apparently dominant scholarly tradition that approached parties in an adversely critical if not destructive spirit." (Leon Epstein, "Political Parties" in Handbook of Political Science, Vol. 4, [Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975], p. 238.)

70 This is a plea echoed by George Hoffman and Lewis Thomas in their writings on Saskatchewan's history. (L.H. Thomas, "The CCF Victory in Saskatchewan, 1944," Saskatchewan History, XXXIV, 1 [Winter, 1981], pp. 1-16.) Already, there are signs that this may be occurring. Penner's The Canadian Left, Horn's The League for Social Reconstruction, and Lewis's The Good Fight give hope that a new generation of scholarship will be more varied in the themes pursued.

71 I am particularly concerned about works on the CCF-NDP which, instead of conducting original archival research, rely too heavily on secondary sources. The result is that these authors' writings are less tempered by historical reality. As time has passed, the protest movement becalmed writings have become more inbred and, not surprisingly, they have increased in their polemical tone.

[72] The would-be researcher is advised to consult Ann Scotton, ed., Bibliography of All Sources Relating to the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation and the New Democratic Party in Canada (n.p., Woodsworth Archives, 1977) and Peter Weinrich, Social Protest From the Left in Canada 1870-1970: A Bibliography (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1982).

The LSR, the CCF, and the Regina Manifesto

Michiel Horn

On 19 July 1933 the national convention of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation opened in Regina. Surrounded by delegates from farmer and labour parties and from CCF Clubs were four academics from central Canada: Eugene Forsey, King Gordon, Joe Parkinson and Frank Scott. They had arrived in time for the National Council meeting which had begun on 16 July. Although none of them was a member of the Council, they had received a special invitation to discuss the draft manifesto and programme for the year-old political party. This invitation made good sense: an organization of which they were prominent members, the League for Social Reconstruction, had been in charge of drafting the document.

Three of the academics were from Montreal. The ebullient Forsey was a lecturer in political economy at McGill University; Scott taught law there. Gordon was professor of Christian Ethics at United Theological College, but he was under notice of dismissal. The grounds were ostensibly budgetary, but many thought that Gordon's outspoken socialism had made him unacceptable to the College's governing board. All three were attending the convention as representatives of the Montreal CCF Council, for the LSR had no status in the CCF. The fourth man, Parkinson, a University of Toronto economist, was at the meetings in no official capacity. His invitation to participate came directly from the CCF leader, J.S. Woodsworth, who had spoken with him at a YMCA meeting in Kenora, Ontario, and had urged him to come to Regina.

The four men had enjoyed the warm welcome they had received at the Council meeting. Now they found to their delight that the convention as a whole also treated them with respect and appreciation. When they spoke on various points of the manifesto or, as Scott did, on the future prospects of the CCF, the other delegates listened with obvious attention. Their contribution to the new party proved more than acceptable! On the last day of the convention they heard with pleasure George Williams, a National Council member from Saskatchewan, say: "...The core of this manifesto is largely the work of a group of eastern university professors...."[1] With even greater pleasure they listened to the applause that followed.

I

How did the four professors come to play such a prominent role in Regina in 1933? What was the significance of their contribution? To answer these questions it is necessary to turn to the national leader of the CCF, James Shaver Woodsworth, and to the organization of which he was the honorary national president from 1932 until 1942, the League for Social Reconstruction.

Woodsworth, in Parliament since 1921, hoped throughout the 1920s that something like the Fabian Society might take shape in Canada. In this way, he thought, educated Canadians might assist him and other pro-labour legislators in Ottawa and the provincial capitals, supplying them with information and expert counsel.[2] Typical was his approach in April 1929 to the University of Toronto historian Frank Underhill. The latter had written an article in the *Canadian Forum* critical of the low level of political discussion in Canada. Might not some persons follow Underhill in forming an organization committed to raising the level of discussion and drawing up proposals for change, Woodsworth asked?[3]

Woodsworth had to wait a couple of years before he heard an answer he liked. The crash of the stock and commodity markets in October 1929 intervened. By the spring of 1930 the economy was clearly in a deepening slump. In the autumn a small group of "radically-minded professors" began to meet in Toronto under Frank Underhill's chairmanship. One of them was the Vancouver-born economist Harry Cassidy, who wrote Woodsworth in May 1931 that a few economists at the University of Toronto might soon be of use to the "ginger group" of Labour and Farmer MPs in Ottawa.[4] This was no doubt music to the politician's ears.

The months that followed would bring Woodsworth further pleasant surprises. Indeed, the winter of 1931-32 witnessed the formation of very much the sort of group that he had desired for years. Of crucial importance in the process of forming the LSR was the meeting in August 1931 of Underhill and Frank Scott. The latter, recently turned thirty-two, listened avidly as the historian, ten years older, stressed the need for an organization of intellectuals that could offer guidance to the new radical political party that Underhill believed would soon arise. The party, which he thought would be based on agrarian and labour organizations, would need a coherent platform in order to prevent it from fading away in the manner of the Progressive party in the 1920s. Scott agreed that the time was ripe for a Canadian Fabian Society.

That autumn the meetings took place in Toronto and Montreal which prompted the completion of a manifesto and the formation of the LSR in Toronto as an organization committed to political education and social change in late January 1932. The first national executive consisted of Eric Havelock, a classicist at Victoria College, King Gordon, Joe Parkinson, Scott, Underhill (the national president) and Isabel Thomas, a Toronto high school English teacher, who became secretary-treasurer. Woodsworth accepted with delight the position of honorary president.[5]

Membership grew rapidly, and by the end of 1932 there were branches in seventeen cities and towns, from Montreal to Vancouver and Victoria, and including Ottawa, Toronto, Winnipeg, Regina, Calgary, and Edmonton. Total membership was less than one thousand, the bulk of these from the employed middle class. However, the LSR's founders felt greatly heartened as they met in Toronto for the League's annual convention in January 1933.

At that meeting the delegates argued a question that had not presented itself a year before. Should they affiliate themselves with a political party, the CCF? It had taken shape during the summer of 1932. No one from the LSR, save Woodsworth himself, attended the meeting in the office of William Irvine, MP, where the "co-operating independent" Members of Parliament decided to form a "Commonwealth Party."[6] By the time the party met in Calgary in early August to acquire a name, a provisional national council, and an eight-point programme, there was considerable LSR interest. A few members of the League's Calgary, Edmonton, and Vancouver branches attended the Calgary convention as observers. When a Calgary member asked what role the LSR might play in the CCF, however, Woodsworth replied that "it was a matter of established League policy that it should not, as an organization, participate in politics."[7]

Woodsworth was right. The LSR was founded as a nonpartisan body. A suggestion that it might itself "create a new party," which appeared in an early draft of the LSR manifesto, was quickly deleted. "The League would seriously handicap its political usefulness if it were to affiliate itself directly with any political party at the present time," Frank Scott wrote to an inquirer in April 1932. Frank Underhill, in announcing the formation of the LSR in the pages of the Canadian Forum, wrote that it was intended to appeal to "those unattached critical spirits who find no haven in either of the two national parties, and whose circumstances do not make it possible for them to join Labour or Farmer political movements."[8] In any case, the LSR's educational goals would benefit from political independence.

Underhill was probably the first of the LSR's founding fathers to change his mind. Before the summer of 1932 was out he was eager to link the LSR formally to the CCF. He saw it as the new party whose coming he had predicted to Scott the year before. In order to be able to guide it the LSR should take a place within it.

Others were not sure. In reply to Underhill's urging that the LSR declare itself, Scott wrote about the CCF: "This seems like the long looked-for article, and therefore I agree that the LSR should help it as much as possible. I am doubtful whether any sort of official connection should be established, however. At present I rather favour keeping the LSR at its educational job alone." Gordon and Parkinson agreed with him. So did Woodsworth. When Underhill informed him that some members in Toronto wanted to affiliate the LSR branch there with the provincial CCF, Woodsworth objected: "If one Local went in, others would have to bear the brunt of any criticism. This would almost inevitably mean that the Ottawa Local, which is composed in part of Civil Service people, would have to drop out, and also that probably a number of members in Winnipeg, Calgary and Vancouver would have to resign as they went in on the understanding that this was to be primarily an educational organization. Would the formal affiliation compensate for the loss of such groups?"[9] He thought not.

Later in 1932, moreover, Woodsworth devised a means whereby middle class people of the kind who typically belonged to the LSR, and whom the League sought to attract in larger numbers, could join the CCF. He proposed that a third type of organization be formed that could affiliate with the CCF alongside farmer and labour movements. This suggestion led to the formation of the CCF Clubs which by the end of 1932 were cropping up all over Ontario. Within a year they became the largest component of the Ontario CCF while spreading to the other provinces as well.[10] Any compelling reason for the LSR to affiliate with the CCF vanished with the appearance of the Clubs, a process in which Underhill and Eric Havelock were active.

Nevertheless, Underhill and others continued to push for affiliation, and made it the major item on the agenda for the 1933 LSR convention. Two delegates from Toronto moved and seconded a resolution calling for affiliation with the CCF at the national level "as a non-political organization pledged to carry on Socialist education and propaganda." The ensuing debate was not only about affiliation but about the use of the term "socialist," one that the LSR had so far avoided in order not to scare off potential members.

Opposition to the motion was particularly strong among the delegates from Montreal. They still hoped to draw in French Canadian members--so far these were extremely rare--and feared that the resolution would make this all but impossible. They disliked the use of the word "socialist" even more than they did affiliation: they knew that socialism was close to anathema to Roman Catholics in Quebec.

After long debate two motions passed. The first was unanimous: it welcomed the CCF and expressed willingness to co-operate with it insofar as it was consistent with the LSR's educational purposes. The second passed by the margin of eleven to nine: "Resolved that the National Executive of the LSR apply to the National Executive of the CCF to be allowed to affiliate with the CCF as an educational organization, pledged to the League's policy of social reconstruction, this resolution to be ratified by twelve of the existing branches within five weeks after receiving the resolution."[11] For the time being the controversial word "socialist" had been avoided.

The motion went down to defeat because the requisite twelve branches did not ratify it. Because of this the Toronto branch executive in April 1933 turned down an invitation from the Toronto Labour Conference through it to affiliate with the Ontario CCF.[12] On the west coast, however, the LSR branches decided to join the British Columbia CCF. In the early spring they reconstituted themselves into the Reconstruction Party (B.C.), and chose an Anglican clergyman from Victoria, Rev. Robert Connell, as their leader. The group then applied for and gained entry into the CCF, despite misgivings on the part of some of the members of the neo-Marxist Socialist Party of Canada (SPC). These had little respect for the ideas of the *petit bourgeois* Reconstructionists. For the next three years relations within the British Columbia CCF were often strained, not least because after the 1933 provincial election Connell was chosen House Leader over the left wing's favourite son, Ernest Winch. The alliance limped along until 1936, however, when a split between the Connell and Winch factions tore the provincial CCF apart.[13]

II

Woodsworth believed in 1932 that it would be inexpedient for the LSR to affiliate with the CCF. He also believed, however, that the League could render important service to the party by giving it expert advice and, more immediately, by drafting a permanent manifesto and programme for it. The eight-point programme adopted at Calgary was provisional only. The LSR seemed to Woodsworth the perfect body to provide a permanent document. In October 1932 he made this suggestion to Underhill and Scott, who accepted with alacrity. Woodsworth then persuaded the other members of the CCF's provisional National Council of the wisdom of his choice, and in late January 1933 an official invitation to prepare a draft of a permanent programme, "based on the eight points passed at the August 1932 Conference," reached the LSR executive and the research committee that it had established.[14]

Not until well into June did anybody in the LSR start drafting anything. Underhill had assumed primary responsibility, but only after he and his family had arrived at a rented cottage on Lake Rosseau, 150 kilometers north of Toronto, did he actually begin. We must assume that he had a copy of the Calgary Programme available to him, but the document he used as a basis of his work was the LSR's own ten-point manifesto. He wrote and corrected a draft, typed up the corrected version, and returned to Toronto shortly after Dominion Day to meet with several collaborators. On a warm and humid evening he, Harry Cassidy, Escott Reid, a political scientist who was national secretary of the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, and possibly Joe Parkinson went over the draft. Drinking lukewarm beer--the Underhill refrigerator had been disconnected for the summer --the men went over the document clause by clause. A further meeting was necessary the following day in order to approve changes that Cassidy had made in Underhill's clauses on a labour code and state medicine. Underhill then retyped the document, consisting of a preamble and twelve clauses, sent copies of it to Gordon, Scott and Woodsworth, and returned to Lake Rosseau.[15]

Gordon, Parkinson, and Eugene Forsey were all participants in a conference on politics held by the Winnipeg YMCA at the Lake of the Woods during the second week of July. They discussed the draft that Gordon had received, but made only cosmetic changes to it. Scott saw no reason to change what Underhill had sent him; neither did Woodsworth. To Underhill the latter wrote: "[I] can only hope that the convention will adopt this carefully thought-out statement rather than attempting to throw in a lot of half-baked suggestions."[16]

With the convention scheduled to begin on Wednesday, July 19, the provisional National Council gathered on the preceding Sunday. A detailed consideration of Underhill's draft began on Monday with Forsey, Gordon, Parkinson, and Scott in attendance and having full right to speak. Adopted without significant changes were the preamble and the clauses on "Planning," "External Trade," and "Socialized Health Services." At the other extreme, the clauses on "Taxation" and the "Emergency Programme" were rejected in their entirety. Adopted with more or less significant redrafting were the clauses on "Finance," "Social Ownership," "Labour Code," "B.N.A. Act," "External Relations," and one called "Freedom." Underhill's clause on "Agriculture" underwent major change. The four academics took an important role in all redrafting.

On 19 July the National Council approved the amended document and voted thanks to "...the group of the League for Social Reconstruction which has spent so much time and thought and produced in the Programme and Manifesto now before us, so fine and valuable a document."[17] On the floor of the convention this gratitude was not universally shared, however. W.C. Good of the United Farmers of Ontario was not alone among agrarian representatives in believing the document to be too socialist. Moreover, Good deplored the CCF's abandonment of the idea of group government, dear to many of the organized farmers during the previous fifteen years.[18] Some of the left wingers among the delegates, on the other hand, notably those from British Columbia and Ontario, thought that the document was too "revisionist" and vigorously fought the undertaking to recompense the expropriated owners of socialized industries. The United Farmer representatives insisted on compensation with equal vigour. In the end, sustained by the votes from CCF Club delegates against attacks from the left and right, the manifesto passed very largely in the form approved by the National Council. The only major change was the addition of a clause on "Social Justice" which dealt with legal and penal reform. Drafted by Lewis St. G. Stubbs, who as a Winnipeg judge had often shown his sympathy for the underdog, it was adopted on the motion of D.M. LeBourdais, chairman of the Ontario CCF Clubs, and Stubbs himself.[19]

As two of Underhill's drafts of the manifesto are available,[20] it is possible to say with confidence that even in its final form the Regina Manifesto was largely an adaptation and elaboration of the manifesto the LSR had adopted early in 1932. There is a shared sensibility between the Underhill drafts and the Calgary Programme. However, a textual comparison of the various documents makes it clear that Underhill, and later the CCF National Council, stuck close to the LSR manifesto. Indeed, many of its clauses, used verbatim or almost so, formed the headings of various clauses in the CCF manifesto.

By relying heavily on the LSR manifesto Underhill was not simply putting his own earlier work for the LSR to further use. The League's manifesto, in fact, was largely the handiwork of the LSR's Montreal founding fathers.[21] In an important sense, therefore, Forsey, Gordon, and Scott, as well as their chief collaborator, a law student named David

Lewis, were the original drafters of the Regina Manifesto. To Underhill, Cassidy, and the other Torontonians, however, belongs the main credit for fleshing out the LSR's fairly brief statement.

A preamble and fourteen clauses made up the Regina Manifesto in its final form. In its preamble and the five clauses on planning, socialization of finance, social ownership, the B.N.A. Act, and external relations, the Regina Manifesto was very close to Underhill's draft. There were also important differences, however. Of these probably the most interesting was the clause on agriculture.

The LSR said little about agriculture, and then only under the heading of co-operative institutions. Underhill wrote rather more about the subject under the appropriate heading, but much of it proved unacceptable. In truth, some farmers shared the LSR's uncertainty about agriculture and what to do about it. The Calgary Programme called for "security of tenure for the farmer on his use-land," defining this as "land used for productive purposes."[22] The Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party, forerunner of the CCF in that province, for a time favoured the notion of "use-lease" or "use tenure." The government would hold ultimate title to the land, moderate the effects of fluctuating prices and weather, and free the farmer from the threat of mortgage foreclosure. The Saskatchewan farmer delegates had some difficulty in communicating their concept, at least to the LSR representatives. "The mysterious Saskatchewan CCF plan for land," Eugene Forsey wrote many years later, "'Use tenure,' I think it was called. Gordon and I tried, repeatedly, to find out what it meant, and failed. All we got was a truculent 'No one is coming here from the East to water down our socialism.'"[23]

If Forsey and Gordon did not grasp what the Saskatchewan Farmer-Labour Party wanted, it seems likely that farmer delegates from other provinces did. On the whole they rejected the use-lease concept because it undermined the traditional form of land ownership. The wording of the clause on agriculture represented a compromise. It demanded "security of tenure for the farmer upon his farm on conditions to be laid down by individual provinces."[24] This ran counter to the centralizing tendency in economic matters evident in both the LSR and Regina manifestoes. That could not be helped, however, given the disagreement between the farmer delegates from Saskatchewan and elsewhere in 1933. A year later even the Saskatchewan CCF was modifying its land policy, and in 1936 it dropped the idea of use-lease from its platform.[25]

Three clauses not found in the LSR manifesto concluded the Regina document. One was the previously-noted brainchild of Judge Stubbs. Two were in Underhill's draft. A plank on "Freedom" called for the protection of civil liberties, the repeal of Section 98 of the Criminal Code dealing with sedition (a far-reaching section which had been passed into law at the height of the Red Scare of 1919), and an end to the deportation of the indigent. Then there was the "Emergency Programme," which outlined the immediate steps deemed necessary to cope with the most pressing problems of the Depression, notably the relief of unemployment. Such a clause was appropriate for a political party; the LSR had no need for one. Completely rewritten in Regina, only an occasional phrase in the section recalled Underhill's draft. Nowhere in that draft was there anything quite so seemingly uncompromising as the final sentence of the Regina Manifesto: "No CCF Government will rest content until it has eradicated capitalism and put into operation the full programme of socialized planning which will lead to the establishment in Canada of the Co-operative Commonwealth."[26] Although M.J. Coldwell later described it as a "millstone around the party's neck,"[27] the sentence was not fundamentally out of harmony with the rest of the manifesto or, indeed, with Underhill's draft. Nevertheless, the sentence made the manifesto sound more radical than it was.

III

Few sensations are more satisfying, certainly in the short run, than that of having got pretty well what you wanted. It was with this warm feeling that the four academics left Regina. Graham Spry, a journalist and member of the LSR research committee--he was soon to become LSR national secretary--who had attended the convention as a delegate of the Ottawa CCF Club, wrote to Cassidy: "The opinions of Scott, Parkinson, Forsey and Gordon were almost always deferred to." In his turn, Cassidy reported to the economist Kenneth Taylor at McMaster University: "Frank Scott called on me this morning on the way back from the CCF convention....He said that the LSR had scored a brilliant success at the convention, since the members of our group who were on hand had succeeded in having their views accepted pretty generally with respect to the programme." Writing to Underhill, Woodsworth described the convention as a "wonderful success" and added: "We cannot be too grateful to you and Cassidy for the manifesto. I trust the revised form will win your approval."[28] There were congratulations all around.

There was also a certain notoriety. At Regina a newspaperman smelled a story. George V. Ferguson of the Winnipeg Free Press was struck by the deference shown to the four professors. The term "brain trust" had recently come into use to describe the academics and other intellectuals who had moved into the public service in Washington since the inauguration of President Roosevelt. Was there not evidence of a brain trust at the Regina convention?

Ferguson thought so. A Free Press story on 19 July referred to a brain trust that had prepared the manifesto. A few days after the convention ended, Ferguson wrote about this "CCF brain trust" and identified some of its leading members. The LSR's work, he wrote, constituted "the more or less formal consolidation of Canadian academic socialist thought." Canadians working "towards the planned and socialised economy will have behind them trained thinkers who have a power to express coherent, logical views well based on a prolonged study of socialist philosophy and practice." Leader of the brain trust was Frank Underhill; the historian had the support of a group of younger men and women (the brain trust averaged less than thirty-two years of age), six of them sometime Rhodes Scholars, "whose bond is an ardent faith in the scientific socialism of the day."[29] Ferguson identified six of them by name: Cassidy, Forsey, Gordon, Parkinson, Scott, and Spry.

The LSR members thus identified felt a bit flattered; they also felt annoyed. The column overemphasized the LSR's socialism; it magnified the League's work at the expense of that done by others at the Regina convention and at other times; it drew undue attention to the LSR and linked it too closely to the CCF. Spry told Cassidy in the letter already cited that Ferguson had "badly misnamed" the LSR. The designation caught on, however; some months later another journalist, Wilfrid Eggleston, referred to the LSR as "Woodsworth's brain trust." Underhill, arguing in 1934 that one of the CCF's major problems was that it had no proper brain trust, charged that Ferguson had coined the phrase in order "to amuse himself by taking his friends for a little ride." Ferguson denied it: "The 'CCF brain trust' was first heard by me on the lips of Comrade Spry and Comrade [Escott] Reid."[30] He was well-acquainted with both men, so the claim is credible.

Underhill's disclaimer was in any case less than ingenuous. In the fall of 1933 he himself had proudly pointed to the Regina Manifesto as evidence of the influence that the LSR already exercised within the CCF. Delegates to the 1934 LSR national convention heard about "the remarkable growth of interest in, and some support for, the political movement which was in part inspired by the LSR, and the two manifestoes of which both were suggested by, and in part written by, the LSR. The formation of the third section of the CCF...the clubs, was initiated by the LSR in Toronto...

CCF leaders have used the research facilities of the LSR on frequent occasions, not only in the national field, but in [the] provincial and municipal fields also."[31]

There was some exaggeration here. The LSR hardly inspired the formation of the CCF, and it did not really have anything to do with the Calgary Programme, though it is likely that those who drafted it at least knew the LSR manifesto. But we do not need to take the LSR at its own evaluation in order to recognize the key advisory role that it had come to play by the summer of 1933.

Advice extended beyond matters of doctrine and policy to those of organization. The CCF adopted federalism as its organizational form. Nothing else was in the cards. Affiliation with the party was at the provincial level. The provincial sections enjoyed a good deal of autonomy in their operation and even in their programmes. Very soon some of the LSR's leaders began to complain about the inadequate central direction in the CCF. Underhill lectured Woodsworth on the need for a strong national office as early as April 1933. He followed this up with a letter in May. Woodsworth disagreed, believing that sound local organization should precede the strong central office Underhill wanted. Not only Woodsworth's preferences stood in the way of such an office, however. More telling yet was the CCF's chronic lack of funds. Indeed, when several years later the party finally got a fulltime national secretary, David Lewis, heading a national office that only then began to be effective to the satisfaction of Underhill and others in the LSR, it was financed in large part by a wealthy LSR member and CCF supporter, Alan Plaunt.[32]

The LSR's influence in the councils of the CCF continued to grow after 1933. Professor Walter Young has traced a shift eastwards in the CCF's centre of gravity during the 1930s. As this happened, "...the CCF came more and more under the influence of the intellectuals....Officially the LSR had no status in the party structure, yet it was more influential in shaping policy than constituency resolutions or the convention itself in the period 1932-40."[33] The influence was all the stronger because some of the people who got started in the LSR eventually took positions in the central circle of the CCF, among them Forsey, Gordon, Scott, and above all Lewis.

IV

The Regina Manifesto contained the LSR's ideas about social reconstruction and social democracy. In 1933 those ideas were in the air, however, perhaps particularly in western Canada. They included aspects of Fabianism, Christian and Guild Socialism, western agrarian radicalism, and neo-Marxism. Underhill, Scott and their associates formulated them for the CCF and made them to some extent systematic. They stated things in such a way that other, less intellectually-oriented people could say: "Yes, that's the way it is," or "that's the way it ought to be." The LSR did not have sole responsibility for stating these ideas, however. CCF politicians, for example, made a centrally important contribution to the process. People like Angus MacInnis of Vancouver, William Irvine of Calgary, and, above all, Woodsworth himself played important parts at the Regina convention as earlier in Calgary. And especially Woodsworth's influence on the LSR can scarcely be overestimated.

Was the result of the LSR's work to give the CCF the most effective programme and manifesto possible? No final answer to this question can be given. But the historian may be allowed to express a certain scepticism. Scott expressed within ten years of the Regina convention the view that the Calgary Programme, brief and to the point, would have been a more effective document than the Regina Manifesto turned out to be.[34] The latter was too long and too rhetorical; the delegates would have done better to subtract from rather than add to it. Recognition that the manifesto was too long found expression at the 1934 CCF convention in the drafting and adoption of a short "Immediate Programme." It focussed on four areas of concern: finance, agriculture, labour and social services, and world peace. These were the areas where the CCF would provide immediate legislation "in order to remove the poverty and insecurity now endured by the people, and to lay the foundation of a new social order ..."[35]

Unwieldy as it was, the Regina Manifesto remained the basic statement of belief and intention for the CCF until 1956. In that year the party finally adopted a new programme, the Winnipeg Declaration of Principles. Throughout almost a quarter century the idealism of the Regina Manifesto had inspired CCFers, although some of them no doubt wondered from time to time whether it did not represent an unduly heavy load of intellectual and moral luggage. The manifesto long outlasted the LSR, for that organization came to a quiet end during the winter of 1941-42. It ceased to function at almost the same time that its honorary president, Woodsworth, died of his second stroke.

The Regina Manifesto also outlasted Underhill's loyalty to the CCF. Yet it was Underhill, more than anyone else, who could claim responsibility for giving the CCF its wordy statement of beliefs and aims. Interviewed by Walter Young in 1962, Scott reported that Underhill had said thirty years earlier that if the CCF was not prepared to go further than the eight points approved in Calgary, "...it would suffer the same fate as the Progressives."[36] Young speculates that this conviction might explain the radicalism of Underhill's language in the manifesto.

During the later 1940s and 1950s Underhill dissociated himself from the document as a whole. Unable to locate an early draft of the manifesto--after his death it became apparent why: he had misfiled it--he eventually told an Ottawa audience in the 1960s: "...After going through so many hands, the Regina Manifesto as it finally emerged was not so tidy and well-written a document as that which left our Toronto LSR hands. None of us Torontonians had lived and worked on a farm, and so our section on agriculture was very clear-cut. The prairie wheat-farmers in Regina made a terrible mess out of this ... And as I read the document now it seems to have too many rhetorical sentences in it which I am sure were not in the first draft...."[37] Underhill was mistaken. The document that he drafted was no less rhetorical than the one adopted in Regina.

By helping to give the CCF's programme a detail and clarity that it might otherwise have lacked, leading members of the LSR, Underhill foremost among them, were trying to ensure that the new movement would not be able to compromise itself out of existence. However, the Regina Manifesto was not rigidly doctrinaire. Like the League's own manifesto, it was born of mutual accommodation among people who did not always agree. Both documents counselled economic planning, both looked to a centralization of important government functions, called for the nationalization of many enterprises, and sought to establish a basis for politics in social class. Both challenged the legitimacy of the profit motive and the power of the modern corporation.

The Regina Manifesto and the policies derived from it meant that the CCF stood clearly apart from other political parties. That was its handicap, but also its strength. Its opponents knew with a clarity unusual in Canadian politics where the CCF stood. But so did its supporters. Of course there were far more of the former than of the latter. Only in Saskatchewan did the CCF come to power. However, although the party nationally and in most of the provinces sustained far more disappointments than triumphs, it did not disappear.

In the federal election of 1945 some 16 percent of Canadian voters cast their ballots for CCF candidates. That was a high point (as well as a major disappointment: the party had expected to do much better), but neither in the doldrums of the late 1930s nor in the postwar years did the CCF dwindle into obscurity and complete insignificance, or into an alliance with the Liberals. The government elected in Saskatchewan in 1944 stayed in office for twenty years. It is at least arguable that the CCF everywhere continued to draw strength from a programme that into the 1950s struck a sizeable minority of Canadians as worth working and voting for. In helping to shape the Regina Manifesto the LSR could not ensure the CCF's success. However, Underhill, Scott and the others did help to secure its survival for more than a quarter century, eventually to turn into the NDP.

NOTES

1 George H. Williams, quoted in the *Toronto Daily Star*, 22 July 1933.

2 Olive Ziegler, *Woodsworth* (Toronto: Ontario Publishing, 1934), pp. 188-89.

3 PAC, Frank H. Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 26 April 1929.

4 Ibid., Underhill to J.W. Dafoe, 30 November 1930, copy; University of Toronto Archives (UTA), H.M. Cassidy Papers, Cassidy to J.S. Woodsworth, 2 May 1931, copy.

5 The events which led to the formation of the LSR are discussed in greater detail in Michiel Horn, *The League for Social Reconstruction* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980), pp. 19-28.

6 An assertion to the contrary by Kenneth McNaught (*A Prophet in Politics* [Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959], p. 259) is mistaken.

7 University of British Columbia Archives (UBCA), Angus MacInnis Papers, Francis J. McKenzie, "The Co-operative Commonwealth Federation," report written for the Vancouver Branch of the LSR, 22 August 1932.

8 PAC, Frank R. Scott Papers, Scott to C.E. French, 4 April 1932, copy; F.H. Underhill, "The League for Social Reconstruction," *Canadian Forum*, April 1932, p. 249.

9 PAC, Underhill Papers, F.R. Scott to Underhill, 7 September 1932; J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 7 October 1932.

10 Horn, p. 38; Gerald Caplan, *The Dilemma of Canadian Socialism* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1973), pp. 14, 24-26.

11 PAC, Scott Papers, *Handbook of LSR* (Toronto, 1933), pp. 6-7.

12 UTA, J.S. Woodsworth Memorial Collection, LSR Papers, Minutes, Toronto Branch executive meeting, 14 April 1933; Ellet MacInnes to Bert Robinson, 17 June 1933, copy.

13 Walter Young, "Ideology, Personality and the Origin of the CCF in British Columbia," *BC Studies*, 32 (Winter, 1976-77), pp. 139-62.

14 PAC, Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 17 October 1932; F.R. Scott to Underhill, 20 October 1932; CCF Records, Minutes, CCF National Council meeting, 25 January 1933.

15 My account is based in its details on a conversation with Frank Underhill in January 1967. Neither Joe Parkinson nor Escott Reid was able to recall any particulars; Harry Cassidy died in 1951.

16 PAC, Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 13 July 1933.

17 PAC, CCF Records, Minutes of the Provisional National Council, 16-19 July 1933.

18 Walter Young, *The Anatomy of a Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969), p. 47. See the exchange of views between W.C. Good and Frank Underhill in *Canadian Forum*, August 1933.

19 PAC, Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 25 July 1933.

20 See Michiel Horn, "Frank Underhill's Early Drafts of the Regina Manifesto 1933," *Canadian Historical Review*, LIV, 4 (December, 1973), pp. 393-418. This article also has as an appendix a textually accurate version of the Regina Manifesto.

21 PAC, Scott Papers, F.H. Underhill to Scott, 11 November and 18 December 1931.

22 Young, Appendix A, p. 303.

23 Eugene Forsey to the author, June 1968.

24 Horn, "Frank Underhill's Early Drafts", p. 412.

25 Peter Sinclair, "The Saskatchewan CCF: Ascent to Power and the Decline of Socialism," *Canadian Historical Review*, LIV, 4 (December, 1973), pp. 424-25.

26 Horn, "Frank Underhill's Early Drafts," p. 418.

27 M.J. Coldwell, quoted in Young, p. 44n.

28 Queen's University Archives (QUA), G.M.A. Grube Papers, G. Spry to H. Cassidy, 24 July 1933; H. Cassidy to Kenneth Taylor, 26 July 1933, copy; PAC, Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 25 July 1933.

29 G.V.F., "C.C.F. 'Brain Trust'," Winnipeg Free Press, 25 July 1933.

30 Wilfrid Eggleston, "Canada's Party on the Left," Current History, 39 (January, 1934), pp. 416-20; F.H. Underhill, "The CCF Convention and After," Canadian Forum, September 1934, p. 463; G.V. Ferguson, letter to the editor, Canadian Forum, October 1934, p. 17.

31 PAC, Scott Papers, Mimeographed letter to Toronto Branch Members, October 1933; UTA, LSR Papers, "Third Annual Report of the League for Social Reconstruction, 1934."

32 PAC, J.S. Woodsworth Papers, F.H. Underhill to Woodsworth, 2 May 1933; Underhill Papers, J.S. Woodsworth to Underhill, 4 May 1933; Horn, League for Social Reconstruction, pp. 238-39.

33 Young, Anatomy of a Party, pp. 71-72.

34 F.R. Scott, "Canada's New Political Party," cited in Ibid., p. 43.

35 CCF Immediate Programme, July 1934, in Michiel Horn, ed., The Dirty Thirties: Canadians in the Great Depression (Toronto: Copp Clark, 1972), p. 445.

36 Quoted in Young, Anatomy of a Party, p. 42.

37 PAC, Underhill Papers, "What the Liberals Might Learn from the C.C.F.-N.D.P.," undated typescript.

"Following the Gleam": The Political Philosophy of J.S. Woodsworth

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David Walden

J.S. Woodsworth has been characterized as a "prophet in politics," a "social pioneer," and a "man to remember," and indeed he was and is very much each of these. Yet studies of Woodsworth, the social gospel, and to a lesser extent the CCF, have tended to stress biographical and charismatic details while minimizing his philosophical contribution to the political creed of the various movements and parties with which he was associated. The present study proposes to take an initial step towards remedying this imbalance by focussing on several key elements in Woodsworth's political philosophy which have earned him a prominent and indisputable place in Canadian political history.[1]

To fully understand the beliefs that Woodsworth held and the ideas which he espoused and championed, it is necessary to know something of the society in which they were formed. Born in 1874, Woodsworth witnessed the incredible consolidation of Canadian industry which took place in the 1880s and 1890s, and the resultant dislocation in many people's lives as automation reduced the number of "hands" required in both industry and agriculture. This coincided with an upsurge in the world economy in the mid-1890s, and the exuberant promotion of settlement in the Canadian west by the Minister of the Interior, Clifford Sifton. The combined forces of industrialization and immigration led to increased urbanization, and the rapid growth of Canadian cities: the population of Toronto almost doubled during the first decade of the twentieth century; Winnipeg's population tripled; Vancouver's quadrupled; and Regina's increased tenfold.[2]

The 1880s and 1890s also saw revivalist religion spread from the United States into Canada, and with it a questioning of traditional concepts of religion. Revivalism preached the idea that radical change in life was possible, thus challenging the Calvinist notion of predestination, and as such represents Canada's initial exposure to the social gospel. The social gospel movement in Canada was part of a larger, widespread attempt in Europe and the United States to revive and develop Christian social values, and to make them applicable to emerging urban society. As such, it was a religious movement which stressed the social nature of man and emphasized that Christianity was a social religion concerned with the quality of human relations on earth. The social gospel was, however, much more than a theological movement; it was also a deliberate, systematic approach to politics and questions of social organization. Politically, the social gospel and its advocates addressed the social ills which accompanied the industrial revolution of the late nineteenth century--the dislocation of urban life, intolerable working conditions, unemployment, bad housing, and poor health among the workers--and contrasted these with the fortunes of the privileged few.[3]

Of all the Protestant churches, the Methodist Church most easily accommodated the social gospel, and Wesley College in Winnipeg became the centre of the social gospel in Canada. Men like Salem Bland, who was perhaps the major exponent of the social gospel in Canada; William Ivens, the founder of the Canadian Labour Church and an active participant in the Winnipeg General Strike; A.E. Smith, who later became a leading Canadian communist; and J.S. Woodsworth, who is perhaps the best known of all, emerged from Wesley College to become the leaders of the social gospel movement in Canada. All were deeply committed to both the agrarian and the urban reform movements, and Woodsworth and Bland in particular were among the vanguard of those who promoted the farmer-labour alliance in politics.[4]

In response to the growing problems of immigration and urban slums, church missions were opened during the 1890s, and between 1907 and 1913 Woodsworth served as Superintendent of All Peoples' Mission in Winnipeg. All Peoples' Mission was operated by the Methodist Church "to bridge the gap between well-to-do Church going Canadian citizens and the immigrant peoples, often alien in language, race, religion and social life." In his annual reports, Woodsworth emphasized his work among the European immigrants--classes in domestic skills for girls, Sunday schools, night schools, mother's meetings, hospital visitation, and relief--but lamented the lack of involvement by others: "Above all we need workers. Are there not among the young people in our churches men and women who will consecrate their lives to social service?"[5]

At All Peoples' Mission Woodsworth witnessed the destitution of the immigrants and their determined efforts to prosper despite the squalor in which they were forced to live. He also saw "touching cases of community of goods" as people shared what little food they had, and in some cases, boarders even supported the families with whom they lived.[6]

Woodsworth's experience with immigration and the urban slums of Winnipeg between 1907 and 1913 also led to his writing two important works of Canadian social gospel literature, Strangers Within Our Gates (1909) and My Neighbour (1911). In Strangers Within Our Gates Woodsworth discussed the problems faced by immigrants in their attempts to adapt to Canadian society, and argued for greater government responsibility in choosing the type of immigrants who would be allowed into the country. My Neighbour, in contrast, was a clear statement of social gospel Christianity, and was important as one of the earliest Canadian works on the subject. In My Neighbour Woodsworth took his concern for the immigrant one step further as he focussed on the problems of the city and suggested solutions similar to those now being advanced by many urban planners. Both books were published with the encouragement of F.C. Stephenson, a prominent Methodist missionary, as textbooks for his Young People's Forward Movement and as such received national distribution.

In 1913 Woodsworth resigned as Superintendent of All Peoples' Mission and immediately assumed the position of Secretary of the fledgling Canadian Welfare League. The League was Woodsworth's creation and sought to "unite, organize and stimulate existing social welfare organizations." Woodsworth observed that this work should be the responsibility of a government department, but that, unfortunately, governments had so far failed to recognize this need. Until such time as governments did accept this responsibility, however, the work was done by private associations and Woodsworth's Canadian Welfare League was one of the earliest such associations. In a pamphlet describing the work of the League, Woodsworth stated its purpose as follows:

1. to promote a general interest in all forms of social welfare.

2. to make a practical study of Canada's emerging social problems caused by industrialization, high levels of immigration and the rapid growth of cities.

3. to federate or otherwise organize for co-operative work existing social institutions in each community so that each may give more effective service to the community.

4. to enlist citizens in personal service for the common welfare of all.

5. to provide trained leadership for social work.[7]

Woodsworth's stated purpose for the Canadian Welfare League was a lucid and concise statement of his own philosophy at the time. It presented not only the predominant themes of the social gospel, but also marked the beginning of his politicization and his determination to fill the void in social services left by governments which were reluctant to become involved. Many of these same ideas were found in the "Report of the First Year's Work" of the Bureau of Social Research in 1916, and, perhaps because this was a government-sponsored agency, there was an even stronger emphasis on "securing data which will form the basis for sound and progressive legislation." While the work of the Bureau ended abruptly at the end of only its first year of operation,[8] the fact that the governments of the three prairie provinces had co-operated to study and seek solutions to community problems only further reinforced Woodsworth's belief that social welfare was a public responsibility.

In 1918, feeling his philosophical position irreconcilably at odds with that of the Methodist Church, Woodsworth resigned from the ministry. After working as a longshoreman in Vancouver, he returned to Winnipeg in the spring of 1919 during the early days of the General Strike. The events of 1918 and 1919 mark a watershed in Woodsworth's life. As a minister and social worker he had hitherto found himself unable to accept all the beliefs and practices of society but had been prepared to remain within the Church and to work through it and various social agencies for the betterment of the poor. As a result of the events of 1918-1919, however, Woodsworth learned "the realities of the class struggle and [was] forced to accept socialism not as a theory but as a way out." He also "witnessed something of the ignorance and the postwar hysteria and intolerance of [his] 'respectable' fellow citizens,"[9] and after being jailed for his involvement in the Winnipeg General Strike Woodsworth was determined to pursue a new course:

> Well, this surely about finishes the old conventional ideals. To be in jail is no longer the most terrible thing. "Justice" is no longer enthroned. In practice it depends upon a dozen conflicting interests, political and commercial. But one is committed as never before to the cause of the poor and the helpless, particularly the foreigner. This is only the first round.[10]

In 1921, when he was elected as the Independent labour representative for Winnipeg North Centre, Woodsworth carried his fight for social justice to the House of Commons. He began his fight for the old age pension in 1923 when he inquired about the government's intention to introduce such legislation and was told that "no decision favourable to the movement had been reached."[11] In 1924 the government did appoint a committee to study the question, and the House of

Commons subsequently accepted the committee's report which recommended pensions for people over seventy years of age who had lived in Canada for a minimum of twenty years, at a maximum rate of $20 per month. In cases where an individual had a private source of income, that amount was to be reduced. The cost of the pension scheme was to be shared equally by the provincial and federal governments.

In 1925, when Woodsworth again asked the government if it proposed to introduce any legislation in regard to old age pensions, he was told that the premiers were not prepared to enter into the proposed agreement as they felt that the pension was the responsibility of the federal government. In a stinging attack on the government Woodsworth accused the provincial and federal governments of "hiding behind" the British North America Act, doing nothing while people suffered. He went on to criticize how the government appealed for immigrants, yet refused to make adequate provision for the welfare of the present residents of the country, let alone those who might yet come. Nor, he noted, was the government proposing to even take particularly good care of the aged, but instead was limiting them to a pension of $20 a month or less. Woodsworth concluded his attack by indignantly stating that as a representative of "one group of those who are called the common people of this country, I want to protest against the apathy and inaction of parliament in dealing with this important matter."[12]

In 1927 he continued his campaign for the old age pension, again attacking the scheme proposed by the government and the administrative arrangement for financing the plan. Woodsworth conceded that there were some advantages in having the provinces administer the programme as they already had social welfare agencies which could assume this responsibility. He believed, however, that the programme should be universally applied and that people should be eligible for the pension because they were citizens of Canada, not because they happened to live in a province which had adopted the scheme. He also advocated greater fiscal responsibility on the part of the federal government by recommending that it assume 75 percent of the cost of the pension plan. It was doubtful, Woodsworth warned, that the provinces, and particularly the maritime provinces, could afford to adopt the plan if they were required to finance 50 percent of it. Woodsworth also continued to attack the means test which was included in the proposed legislation, noting the case of public officials who received large sums of money from private sources and yet were also permitted to receive funds from the public treasury. "There ought," he insisted, "to be something like equality in dealing with matters of this kind."[13]

Woodsworth's determination to obtain the old age pension legislation was a direct application of the social gospel to the field of politics. Throughout the debates over the implementation of the plan and the question of eligibility for the pension, Woodsworth stressed the pressing need for social welfare legislation and demanded that it be universal and treat all recipients equally. This egalitarianism permeated his advocacy of a plan which would permit all provinces to participate, his belief that the plan had to be national in scope, and his insistence that everyone over a certain age--regardless of other sources of income--receive the full amount of the pension. When, in 1926, Woodsworth was able to wrest an Old Age Pensions Act from the politically vulnerable Liberal government, it was both a triumph for Woodsworth personally and for his unique philosophical blend of the social gospel, social welfare, and socialism.

The problem of unemployment and the human and economic waste which it engendered was also a constant concern for Woodsworth. As early as 1920, in the election manifesto of the Federated Labour Party, Woodsworth and his companions advocated "the adoption of the principle that it is the duty of the State to provide productive employment for the unemployed man or woman."[14] This theme, combined with the demand that relief be provided when no meaningful work could be found, was to dominate Woodsworth's campaign for unemployment assistance for the rest of his life.

Both in Parliament and in public forums, Woodsworth argued that unemployment was involuntary, and that with the exception of a few lazy people who did not want to work, the majority of the unemployed had recently lost their jobs and would work again immediately if jobs could be found. Unemployment was not, he maintained, a "natural corrective" as the general manager of the Bank of Montreal had called it, but rather a serious social problem.[15] As the causes of unemployment were beyond the control of the workers, and because private enterprise was failing to do so, Woodsworth insisted that the State accept its obligation to provide work. As the body that had to deal with questions of the magnitude of immigration, the fiscal policy of the country and international relations, the State should also assume responsibility for unemployment, especially as unemployment was often a consideration in determining Canada's policy in these areas.

Work provided by the State should be productive work, Woodsworth maintained, carried out under existing rates of pay and subject to prevailing labour conditions. Anticipating much of the sociology of work literature of the last two decades, Woodsworth condemned relief work as being both economically and morally futile, and stressed that all work should be meaningful. To finance the enterprises necessary to provide such employment, Woodsworth advocated the development, by Canadians, of the vast natural resources of their country: "We have admittedly abundant natural resources, we have the credit of the country--the capitalized labour power of the people--that on which alone our whole modern financial system is based. Why not bring natural resources, credit and workers, together?"[16]

If suitable work could not be found, then the state, or preferably industry itself, should provide "adequate maintenance" for the workers. Such "maintenance" was not to be considered charity, but rather "simple justice" for the cost of the involuntary unemployed should be borne by the whole community. Unemployment insurance was not a new idea, Woodsworth argued, as it already existed in other industrial countries. A variant of it was already in place in Canada in the Workmen's Compensation Act where it was recognized that, if a man was injured at work, it was industry's responsibility to assume the financial burden for that injury.[17]

Woodsworth pursued an unemployment insurance act in the House of Commons in much the same way that he fought for the old age pension. Year after year he asked the government what steps it proposed to take in regard to unemployment insurance, and just as it had done with the pension question it stressed the problems of divided jurisdiction imposed by the BNA Act as the greatest obstacle to such legislation. During the Depression the federal government was forced to assume the relief debts of the provinces and municipalities, and in 1940, after twenty years of first Woodsworth and later the others members of the CCF fighting for unemployment insurance, Bill 98, an Act to establish an Unemployment Insurance Commission, was passed by the House of Commons.

As with his campaign for the old age pension, Woodsworth stressed the responsibility of society, and ultimately the government as the elected representatives of the people, to care for those who were suffering through no fault of their own. From his early writings, through his speeches in Parliament to the inclusion of a provision for unemployment insurance in the Regina Manifesto in 1933, Woodsworth presented a formidable case for the necessity of social welfare legislation. While the CCF claimed--and quite correctly--that it was only after "continuous pressure" from their members that the unemployment insurance act was introduced, it should not be forgotten where the impetus for this part of their programme came from, nor that Woodsworth had been actively campaigning for unemployment insurance since 1921.

Perhaps the best known aspect of Woodsworth's political philosophy is his pacificism. Like the other elements of his creed, his pacificism had its roots in the social gospel, but again Woodsworth blended it with socialism to create a distinct form of pacifism which was unique to his thought. As ministers of the social gospel, Woodsworth, Salem Bland, and William Ivens all opposed war on the grounds that it was contrary to the teachings of Jesus. Nowhere is this more clearly stated than in Woodsworth's letter of resignation from the Methodist Church:

> For me, the teachings and spirit of Jesus are absolutely irreconcilable with the advocacy of war. Christianity may seem an improbable idealism, but so long as I hold it, ever so unworthily, I must refuse, as far as may be, to participate in war. When the policy of the State--whether the State be nominally Christian or not--conflicts with my conception of right and wrong, then I must obey God rather than man. As a minister, I must proclaim the truth as it is revealed to me.

The "truth" for Woodsworth was that many ministers, church officials, and indeed churches themselves had become willing instruments of the war effort. Not only was war "the absolute negation of anything Christian" for Woodsworth but, contrary to the teachings of Jesus, he saw churches actively promoting participation in the war by acting as "very effective recruiting agencies."[18] To demonstrate the extent of the churches' involvement in recruiting, Woodsworth described how, at a Sunday evening service at a church in Montreal, the congregation was addressed first by a military general who gave a "recital" of the atrocities in Belgium, then by the President of McGill University who made a patriotic appeal to the youth present, and finally by the pastor of the church who "in approved evangelistic style appealed for recruits, urging that the young men give their names to the sergeants in uniform stationed at the doors."[19]

Woodsworth was also deeply concerned that the church's support of the war had become an end in itself, even though it meant condoning sins such as retaliation and murder which had been repudiated by Christ. For Woodsworth, civilization had reached a crisis, and a decision as to whether or not war was compatible with Christianity--and even civilization itself--would have to be made: "I do not think we can go on as our fathers have done, as all nations have done, and maintain civilization much longer. Some other way will have to be found."[20]

Woodsworth firmly believed that war was "the inevitable outcome of the existing social organization with its undemocratic form of government and competitive system of industry."[21] The economic system also encouraged injustice, exploitation and class interests, Woodsworth argued, which ultimately resulted in the common people of one country "slaughtering" the common people of another. While this was taking place, he continued, businessmen remained at home and collected huge profits from war-related industries. Urging an "equality of sacrifice," Woodsworth, and later the CCF, argued that if working men had to go to war, then the very least the large manufacturing interests could do would be to *give* their services to the State. And if Canada became so heavily involved in the war that conscription of manpower became necessary, Woodsworth insisted that it should be accompanied by the conscription of wealth.[22]

Yet while advocating the nationalization of industry and the conscription of wealth, Woodsworth never formulated a detailed plan as to how this would be achieved, perhaps because he did not believe that either would solve the problem of war. Nor did he believe that war would resolve any of society's problems: "The devil of militarism cannot be driven out by the power of militarism without the successful nations themselves becoming militarized,"[23] Woodsworth wrote in 1918, and he spent the rest of his life vehemently campaigning against the evils and futility of war.

In speeches in Parliament and in articles in magazines Woodsworth stressed that World War I had settled nothing. On the eve of World War II he reiterated the position that he had held for over twenty years:

> ...did the last war settle anything? I venture to say that it settled nothing; and the next war into which we are asked to enter, however big and bloody it may be, is not going to settle anything either. That is not the way in which settlements are brought about. While we are urged to fight for freedom and democracy, it should be remembered that war is the very negation of both. The victor may win, but if he does, it is by adopting the self-same tactics which he condemns in his enemy ...we have been willing to allow Canadians to profit out of the situation...[and] I submit that if any shooting is to be done the first people who should face the firing squad are those who have made money out of a potential enemy.[24]

As an alternative to war Woodsworth advocated permanent peace, and while he realized that his proposition might seem foolish to some, he held steadfastly to it as he believed that that was what Christ had taught. As a means to realizing such a peace he urged that war be de-emphasized and solutions instead be sought for its causes. In a letter to Norman F. Priestley in 1934, for example, Woodsworth remarked that "what we do in the event of war breaking out is, in my judgement, not nearly so important as what we will do now with regard to those situations which inevitably lead to war."[25] And while he realized his position might seem idealistic, he added a striking realism when he poignantly asked: "Why should we not be willing to make for peace some of the same sacrifices that are required for war?"[26]

In September 1939, when the National Council of the CCF met to discuss the CCF's position on Canada's involvement in the war, it was hardly a surprise, then, that Woodsworth was unable to support a policy which favoured even limited Canadian participation. As a result, Woodsworth was isolated and alone in his opposition to Canada's entry into World War II, and while he may have been abandoned by his party, his belief in the CCF remained firm: "Some of us are determined to be true to our convictions, and yet are very anxious if possible to hold our organization together."[27]

Woodsworth was able to successfully combine his background in the social gospel and his experience in the rural west with the aspirations of the urban labour movement in the east, thus facilitating the farmer-labour alliance in the CCF. As a participant in the Winnipeg General Strike, a Member of Parliament for the Independent Labour Party, the first President of the CCF, and the Honorary President of the LSR, Woodsworth's diverse and varied experience established his credibility with farmers, labour, and intellectual socialists, and aided greatly in bringing them together in the CCF.

In 1932 when representatives of the various farm and labour organizations decided to unite into a single political party, Woodsworth was instrumental in bringing them together first in Ottawa and then in Calgary. The programme adopted by the delegates to the "Economic Conference" in Calgary in August 1932 was a fundamental statement of Canadian socialism and contained, although not in the same detail, many of the same points which were incorporated in the Regina Manifesto one year later.[28] Both documents visibly reflect Woodsworth's influence, for most, if not all, of their propositions had at some time been advocated by him. Similarly, Woodsworth had had considerable experience with the manifesto style of presentation, having earlier participated in the writing of the manifestoes of the Federated Labour Party and the Independent Labour Party.

Woodsworth's political philosophy was a unique blend of the social gospel and socialism, and the ideas of the social gospel continued to influence his approach to politics long after the main impact of the movement had waned. Of all its advocates, Woodsworth alone was successful in maintaining the relevance of the concerns of the social gospel by carrying them beyond the confines of ecclesiasticism and into the realm of politics. Having learned his socialism from the workers, immigrants, the poor, and the unemployed, Woodsworth firmly believed that if the Canadian state would only assume greater social responsibility for the welfare of the people much could be done to overcome the excesses of capitalism. As a political activist he was more concerned with direct action to achieve his goals than he was with polemics or attempts to construct theoretical models of socialism. In fact, he noted in 1935 that the writings of the scientific socialists were "too abstract and left us cold,"[29] preferring instead to address himself to solutions to the immediate problems faced by the workers. It is perhaps this sense of immediacy in Woodsworth's political philosophy which makes it truly distinctive, for it enabled him to both achieve many of the goals which he pursued so relentlessly and to make a lasting contribution to Canadian socialism.

NOTES

1 See Kenneth McNaught, *A Prophet in Politics* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959); Grace MacInnis, *J.S. Woodsworth: A Man to Remember* (Toronto: Macmillan, 1953); and Olive Ziegler, *Woodsworth: Social Pioneer* (Toronto: Ontario Publishing, 1934). This essay should be considered only an introduction to the political philosophy of J.S. Woodsworth, as it would be possible to write an entire volume on his complete social and political thought.

2 Richard Allen, "The Background to the Social Gospel" in Richard Allen, ed., *The Social Gospel in Canada* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), pp. 9-10. In the quarter century after 1891 the population of Canada swelled from 4,800,000 to 8,000,000.

3 Stewart Crysdale, "The Sociology of the Social Gospel: Quest for a Modern Ideology" in Allen, p. 264. See also Stewart Crysdale, *The Industrial Struggle and Protestant Ethics in Canada: A Survey of Changing Power Structures and Christian Social Ethics* (Toronto: Ryerson, 1961), and Donald B. Meyer, *The Protestant Search for Political Realism, 1919-1941* (Berkeley: University of California, 1960), especially Chapter 1.

4 Richard Allen, *The Social Passion: Religion and Social Reform in Canada, 1914-28* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971), p. 45.

5 See the annual reports of All Peoples' Mission, 1907-1908 and 1908-1909 in PAC, Woodsworth Papers, volume 37.

6 Ibid., "All Peoples' Mission, Annual Report, 1908-1909," p. 12.

7 Ibid., *Canadian Welfare League* (pamphlet), ca. 1913.

8 The Bureau of Social Research was closed at the end of its first year of operation because of Woodsworth's public opposition to conscription.

9 Woodsworth, "My Convictions About War," *Vox*, December 1939, pp. 5-6.

10 PAC, Woodsworth Papers, volume 37, "J.S. Woodsworth's Account of His Stay in Jail," n.d., typescript.

11 *Hansard*, 1923, p. 733. The idea of old age pensions was not new and had been advocated by the Trades and Labour Congress since the turn of the century. The question had been before the House of Commons since 1907, but had been ignored until Woodsworth again raised the issue.

12 *Hansard*, 1925, pp. 4431-33.

13 Ibid., 1927, pp. 447-49.

14 PAC, Woodsworth Papers, volume 37, Thos. Richardson, W.R. Trotter, J.S. Woodsworth, "Federated Labour Party--Manifesto in connection with the British Columbia Provincial Election," 1920.

15 *Hansard*, 1922, p. 87. See also Woodsworth, "Unemployment," in *Canadian Forum*, April 1921, p. 202.

16 Woodsworth, "Unemployment," *Canadian Forum*, April 1921, p. 202.

17 *Hansard*, 1922, p. 88.

18 Woodsworth to A.E. Smith, 18 June 1918, quoted in Woodsworth, *"Following the Gleam,"* 1926, p. 9.

19 Woodsworth, "My Convictions About War," *Vox*, December 1939, pp. 4-5.

20 *Hansard*, 1939, p. 2447.

21 Woodsworth to Smith, 8 June 1918, quoted in *"Following the Gleam,"* p. 9. See also Woodsworth's speech in the House of Commons at the outbreak of war, 8 September 1939, *Hansard*, Special Session 1939, p. 45.

22 *Hansard*, 1922, pp. 89-90; 1939, pp. 1457-58, 2444. See also Woodsworth, "New World or the End of Civilization?" (PAC, CCF Records, volume 107, file "J.S. Woodsworth, 1937-1942.")

23 Woodsworth to Smith, 8 June 1918, in *"Following the Gleam,"* p. 9. See also *Hansard*, 1922, p. 91.

24 *Hansard*, 1939, Special Session, p. 45.

25 PAC, CCF Records, volume 107, J.S. Woodsworth to N. Priestley, 23 April 1934.

26 *Hansard*, 1939, p. 2447. See also PAC, CCF Records, volume 198, "Out of the Night the Angel's Song" in Woodsworth, *Hours That Stand Apart*, p. 9.

27 PAC, CCF Records, volume 348, J.S. Woodsworth to Eileen Tallman, 13 September 1939.

28 Ibid., volume 1, minutes of the "Economic Conference," Calgary, 1 August 1932.

56 "Following the Gleam"

29 Woodsworth, "Foreword" in Social Planning for Canada (Toronto: T. Nelson, 1935).

The Pacifist Background of the Early CCF

Thomas P. Socknat

With the adoption of the Regina Manifesto in 1933 the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation endorsed "a foreign policy designed to obtain international economic co-operation and to promote disarmament and world peace." "Canada must refuse," the Manifesto stated, "to be entangled in any more wars fought to make the world safe for capitalism."[1] Although in direct reference to external relations, this bold and resolute stand against participation in war clearly revealed the pacifist spirit which pervaded the entire Manifesto as well as the early basis of CCF support. For example, the social and economic transformation prescribed to create the co-operative commonwealth was to be brought about by non-violent political action and the CCF registered its outright opposition to "change by violence." Canada's legal system, moreover, which social critics claimed was based upon vengeance and fear, was to be remodelled upon a modern understanding of human behaviour and relationships. By thus replacing fear with trust and understanding, vengeance with justice, competition and exploitation with co-operation, most of the Manifesto's goals, from the socialization of finance and ownership to the development of a fair labour code, were intended to eliminate the causes of violent conflict in the new social order. The ideal co-operative commonwealth was to be the achievement and reign of both peace and justice.

The philosophy underlying the CCF programme reflected the socialist/pacifist alignment which had been taking place in Canada since World War I. The debate over Canadian participation and conscription had sharpened the radical analysis of war as rooted in capitalist imperialism and thus revealed common bonds between socialist and pacifist protests. J.S. Woodsworth most clearly represented the complete synthesis of the socialist critique with absolute Christian social ethics, but by 1919 even traditional religious pacifists such as the Society of Friends had come to equate international war with the social struggle and endorsed a non-violent social revolution.[2] Although somewhat surprised, Woodsworth welcomed Quakers to the socialist attack upon the evils responsible for modern wars. He joined with them and a handful of Canadian feminists in the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WIL) in a concerted attack upon armament expenditures, cadet training in the schools, and militarism in textbooks.[3]

By mid-decade their pacifist radicalism had merged with growing revulsion against the last war and renewed liberal internationalism to produce a resurgent peace movement which, in turn, successfully sublimated the increasing failure of other social and political reforms.[4] In the west, particularly, as progressivism waned, popular imagination was captured by the new pacifist/socialist argument for the co-operative ideal.

The Vancouver WIL activist, Laura Jamieson, was among the first to reject the traditional internationalist approach to peace through arbitration and disarmament and call instead for a truly co-operative social order which would allow for the peaceful release of tensions and thus fulfill human needs without recourse to social violence and war. Jamieson's ideas found enthusiastic support in Saskatoon from Violet McNaughton who, as women's editor of the Western Producer, popularized the idea that the adoption of an economic system built upon the co-operative spirit so evident on the prairies would destroy the aggressive and selfish nationalism of the capitalist system and create justice, human welfare, and harmony within nations and between them.[5] In effect, the way to peace was through the extension of the western co-operative spirit to the rest of Canada and to the world. Jamieson, McNaughton, and Agnes Macphail carried that message to the 1929 International WIL Congress in Prague. They returned home committed to strengthen the WIL through the organization of numerous local chapters across Canada, thereby creating a national network of politicized women's groups which later became an important nucleus of CCF support.[6]

During the 1920s the peace movement was relatively successful in arousing public sympathy for the paper pacifism of pacts and resolutions, but it was not until the social and economic upheaval of the Depression years that even pacifists themselves fully articulated the inter-relationship between peace and radical social change. The apparent failure of both the world economic and disarmament conferences, moreover, further heightened the realization that peace rested solely upon the achievement of social and economic justice and ensured that the CCF would benefit from pacifist sympathy.

That the CCF came to symbolize this alliance reflected not only Woodsworth's personal philosophy but that of a broad range of socialist organizations formed in response to the Depression, including the LSR, the group of intellectuals responsible for drafting the Regina Manifesto and shaping the general outlines of CCF policy. The LSR's own manifesto also called for peace and disarmament as well as international co-operation through international trade.[7] Furthermore, in their book Social Planning for Canada, the leftist intelligentsia clearly emphasized the interdependence of peace and social reconstruction and warned that "mere national aloofness and mere pacifist spirit" would not be enough to keep Canada out of another European war. What was needed was a definite policy for peace based upon the popular understanding that "war is an inherent institution in our present capitalist civilization and that it can only be eliminated by a world-wide reconstruction of our social and economic institutions." Ideally, therefore, a league of socialist commonwealths would ensure world peace but, in reality, the concept of collective security was bankrupt because the League of Nations was nothing more than a league of capitalist imperialist victors. The only alternative for Canadians was to endorse neutrality and to "make clear to London and to Geneva that we intend to fertilize no more crops of poppies blooming in Flanders fields."[8]

It was an admittedly negative policy, "putting more stress upon keeping out of war than upon preserving world peace," but under the circumstances, with the world drifting towards what they perceived as an inevitable war, it appeared to the LSR that Canada's best contribution to building a peaceful world was to establish a socialist commonwealth within its own borders. In this light, pacifism and socialism were one.

The LSR consistently promoted this theme through various publications and the sponsorship of guest speakers such as Fenner Brockway, the British pacifist and socialist, and Reinhold Neibuhr and Harry Ward, the leading representatives of radical pacifist thought at Union Theological Seminary in New York, under whom some key Canadian activists, such as J. King Gordon, had studied.[9]

Gordon and other LSR and CCF figures, including Eugene Forsey, Gregory Vlastos, R.B.Y. Scott, and Eric Havelock, also held joint membership in the Fellowship for a Christian Social Order (FCSO), another product of the Depression which viewed socialism not only in political and economic terms but as the practical application of radical Christianity as well.[10] As Christian socialists they believed the social crisis confronting Canadians and the world was ultimately a spiritual problem that required a spiritual interpretation and response and they looked to the church to ease the impact of radical social change and to ensure its non-violent nature.[11]

Accordingly, the FCSO condemned the capitalist economic system as not only responsible for war but as entirely contrary to Christian belief and urged the creation of a new society which would offer the opportunity to practice the pacifist ethic of the Sermon on the Mount. Rather than traditional passive non-resistance to evil, however, what the FCSO radicals envisioned was "publicly-expressed non-co-operation" which would force capitalist governments to settle international disputes peacefully. Therefore, they pledged themselves to "the most effective non-co-operative action in which we can engage in the event of war and in times of peace."[12] It was certainly one of the first endorsements of non-violent resistance as a realistic means of social action in Canada.

In order to convert Canadians to Christian socialism, and ultimately to the CCF, FCSO members organized study groups and social action groups across Canada, released statements on various social and economic problems, gave public lectures, contributed articles to the religious and secular press, and published their own bulletin, Christian Social Action, which reached a circulation of 3,500.[13]

Young people were attracted through the Christian Commonwealth Youth Movement (CCYM), founded by Warwick F. Kelloway of Calgary, which adopted an unqualified opposition to war and endorsed the War Resister's International and its declaration: "War is a crime against humanity. We therefore are determined not to support any kind of war and to strive for the removal of all causes of war."[14]

This was similar to the message Canadian youth had been receiving through the 1920s from the Student Christian Movement and it remained prominent with the federation of all youth groups, including the CCYM, in the Canadian Youth Congress (CYC) in 1935. Under the chairmanship of Kenneth Woodsworth, the CYC endeavoured to mobilize Canadian youth behind social and economic reconstruction and world peace through public forums, demonstrations, and torch light parades. Such activities clearly benefitted the CCF, and it was no surprise that Saskatchewan's Tommy Douglas was one of the CYC delegates to the World Youth Peace Congress meeting in Geneva in 1936 under the auspices of the International League of Nations Society.[15]

Meanwhile, on the prairies the centre of radical Christian support for both democratic socialism and pacifism was the Alberta School of Religion, an annual summer camp for United Church ministers and their families situated approximately twenty miles from Calgary on the Bow River. Under the direction of its founder, Harry M. Horricks, and his assistants, Arthur H. Rowe, Stanley Hunt, and Charles H.

Huestis, the Alberta School of Religion became a dynamic forum for radical thought. Over the years it attracted an illustrious group of speakers which included CCF spokesmen such as Woodsworth, William Irvine, T.C. Douglas, and Carlyle King, as well as internationally known pacifists such as Harry Ward, Sherwood Eddy, and A.J. Muste.[16] Although originally affiliated with the FCSO, Horrick's group placed an even stronger emphasis upon pacifism, requiring all members to take a personal pacifist pledge, and finally switched affiliation to a strictly pacifist organization, the Fellowship of Reconciliation (FOR).[17]

By the mid-1930s, therefore, CCF philosophy was being promoted by several radical Christian, youth, and women's organizations which appealed to pacifist as well as socialist loyalties. Indeed, many actually came to view the CCF as the political expression of pacifism and the connection was quite evident in the predominance of the CCF in the broad range of groups and individuals, including those mentioned above, which comprised the peace movement.[18] For all practical purposes the WIL appeared to be the women's peace arm of the CCF and its leading figure, Laura Jamieson, had been active in the west coast branch of the LSR before becoming a CCF member of the British Columbia legislature. Other WIL activists in the CCF included Beatrice Brigden and Lucy Woodsworth in Winnipeg and, in Toronto, Anna Sissons, Alice Loeb and Dr. Rose Henderson, one of the dynamic leaders of the party's Women's Joint Committee.[19] As politically conscious feminists, the WIL successfully wedded their interests in women's rights and peace to democratic socialism.

The same was true of the FOR, the leading Christian pacifist organization in Canada. Most FOR members were United Church ministers and laymen, especially those in the FCSO, and nearly all considered the CCF as the political embodiment of their ideals.[20] Stalwarts in the Saskatoon chapter included Violet McNaughton, the WIL activist, Peter Makaroff, the Doukhobor lawyer and CCF candidate in several elections, and Carlyle King, a young university professor and outspoken anti-imperialist. King, who later became president of the CCF in Saskatchewan, was the first national chairman of the FOR in Canada and, as such, led pacifists into the war years.[21]

This cross fertilization between the movement for peace and that for the co-operative commonwealth had taken a fateful turn in 1934 with the appearance of the Canadian League Against War and Facism (CLWF), later renamed the Canadian League for Peace and Democracy, a Communist party front organization under the direction of A.A. MacLeod. Through the CLWF MacLeod hoped to steer social activists away from doctrinaire pacifism and towards the view of peace as realizable through radical change and socialist solidarity and, thereby, to arouse public support for an alliance with the Soviet Union against fascist aggression. To this end MacLeod successfully attracted a wide range of CCF, FOR, WIL, and CYC support in staging peace rallies, protests against the persecution of European Jews, and, particularly, in organizing assistance for Spanish republicans through the Canadian Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy and the Friends of the Mackenzie-Papineau Battalion.[22]

Although MacLeod's League had already questioned the validity of pacifism as a socialist creed, it was the Spanish Civil War itself which triggered a crisis of conscience within CCF ranks, causing numerous members to abandon their party's commitment to non-violence and a neutral foreign policy for the fight against fascism. Officially the CCF maintained its neutralist stance and even rationalized the Foreign Enlistment Act as protection for Canadian neutrality,[23] but it became increasingly evident that the war in Spain was taking its toll on CCF solidarity and had given rise to an internal struggle between interventionist and isolationist forces which finally came to a head in 1939.

The final retreat to a rather insular attitude by pacifists is understandable in the context of the late 1930s but that did not mean that the CCF's early brand of pacifism was the equivalent of isolationism, at least not according to one of the party's leading pacifist theorists, George Grube. Writing in the Canadian Forum, Grube argued that rather than passive non-interference or isolationism, pacifism entailed constructive actions of mass resistance and non-co-operation, similar to that carried on by Gandhi in India, "including the general strike as well as the refusal to bear arms or pay taxes." If organized for non-co-operation, he predicted, the power of the proletariat would be "irresistable."[24] It was this revolutionary potential of pacifism in either imperialist wars or class wars of social liberation which Grube and others in the CCF considered an important new dimension of the social struggle. Socialist victories around the world, even in Spain, he argued, would be more likely to occur if the energy devoted to armed resistance was expended in organizing popular non-violent resistance to fascist governments. The real problem for socialists, therefore, was how to do this without succumbing to destructive fascist wars. There would be no easy solutions to this dilemma but Grube expressed confidence that the spread of pacifist non-co-operation across national boundaries would eventually help ensure the victory of peace and internationalism.[25]

This type of vague and optimistic faith revealed an important religious quality of pacifism, but for most inspiration and ideas Grube drew upon the contemporary body of pacifist literature, including the writings of the Dutch sociologist, Barthélemy de Ligt.[26] Another important influence, especially in interpreting Gandhian resistance, was Richard Gregg's *The Power of Non-Violence*, probably the most widely read book in Canadian pacifist circles throughout the decade.

Despite such intellectual underpinnings and its traditional Christian socialist faith in the brotherhood of man, the CCF's pacifist internationalism was increasingly frustrated by its inability to affect significantly the volatile social and political situation in Europe. Once those who wished to actively challenge fascism found it necessary to support armed intervention as the only realistic course of action, the pacifist position, including the CCF's neutralist policy, became irrevocably linked with isolationism. Although this polarization within the party continued through the decade, an important shift in policy was evident as early as 1937 when the CCF National Council rephrased its 1936 foreign policy resolution so as to urge neutrality only in the event of an "imperialist" war. Did this mean the party would now openly support a war to resist fascism, as in Spain? Woodsworth, of course, continued to call for strict neutrality and the CCF endorsed that position in regard to the Sino-Japanese conflict.[27] Nevertheless, as unrest continued to mount, the neutralist platform was doomed. By the following year leading CCF spokesmen such as Eugene Forsey, Eric Havelock, and the National Chairman, M.J. Coldwell, had renounced pacifism and the party itself again modified its official stand in order to recognize the need for home defense. Finally, with the British declaration of war in September 1939, the crisis within the party came to a head.

Meeting in special session, the CCF National Council was sharply divided between the pacifists under Woodsworth and the interventionists led by George Williams, a proud World War I veteran and president of the party in Saskatchewan.[28] As Walter Young has explained, however, it was also a split between those who still considered the CCF a social movement and those who were concerned about its future as a party, with the latter being in control.[29] The CCF National Secretary, David Lewis, for instance, let there be no doubt that he feared support for the pacifist position would ruin the party's political fortunes as he pushed the CCF as close to a full endorsement of the war as possible under the circumstances. In the end, Woodsworth's motion for a straight vote for or against the war was sidestepped in favour of a compromise which supported economic assistance to Britain and provision for home defense but opposed the deployment of Canadian forces overseas.[30]

Approved by a final vote of fifteen to seven, the new position was not only a clear reversal of party policy but signalled as well a loss of idealism; an abandonment of the prophetic role. Despite the "sharp line drawn between economic assistance and military intervention overseas," and the fact that the party membership at large remained divided over the issue for a time, the CCF was launched upon the road to total war support and there would be no turning back. As in World War I, the forces of social reform had joined with the war effort and its route to victory.

Although feeling somewhat disillusioned and betrayed, pacifists in the CCF generally accepted the turn of events by devoting their energies to the reconciliation of social tensions and the defense of civil liberties, waiting for a new day to translate pacifism into meaningful social action. Otherwise, as Carlyle King reminded the disgruntled minority, there were few avenues open for action or criticism once the War Measures Act was in force. Even George Grube came to realize it was extremely difficult to be active in politics and still hold pacifist ideals; therefore, he concluded that pacifists "could have little influence in politics and should be content to play the role of the social prophet in society."[31]

To a large extent the pacifists had been misunderstood, probably because pacifism itself had different meanings ranging from the non-resistance of religious sects to neutral isolationism. To socially conscious pacifists in the CCF, however, pacifism had come to symbolize the ideal of radical social change; the perfection of democratic socialism. Others went even further and viewed pacifism as a realistic strategy for social action, but this relatively new dimension of non-violent resistance was never fully articulated and therefore failed to arm pacifists with an effective means to combat injustice. Amid the escalation of fascist aggression in the late 1930s, pacifists were bound to identify with the isolationist mood.

Nevertheless, early in its evolution the CCF had clearly represented a democratic socialist movement shaped in varying degrees by a pacifist emphasis upon co-operation and human understanding; the peaceful settlement of disputes between men, women and nations; and the revolutionary concept of passive resistance, all of which were challenged by World War II. It would be left to later generations of Canadians to continue the development of such a social philosophy but there could be no escaping the fact that the political heritage of the later CCF and the NDP which followed was deeply rooted in the pacifist tradition.

NOTES

1 The "Regina Manifesto," reproduced in Walter Young, *The Anatomy of a Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969), pp. 304-13.

2 *Minutes of the Genesee Yearly Meeting of the Society of Friends*, 1919, p. 21.

3 *Western Labor News*, 5 September 1919, p. 6; for a fuller discussion of the peace movement during the 1920s see Thomas P. Socknat, "'Witness Against War': Pacifism in Canada, 1900-1945" (Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University, 1981), and Donald M. Page, "The Development of a Western Canadian Peace Movement" in S.M. Trofimenkoff, ed., *The Twenties in Western Canada* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1972), pp. 75-106.

4 This is clearly explained in Richard Allen, *The Social Passion* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1971).

5 Page, pp. 90-93; Saskatchewan Archives Board (SAB), Violet McNaughton Papers, McNaughton to Jane Addams, 4 October 1929.

6 SAB, Violet McNaughton Papers, file E.95 (1), Agnes Macphail to McNaughton, 1 March 1929. For more on the WIL feminists see Joan Sangster's essay in this volume.

7 LSR Manifesto, reproduced in Michiel Horn, *The League for Social Reconstruction* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1980), p. 220.

8 League for Social Reconstruction, Research Committee, *Social Planning for Canada*, introduction by F.R. Scott et al. (Toronto: T. Nelson, 1935; reprint ed., Toronto: University of Toronto 1975), pp. 518, 522.

9 Ibid., p. xii; J. King Gordon, "A Christian Socialist in the 1930's," in Richard Allen, ed., *The Social Gospel in Canada* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), p. 125.

10 Interview with R.B.Y. Scott, 9 November 1976.

11 For example see McGill University Archives, J. King Gordon, "Capitalism--A Played Out Creed," *The Echo*, 4 (Winter, 1932), p. 15.

12 Roger Hutchinson, "The Fellowship for a Christian Social Order: A Social Ethical Analysis of a Christian Socialist Movement" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Victoria University, Toronto, 1975), pp. 273, 275.

13 *Christian Social Action*, 11 (March, 1940), p. 1.

14 Norman A. Colley, ed., *The Handbook of the Christian Commonwealth Youth Movement* (Calgary: National Council of the CCYM, 1932), p. 22.

15 McMaster University Special Collections, Canadian Youth Congress Papers, box 1, file 2, minutes of the Canadian Youth Congress, Toronto, 5 June 1935, 10 July 1935, and 24 July 1935; Kenneth Woodsworth, "The World Youth Congress," *The New Outlook*, 14 October 1936.

16 SAB, H.M. Horricks Papers, Mrs. H.M. Horricks to Richard Allen, 22 June 1963; Alberta School of Religion, Programme of Annual Sessions, 1928-1946; interview with Carlyle King, 29 September 1977.

17 SAB, H.M. Horricks Papers, "The Horricks Fellowship Pledge."

18 Interview with Carlyle King.

19 SAB, McNaughton Papers, file E.95 (4), Minutes of the Organization Conference, Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, Canadian Section, Winnipeg, 1-2 June 1937; Anna Sissons to McNaughton, telegram, 16 February 1937; John Manley, "Women and the Left in the 1930's: the Case of the Toronto CCF Women's Joint Committee," *Atlantis*, 5, 2 (Spring, 1980), pp. 100-119. Although never officially a member of the CCF, Violet McNaughton laid a basis for CCF support in Saskatchewan. For this information I am indebted to Sophia Dixon, Women's President of the United Farmers of Canada in 1934, CCF founding member at the 1933 Regina Conference, and herself a member of the WIL.

20 During the early 1930s one of the leading pacifists in the Toronto FOR was Richard Roberts, co-founder of the original FOR in Britain in 1914 and Moderator of the United Church of Canada.

21 SAB, Carlyle King Papers, King to Mrs. N.A. Frasen, 15 October 1939.

22 A.A. MacLeod Papers (in possession of Mrs. A.A. MacLeod, Toronto); interview with Mrs. A.A. MacLeod, 30 March 1976.

23 For instance, this was the opinion of F.R. Scott. (Horn, p. 151.)

24 George Grube, "Pacifism and Socialism," Canadian Forum, October 1936, p. 9.

25 George Grube, "Pacifism and Human Nature," Canadian Forum, July 1936, p. 15.

26 As book review editor, Grube gave special attention to de Ligt's Mobilization Against all Wars, published in 1936. (Canadian Forum, August 1936, p. 25.)

27 For an account of these events see Agnes Jean Groome, "M.J. Coldwell and C.C.F. Foreign Policy, 1932-1950" (M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, Regina, 1967), and Kenneth McNaught, A Prophet in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959), p. 286.

28 Woodsworth was supported by Stanley Knowles, F.R. Scott, Dorothy Steeves, Frank Underhill, and Chester Ronning. The interventionists included Williams, Angus MacInnis, David Lewis, A.A. Heaps, and H. Gargrave. (PAC, CCF Records, National Council minutes, 6-8 September 1939.)

29 Young, p. 95. I disagree here with Alan Whitehorn's assertion in this volume that Young condemns the CCF's evolution into a party. On the contrary, Young merely provides a useful description of that evolution which partly explains why the CCF could not maintain as a party the same prophetic role it enjoyed as a social movement.

30 PAC, CCF Records, National Council minutes, 6-8 September 1939.

31 United Church Observer, 15 July 1939, p. 11.

"Women and the New Era"[1]: The Role of Women in the Early CCF, 1933-1940

Joan Sangster

At the founding convention of the CCF in Regina, the women delegates were far outnumbered by the men in the conference hall.[2] Despite their small numbers, they were a determined and dedicated group, many of whom, like the men, had to improvise and economize to reach Regina that summer. Dorothy Steeves and Mildred Osterhaut Fahrni shared a bumpy ride from Vancouver to Regina in a car which specialized in tire blowouts and which they feared would not make it through the mountains. Lorna Cotton-Thomas, a well-educated but unemployed University of Toronto graduate, illegally used a friend's CPR pass, much to the dismay and disapproval of her boyfriend, who tried to persuade her that in this case the means did *not* justify the end. Elizabeth Morton, a member of the SPC, drove from Toronto, sharing a car with four other delegates and paying her expenses with speaking engagements along the way.[3] These women, along with the other female delegates at Regina, symbolized the important presence, although less influential and powerful roles, that women were to have in this new party. Their distinct contribution to the early growth of the CCF has been largely ignored by historians, perhaps because women, always a minority of CCF leadership, were less visible to the eye of the political historian, or perhaps because historians have too easily undervalued women's support work in the movement and dismissed the discussion of "women's issues" which did occur in the early history of the party.[4] This essay will attempt to write women back into the history of the CCF, examining the reasons why they were drawn to a socialist party, the roles they played in it, and the functions CCF Women's Committees fulfilled.

Although women were drawn to the CCF from disparate backgrounds, and with differing socialist ideals, certain common themes underscored their activism. Women already active in left-wing politics came into the CCF from other earlier socialist parties, farm groups, and the LSR. Many of these activists, as well as the newer recruits, were deeply affected by the harsh experience of farm and working-class life or by the economic upheaval of the Depression. Many had found answers to their questioning of the social order through their re-education in socialist literature by authors like Edward Bellamy, Karl Marx, and the British

Fabians. Once active in the CCF, women tended to occupy specific political roles and dominated few political tasks. A minority of national and provincial leadership, women were more likely to be found in the necessary but routine grass-roots work, in educational work, or as local and regional organizers. Drawing on traditions of earlier labourite and farm groups, some women formed women's auxiliaries and women's committees. These separate or semi-autonomous social, study, and lobby groups emerged with goals ranging from fund raising to feminist social action. Such women's organizations were sometimes encouraged by the CCF although it did not see "the woman question" as an issue of priority. Indeed, only a minority of women who became involved in the CCF did so with feminist goals and an interest in women's issues in the forefront of their activism. For this minority, women's committees were the medium for their attempts to rectify women's lower membership numbers, and women's lower profile in the CCF. The recognized that, despite the CCF's egalitarian principles, in practice women's activities in the movement were sex-segregated and women were under-represented in the leadership, a reflection of the fact that the CCF, like the society it strove to change, upheld distinct and sometimes unequal roles for women.

I

Many women made an easy and natural entry into the CCF from their previous political work in the 1920s and early 1930s: women in local labour parties, left-leaning women in farm organizations like the United Farmers of Canada (Saskatchewan Section) [UFC(SS)], women in the SPC and in the LSR found a familiar pathway into the CCF from their earlier political work. Some women were introduced to the CCF through the co-operative movement and through peace groups, or they "inherited" a family tradition of socialist activism: parental involvement in prairie co-ops or in a labour party might interest young women in CCF youth groups, while husbands sometimes encouraged their wives to join CCF women's auxiliaries. Hilda Kristiansen, for example, grew up in an atmosphere conducive to the development of a socialist perspective: her father was active in the local co-op, the UFC(SS), and attended the 1933 Regina Convention, while her mother was quietly supportive of these causes.[5] Likewise, Nellie Peterson, later a dynamic organizer and leader in Alberta, as a child witnessed her parents' support of progressive causes like the United Farmers of Alberta (UFA) and the co-op movement, and in the family circle she was encouraged to "debate politics, including socialism" with her parents.[6]

Still, the commitment of women to the CCF cannot be explained simply by the "inheritance" of family and party politics, for family members could always stray from their parents' ideals and activists in the Independent Labour Party (ILP) might have taken their activism elsewhere. What then were the motivating forces behind women's commitment to socialism? Although it is difficult to weigh and measure the political motivations of any one group precisely, certain common influences are apparent in the motivational mix that made women socialists: women's experience of working-class life or farm life, or their witness to social inequalities, often combined with exposure to socialist ideas of various types to interest them in the CCF.

Economic insecurity and arduous working conditions were the lot of most working-class and farm women in the 1920s; the Great Depression only worsened their lot. Single and married women working for wages faced wage reductions, speed-ups and, in some occupations, the loss of their jobs. Women workers were often forced to resort to the only alternative open to them--despised and poorly-paid domestic work. In many cities single unemployed women found relief either impossible to obtain or impossible to live on, and their working sisters sometimes subsisted on wages equal to, or less than, the meagre relief allotments. The personal experience of wage-work might interest women in socialism; so might the mere knowledge of such working conditions, for women were also affected by the experience of friends, relatives, or even strangers around them. Irene Biss, a professor at the University of Toronto and LSR activist, investigated and wrote about the conditions of Toronto garment workers. Similarly, British Columbia judge Laura Jamieson was moved by the grim situation of women workers.

Unemployment and relief--either experienced first hand or viewed second hand--were also radicalizing forces for many women. In East York, a Toronto municipality hard hit by unemployment, relief recipients, aided by existing associations and local socialists, organized collectively into a self-help and action-oriented organization, the East York Workers' Association (EYWA). Women in the EYWA constructed their own women's Marxist study group, and contributed their energy to the Association's anti-eviction campaigns, its lobbying efforts, and attempts at mutual aid. Some of these women subsequently joined the CCF.[7]

Nor was the relief experience limited to urban Canada. In the West, and particularly in Saskatchewan, depression and drought carved out a path of destruction and poverty. Income levels plummetted and some families, if not forced off their land, were reduced to the most meagre subsistence, or the humiliation of relief. Letters from women to the *Western Producer*, and later to the CCF newspapers, often included poignant descriptions of their struggle with economic adversity. The burden of rearranging the already inadequate budget or of finding immediate methods of raising petty cash to keep the family going often fell upon women. These years, according to many women who became CCFers, left an indelible mark on their memories. Women were forced to leave school early to support their families; they were faced with the fear--and the reality--of crop failure; they were sometimes uprooted to the city; they were given no alternative but relief; they scrimped and compromised on their family budget; and they saw brothers and friends leave to ride the rods or head to the Relief Camps. In the midst of such social upheaval, it is hardly surprising that some women began to question the status quo. Economic dislocation led to a questioning of the system, and encouraged many people to see farm failure and unemployment as a shared social predicament. Anti-establishment actions like the On-to-Ottawa Trek were increasingly viewed with sympathy, for women had relatives and friends who had relayed to them the intense frustration and hopelessness of life in the "Slave Camps." Although the Depression did not cause the emergence of the CCF, it did encourage some women to reflect on the social order and it stimulated their search for an alternative system. "It seemed by 1933," recalled Sophia Dixon, "as if the capitalist system was simply crumbling before us and our task was to find and build a new system which could replace the old."[8]

Women's experience of inequality and their exposure to social deprivation fused with their re-education in socialist ideas to become a powerful combination leading them to CCF involvement. For a significant number of early CCFers, a radical understanding of Christian teaching and their participation in progressive Christian groups like the FCSO aided their introduction to the CCF. For these people, who followed in the tradition of the social gospel, the CCF was the logical political extension of their belief in the need to apply Christian principles, in a pragmatic sense, to the economic and social order. Some young CCF activists, like Marjorie Mann, had their early education in the Student Christian Movement, a student organization founded in the 1920s.[9] Similarly, Avis McCurdy, who came from a middle-class family in the Maritimes, described her path into politics: "I came straight to the CCF because I was convinced I had to be my brother's keeper. It was right out of my religious background--CGIT and SCM. I had also worked in business in my summers, and was overcome with the injustice and inequality. But mainly, it was my moral, religious background."[10]

Older women like Louise Lucas, Beatrice Brigden, and Mildred Fahrni also found in the CCF a logical extension of their ideas about the brotherhood and equality of man.

Brigden, despite the fact that she left the organized church, continued to see her political vision as a Christian one.[11] Mildred Fahrni, who grew up in a religious household, found her eyes opened to the inequalities and waste of capitalist society during the Depression, particularly when she worked with single unemployed women in Vancouver. At the same time, her intellectual growth as a Christian and pacifist were also integral to her activism. The influence of her university studies, especially at Bryn Mawr and the London School of Economics, of her travels to Russia and later India, and of her life at Kingsley Hall Settlement House, all shaped her socialism which was ethical, humanist and Christian in nature: "We CCFers were evangelists," she remembers, "out to build a new world order, out to build the Kingdom...and we felt it could be done!" Even CCFers who did not participate in organized Christian groups like the FCSO often described their politics, in part, as "applied Christianity": to many, explained Nellie Peterson, socialism was simply the practical expression of Christian ideas about equality.[12] In a society still receptive to the moral language of Christianity, many CCFers, even if unattached to the Church, culled their metaphors from traditions of radical Christian ideals such as the Brotherhood of Man just as earlier socialist and labour activists had drawn on these metaphors to argue their case for social justice.

For CCF women like Mildred Fahrni, Christian ideals were inextricably intertwined with pacifist ones, and indeed, for many CCFers, and particularly CCF women, the new party was attractive because of its commitment to the principles of international peace. Behind Fahrni's pacifism lay both a materialist analysis of war as a means of economic aggrandizement, of gaining power and status, and perhaps more predominantly, a humanist belief that under no circumstances was taking a human life justifiable. Although other CCF women subscribed to different variations of anti-war and pacifist ideals, most saw some connection between their socialism, pacifism, and feminism, and a great number of CCF women found common cause for these ideals in the WIL. In the 1920s the WIL had branches in Vancouver, Winnipeg and Toronto and was affiliated to some women's farm groups; it was given informal but enthusiastic leadership by Laura Jamieson, a former suffragist and social reformer who later became a CCFer. In the 1920s the WIL's well publicized campaigns against militarism in the schools were supported by many socialists, and by the early 1930s a list of the WIL leadership began to look like a list of well-known CCF women. Although the WIL membership also included many liberal pacifists, it did appeal to an important group of socialist women with its calls for the elimination of social, economic and sexual inequalities, as well as violence, from all societies.[13]

For women like Rose Henderson, Laura Jamieson, and Lucy Woodsworth, who had been influenced by the maternal feminism of the suffrage era, WIL principles and the CCF's pacifist connection had a special attraction. Not only did the WIL speak to the economic causes of war, but it also spoke to women's maternal understanding of peace. Henderson, for example, a long-time peace advocate, published a pamphlet in the 1920s which reflected these ideas. The germs of war, she argued, were economic: "they are hatched within capitalism." No less than the working class, who were inevitably used as "cannon fodder," women, the bearers of life, had much to lose from war. Thus women, in alliance with the working-class, must become the leaders in the cause for peace. It was because they were mothers, she concluded, that women best understand the value and sanctity of human life and therefore the need for peace:

> Are not all mothers one people? Do not all mothers love their children? Would not all mothers die to save their children from slaughter and suffering?
>
> If humanity is to exist--if peace is to be a reality, the mothers of the world must become the standard bearers, martyrs in the cause. They must be prepared to suffer as much in the cause of peace as they were willing to suffer in the cause of war.[74]

Henderson's pacifism was a unique blend of socialist and feminist ideas which was not uncommon to other CCF women. Drawing on both a materialist analysis of imperialism, and an idealized view of women's maternal commitment to nonviolence, many women came to see peace as a socialist issue and a women's issue and they turned to the CCF as a peace alternative. Moreover, the tight connection between the WIL and CCF women undoubtedly aided the growth of the CCF, for some women may have learned of, or joined, the CCF through the WIL connection, or vice versa.

Although Christian and pacifist ideas were strong intellectual motivations and justifications behind the commitment of many CCF women, there were also other important ideological traditions stimulating women's interest in socialism. In British Columbia and to a lesser extent Ontario, a Marxist tradition, carried partly through the SPC, was the impetus behind some women's interest in socialism. Again, the immediate realities of economic inequality and class conflict--both brought into sharp focus by the Depression--provided the background to their radicalization. Their intellectual development as socialists, however, was shaped most distinctly by the writings of Marx and Marxists.

Although the CCF did not rely predominantly on Marx and Engels in their educational work, as did the Communist party, Marxist books were offered for sale through many education and literature committees. Also, in areas where a strong tradition of Marxism existed, as in British Columbia, some CCF members who were well versed in Marxist ideas attempted to share them with newcomers to the movement. For instance, a self-taught Marxist in the British Columbia party, George Weaver, who often spoke at meetings and wrote a column in the Federationist, used Marx and Engels to explain women's oppression. His writings tended to stress women's primary subordination to the economic exploitation of a class society; however, he drew heavily on Engels' Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State, in an attempt to construct a fairly sophisticated dialectical understanding of the class and sexual exploitation of women.[15]

Women whose radicalization crystallized around Marxist ideas saw Depression conditions as a sharp reminder of the inherent contradictions of a capitalist economy. The events and issues around them--the exploitation of wage earners, the state's response to the unemployed, the growth of fascism--were made more understandable by their re-education in Marxist ideas. For some women, this re-education led them to downplay women's inequality in the movement and stress class solidarity:

> my main attitude was that women shouldn't be separated from men. The problem was not a sexual one, but an economic one, and the economic problem makes a sexual one.

But in retrospect, continued Eve Smith, her own enthusiasm may have made her tactless in some women's eyes:

> at the National Convention in Edmonton (1938) the women asked me to speak to them...I said why do you have a women's group? Why do you not have a mixed group? They said women can more easily attend day meetings, and at mixed meetings, women don't like to talk in front of the men. I said, "well you just have to get up and talk at mixed meetings!"[16]

On the other hand, immersion in Marxist ideas may have sensitized women to an awareness of problems ignored by others. Eve Smith, for example, was also active in the Single Women's Unemployment Association and in her brief turn as "women's columnist" for the Federationist stressed some of the urgent problems of women wage-earners.

Moreover, Marxist ideas in the CCF cannot be simplified to one precise viewpoint for Marxists themselves varied in their outlooks, and some socialists included Marxist ideas with other influences n an eclectic socialist philosophy. Dorothy Steeves, for instance, combined her knowledge of Marxism with Fabian-like disgust for the waste and inefficiency of a system based on profit rather than public planning. Indeed, the socialist development of women in the CCF did not emerge only from Christian and ethical principles, or from Marxist ideas, for the intellectual traditions comprising the CCF crossed the spectrum from Fabianism to Bellamyite socialism. The high number of women who later recalled the powerful influence of Bellamy's Looking Backward on their politicization attests to the importance of the latter tradition. To them, Bellamy's Utopia appealed as a society in which poverty and inequality, and class conflict and violence, had all been planned away. Women who came to the CCF from the agrarian movement brought with them the influence of their own class analysis, which stressed the value of small producers; criticized the power of capitalist financial institutions; and rejected competitive individualism in favour of co-operative principles. Lastly, women who were schooled in the LSR brought ideas of Webbian socialism and state planning drawn from their reading of the Fabians. Moreover, none of these intellectual influences had to remain finite and absolute. Indeed, in a movement in which continuing socialist education had an important place, the intellectual options available to CCF women were continually broadened as they participated in weekly club meetings and discussion groups, in special educational and summer camps, listening to various points of view and reading a wide range of radical literature always available through the literature secretary or education committee.

II

Whatever their background, once active in the CCF many women gravitated towards specifically "female" areas of political work, revealing the existence of a political sexual division of labour within the CCF similar to that in Canadian society. Although some women like Grace MacInnis and Dorothy Steeves became well-known national CCF leaders, and a slightly larger group became regional leaders, the majority of women were most active at the grass-roots of the party. Some female CCFers formed women's committees and women's auxiliaries, while others were more directly integrated into party work; the latter group, however, were still most often concentrated in electoral support work, constituency organizing, and educational work, rather than policy making.

To some extent, women's grass-roots work in the CCF overlapped with the support work performed by some of the women's auxiliaries and women's committees. It is a truism that, in political parties, women were called on to "make the coffee and lick the envelopes"; the truism, however, does not give emphasis to the fact that such support work was essential to the day-to-day maintenance of the CCF. As one CCF woman put it: "the CCF was made in the kitchen and you didn't find too many men in the kitchen!"[17] It was this kind of maintenance work which preoccupied the time of many CCF women, partly because they were more comfortable in such "behind the scenes" work, partly because many housewives could fit such work into their domestic schedule, and partly because the CCF encouraged women to fulfill these roles. In an article in the Ontario New Commonwealth one writer described "How to Organize a Successful CCF Unit," explaining that the social committee, an essential unit of the party, should be at least two-thirds women because they were "perfect jewels" at raising funds and lovad "playing amateur salesladies at bake sales."[18] Such exhortations for women to remain the drones in the movement were not, of course, part of a conscious design to segregate women in inferior roles; it was just much easier to let women occupy traditional roles while the men proceeded with the "important" task of policy making--an easy imitation of the male-dominated power structure existing outside the party.

Election time often found CCF newspapers taking note of the part women should and could play in politics. Since it was often assumed that women, isolated amidst domestic drudgery, had little time or inclination to consider politics, these articles tried to indicate ways in which government decisions affected women's daily lives, and especially the lives of their children. Politics do not simply involve abstract principles, they would say, for government decisions decide whether your husband will work, how much you will pay for milk, what kind of education your children receive, and if your family will get adequate medical care. On the one hand, these appeals mirrored the conception that women, isolated with their diapers and dishes, were less knowledgeable and more apathetic than men. But they were also a simple reflection of the CCF's logical political planning: it placed important emphasis on electoral politics, and since most women were homemakers, the party felt it must convince this large constituency of the need for socialism by speaking to the immediate daily concerns of women in the home.

Women were asked not only to vote for the CCF, but also to take an active part in the party, and to many in the CCF this signified a more egalitarian approach than the two older political parties. As one masculine friend commented (and not in jest), "In clubs, women not only fold and stamp literature, they also go out door to door with male comrades to distribute it...[whereas] under the old parties, women are almost disenfranchised."[19] Many women did their "door to door" work only during election times; others remained actively involved in local and provincial organizing all year round. In Winnipeg, for instance, Edith Cove was known for her work with the Labor Women's Federation and as the efficient manager of many local election victories in Winnipeg North-Centre. In Saskatchewan, women like Gertrude Harvey, Florence Baker, Eve Pfeifer, and Elsie Gorius developed respected reputations as membership and election campaign organizers; "those Saskatchewan women," remembers Grace MacInnis, "they were organizers...many MPs were only in parliament because of the women's organizing skills."[20]

Women like Elsie Gorius in Saskatchewan and Nellie Peterson in Alberta were able to work as travelling organizers for the CCF, not only because of their proven organizing talents, but also because of the essential aid of a supportive family, including someone to care for the children. Many other women found that long absences from home were not tolerated by their husbands who shared the community's suspicions of such "wandering wives."[21] Gorius's mother looked after her son; "otherwise," she concluded, "I wouldn't have been able to do political work."[22] Similarly, when Nellie Peterson travelled throughout Alberta as an organizer she had a sympathetic mother to help look after her son, and a politically supportive husband--an essential to the career of any woman organizer.[23] Many women who were active at the local level of the CCF (especially in urban areas) doing constituency work, gathering memberships, and helping raise funds had to combine their domestic work with their political activities. In a short article written for the Ontario Commonwealth, a local publicity organizer in Fort William described her normal day, revealing both the kind of work women often did, and the way in which married women integrated domestic and political labour:

> up at 8, feed family of 5, make lunch send boy to school, do report on meetings, draw up ads, numerous phone calls, 9:00 dress baby, wash dishes, answer phone, make beds, sweep and dust, answer phone. sell potatoes donated by country CCF units. write letters and notes for tonight's speech. dishwashing, cleaning, calls, dress baby for outdoors, odd jobs, supper, prepare kids for bed, go to meeting.[24]

Thus, at the local level, women often worked in elections, on membership drives, and as fund raisers, and they figured as secretaries of CCF Clubs and as constituency organizers. At the local and provincial levels, women were also highly represented in educational work. Within a constituency CCF Club, women were often put in charge of local libraries or acted as literature secretaries, as one Saskatchewan woman remembers: "we had a constituency library run by Mrs. Laura Dolman, with books on socialism. She was a school teacher and knew the literature used for discussion groups and encouraged people to read the books."[25] In almost every province, a woman acted as Literature Secretary, and women comprised significant numbers on the Provincial Education Committee, which took on tasks like deciding what books to order, drawing up reading lists, establishing discussion groups, and organizing CCF summer schools. The predominance of women in educational work may have been, in part, a result of the widely-held notion that women were eminently suited for such practical tasks, as well as the fact that women did prefer behind-the-scenes organizational work. More important, however, was the duplication within the CCF of the occupational structures found outside it. In the 1930s the only professions truly open to women were teaching and nursing; as a consequence, women's participation in education committees was seen as logical and natural. Also, many CCF women who had a university or secondary school education had worked as teachers and were probably eager to use their skills in party work. Their roles were often justified and understood within the same circle of ideas which had earlier explained the feminization of teaching. Because women were well suited to teaching the young, it was said, they could put these same talents to use in socializing new members to socialist ideas: "women teachers worked with youth and this helped them to realize that we had to reach the younger generation. Their mind was turned to the channels of education--how to get ideas across, that is why women were involved in education...."[26]

Thus, the combination of women's proven skills and the easy acceptance of their traditional work roles encouraged women to involve themselves in educational work. Although women's participation in Educational Committees emerged from this narrow definition of women's "proper" social sphere, there is no doubt that education also had a recognized importance in the CCF. As a new socialist party, and as a party opposed to the dominant social norms of competition and free enterprise, the CCF needed both an informed membership and new recruits--both of which relied, to some extent, on educational work. As part of their mandate to foster socialist discussion and extend the knowledge of party members, educational committees organized CCF summer camps, and again women were prominent as camp organizers. Such camps aided the development of members' own politics and consolidated their allegiance to socialist politics in an atmosphere of cameradorie and common purpose. In Saskatchewan, Gertrude Telford, who organized the Crystal Lake Camp from 1937 to 1942, noted the extent of planning needed: "we had educational programs - lectures, speakers were brought in, we had discussions on economics, debating and also, recreational activities, swimming, games and campfire programs."[27]

Women's prominence as organizers of such camps resulted, in part, from their important role on education committees; it may also have been the result of the more flexible summer schedule of women who were homemakers. Camps usually lasted for a week or more and their organization and maintenance took considerable time, for besides the arrangement of educational material, the essentials of accommodation, cooking and cleaning all had to be organized. Family responsibilities could also be transported to the camp, for, in Saskatchewan, provision was made for children's tents and programmes. Within camp life, however, women were never limited to domestic tasks. Because camps were organized as a microcosm of the truly communal, socialist future, everyone shared in the dishwashing--a fact commented on so positively by the women that one has to suspect that it was not the practice outside camp life.

Many of the women who made a significant contribution to Education Committees were, or became a part of, the provincial leadership. In general, of course, women were highly underrepresented in the leadership of both national and provincial parties, with their degree of underrepresentation varying over time and by province. Women tended to gain election to provincial councils and executives more easily than national ones. In the 1930s in Saskatchewan women comprised up to one-quarter, occasionally one-third, of the provincial leadership--a fairly high percentage which might be explained by established traditions of female participation in the farm movement. Similarly, in British Columbia a consistent female group was represented in provincial council, a situation in part due to the existence of three women CCFers in the legislature. Dorothy Steeves, one of those three, rose to a position of some influence in the British Columbia party, acting as Vice President of the CCF and gaining province-wide prominence. Grace MacInnis, also an MLA, became a CCF leader of some influence.

No easy generalization can characterize the qualities of women in leadership positions, for these women differed in their politics and in their personal styles. Steeves, for example, was known as a sharp-minded (and sometimes sharp-tongued) debater, and herself maintained that "she was as good as any man." Saskatchewan's Louise Lucas, on the other hand, had a very different personality. Less an intellectual, but a charismatic, religious-minded woman, Lucas became known as a never-tiring evangelist for the movement, and her acceptance of the title "Mother of the CCF" indicated a different reputation which stressed the feminine attributes in her leadership. Although women who became leaders could vary as much as Steeves and Lucas did, one wonders if women, who held far fewer leadership positions than men, were more easily squeezed into stereotypic roles, stressing either their maternal and feminine qualities, or their similarity to men.[28]

Whatever their style of politics, women shared a common experience--it was usually more difficult for them to reach leadership positions. The reasons for their circumscribed role in the CCF were complex, involving both the influence of outside society, which sanctioned sexual inequality, and the disinterest of the party in challenging those same inequalities within their own movement. The prevailing social perception of women stressed their roles as "private" beings, whose life rotated around the family, rather than their roles as "public" beings whose interests should be politics and government. Women in politics were considered an oddity. Mass magazines, on the rare occasion they addressed the subject, treated women politicians as unusual deviations from the norm, and assumed a political career and a family were almost completely incompatible. Woman's separate sphere was replicated within the party. Many members (including some women) maintained that, as a socialist party, the CCF was egalitarian, and they refused to see any evidence to the contrary. Yet, evidence did indicate that women were channelled into social committees; that women's feminine character was often described as emotional and sensitive, implying a female inability to cope with the "rational" world of politics; and that women were seen as more conservative, apathetic, and politically backward than men. Moreover, perhaps most important, because women's primary responsibility for the family was never questioned, an essential barrier to women's wholehearted participation in politics remained unchallenged and unchanged.

Nowhere was women's secondary role in the CCF more glaring than in the selection of candidates for election. Although the CCF often fared much better than the Liberals and Conservatives, women were still placed in impossible ridings or given inadequate support in their bids for CCF nominations. After Agnes Macphail's election defeat in 1940, Jean Laing lamented that so few women were seriously considered as candidates by the party:

> In Toronto, in all the Parties, the men were doing all the contesting as candidates and the women were doing all the work...there was a great increase of women for R.O.'s, poll clerks, and scrutineers. We expect of the old line Parties that

> they will nominate all men candidates, but for the CCF we look for equal recognition of the women. Yet, in Ontario, the only woman CCF candidate was Mrs. Dymond, and she was nominated because one of the man candidates was sick.

In Saskatchewan, shortly after this, Gertrude Telford lost a provincial nomination to a man whose attack on her candidature, she said privately, was "on her as a woman." Telford had for years done the hard leg work in the riding and justifiably felt unhappy when an outsider (who assured her he was not going to run) threw in his hat at the last minute. Despite some unusual circumstances surrounding the nomination meeting, the case was not investigated by the CCF. Telford was later considered as a potential replacement for Louise Lucas in the federal riding of Melville, but again she was bypassed. Lucas expressed her sympathy to Telford, as well as her anger that once again women had been ignored:

> there is no need to tell you how chagrined I am over B's nomination. If it had been Mrs. Baker, Mrs. Strum or you, I would have felt reconciled - in fact elated, but you know what I think of this ....I had written to Mr. J.C. from the conference pleading that he think of Christ and the women's cause in their deliberations. Replied that he agreed we need more women in the Party but said they would have to take a more prominent part. These men don't seem to be able to grasp that they are not allowed to take these prominent parts. You know what I mean.[29]

Lucas's criticism, like those of Laing and Telford, were out of loyalty to the party voiced privately rather than in the columns of the CCF newspaper. Many CCF women, dedicated to their party and to the ideal of socialist egalitarianism, believed or wanted to believe that, within the movement, women had the same opportunities as men. Yet, in the last resort, they were often forced to admit disappointment as they witnessed women held back from advancement into the leadership and from securing nominations.

III

CCF Women's Committees emerged, in part, from these very circumstances. Separate women's groups were seen as a training ground for new women activists and female leadership, as well as a medium through which women's special concerns and abilities could be expressed. In Ontario and the West CCF women's groups emerged after the Regina Convention, either as continuations of previously existing labourite or farm women's organizations, or as enthusiastic responses to the formation of the new party. Some provincial CCF newspapers also initiated women's sections which ran intermittently throughout the 1930s. Such columns, often geared largely to the homemaker, included news and activities of the local CCF women's groups, discussion material for CCF women's clubs, political editorials and articles perceived to be of interest to women, and household hints and patterns. Within the CCF there was always some debate about the necessity of separate women's columns (as well as women's groups) in a socialist movement supposedly build on egalitarian principles. Even the women's columnist in the Ontario New Commonwealth felt this ambivalence for she explained that, on one level, she "disapproved of women's pages...for women should read all articles [in the paper]." On the other hand, she added, "women are rather backward about expressing their ideas in print, especially in competition with the masculine point of view"--hence the need for the column. She concluded her rather negative view of women with a more positive note, the hope that men too would read the column--and hence, its name, "Fairly Feminine." Although the column ran for only a short time it did contain informative articles on women's history, the activities of CCF women, women in the peace movement, and the situation of women on relief. Its author was sometimes daring enough to challenge some of the staples of other women's pages, such as the fashion section, with articles like one entitled "Behind Paris Gowns - the Dressmakers Strike," an expose of women's bad working conditions in the fashion industry. Yet, on other occasions, the column found itself reverting to these same staples. Fashion tips and recipes were included for women, and their political character was drawn in one-dimensional proportions. Readers were informed in one reprinted article, for instance, that German women's conservatism was a major factor in the growth of fascism for "the most violent anti-feminists in Germany were women."[30]

Within the Commonwealth as a whole, women's family-centred concerns were often stressed in the appeal to women, but good labour coverage of major strikes involving women workers meant that the situation of single working women was not ignored. After the demise of "Fairly Feminine" occasional articles and editorials on issues like birth control, divorce, and rising prices sustained some discussion of women's issues. But lacking a regular women's column, the discussion was less animated.

In other provincial newspapers women's columns appeared and disappeared throughout the 1930s, taking on a different flavour and perspective according to which CCF newspaper they were in, and who the author was. In British Columbia, for example, the women's column in the Federationist was testament to the various perspectives on the woman question held in the CCF there. Written in the early years by Eve Grey Smith, the column concentrated primarily on economic issues--women's role in the class struggle, the relationship of worker and capitalist, the situation of unemployed women --reflecting both Smith's Marxism and the strong Marxist tradition in the British Columbia CCF. When Elizabeth Kerr assumed responsibility for the column in 1937, it began to take a different shape, mirroring Kerr's long association with both feminist and socialist causes.[31] Although she did not ignore economic issues, Kerr also discussed "feminist" concerns such as women's role in the family, the need for better divorce laws, and the imperative need to increase women's participation in the CCF. In her column written after the 1938 provincial convention, Kerr lamented the small number of female delegates present, blaming "family responsibilities and male prejudice" for their absence, and she objected strenuously to the fear, supposedly expressed on the convention floor, that three women on the CCF executive would spell "feminist control" of the inner party sanctums: "we have not shown feminist views, but we have examined a broad range of problems from a human perspective ...but, even if we were stay-at-home types, without a broader view, why shouldn't that womanly view be expressed in our movement? For a movement boasting no difference in sex, race and creed, some of our Marxian socialists are pitifully mid-Victorian."[32]

Women's Committees also emerged with very different political outlooks and orientations, ranging from fund raising and socialist education to feminist social action. Although women's committees existed in Ontario and every western province, three short examples can illustrate some of their aims and accomplishments.[33] In Saskatchewan, women's groups sprang up out of a neighbourhood milieu, often on the suggestion of one local CCF supporter, or they were aided into existence by the party's provincial office. After some debate in 1936-1937 within the CCF executive and at the provincial convention over the limited voting status of CCF women's clubs, and over the need to ensure more female representation in the leadership of the movement, the provincial executive hired a part-time organizer, Minerva Cooper, to help establish CCF women's clubs.[34]

In her short period as an organizer Cooper aided sixteen new clubs into existence, boosting the number of provincial CCF women's groups to forty-two. Her aim was to orient the clubs to women's social needs as well as their political development; the assumption was again that women needed different, and extra, political education geared to their more isolated existence and their less knowledgeable approach to politics. Cooper suggested a common programme of entertainment and education: "we can use the time-honoured custom of afternoon teas for women to have a programme for the tried worker and the new rank and filer, combining business, study and social time. In the meeting we can start off with slogans and anecdotes...we should avoid dull papers on economics. We need regular meetings, with shared discussion and a capable leader."[35] The problems of organizing women, Cooper soon found, were generated primarily by the vast geographical area she had to cover, and by the CCF's limited economic circumstances. The central office could not afford to hire a full-time women's organizer, nor could local clubs afford to pay transportation costs to bring Cooper in. Gas shortages prohibited some women from attending regular meetings, and study materials were expensive for the women to buy and for the central office to supply. Despite such difficulties, local clubs did flourish; indeed, one dynamic activist in northern Saskatchewan, Dorise Neilson, helped to establish six new clubs in the space of a year. Cooper believed that such local women organizers, with a feel for the community, often had the best results. Success for the CCF was also scored, she maintained, when the women's clubs gradually evolved into mixed ones. New people were drawn into the movement, and the women, already fortified with executive and speaking experience, still tended to "hold executive positions in the mixed setting, not taking a back seat"[36] as they did in other clubs.

Although Cooper was not rehired for a second term as an organizer, she did continue to edit a women's column for *The New Era/Commonwealth* throughout the next year.[37] This "Women's Section" was used as an educational tool for the women's clubs, as Cooper was careful to include material specifically for women's political discussion groups. The minute book of a CCF women's discussion group formed at this time reveals some of the aims and accomplishments which small women's meetings could achieve.[38] Aided by a study programme prepared by the Provincial Office, this women's group decided at its inaugural meeting in the spring of 1937 to hold a combined social evening and study session on *The Case for Socialism.* They also initiated fund raising efforts, including a bridge tournament with proceeds going to the Mackenzie Papineau Battalion; social events such as a tea for all women coming to the Provincial Convention; and sewing and knitting sessions, with the products of their labour going again to the Mac Paps. Speakers were sometimes invited to address the group, but often women concentrated on developing their own speaking skills. They discussed current events, reviewed books, examined newspaper clippings, delivered papers, and practiced their political rhetoric by initiating an innovative method of roll call: each woman responded with a short story or a new slogan pertaining to the current political and economic situation.

Many women's groups, like this one, performed some of the traditional fund raising tasks long associated with the "woman's auxiliary"--tasks which were still very important to local party coffers. At the same time, they did not limit themselves to fund raising and support work, for they also strove to make themselves and their neighbours more conscious of the need for socialism. The focus for discussion in such CCF women's clubs was often women's family-centred concerns, just as women's columns in CCF newspapers concentrated on women's domestic and maternal responsibilities. Yet these family-centred concerns were located in a political context qualitatively different from the thinking of the earlier maternal feminists. In the 1930s CCF women addressed social and economic issues only skirted by earlier female reformers. The struggle of farm women, women on relief, and wage-earning women were the catalysts for their politicization, and their solution to social ills was to be the replacement of private with co-operative ownership. Rather than patchwork reform efforts to improve the morals of society, CCF women proposed to improve family life by effecting an entire reordering of the economic system.

Women's family-centred political concerns were also an important element of the women's CCF clubs which grew up in Manitoba. In Winnipeg, women's neighbourhood ILP groups had been active for some time and since 1932 were federated into a city-wide Women's Labour Conference. Within the neighbourhood groups, fund raising and political education were the key activities. Besides holding euchres and bazaars, women examined the important questions of the day. In the Winnipeg Centre club, Lucy Woodsworth led a study session on Social Planning for Canada; the South Centre group investigated women's employment in the needle trades; and the St. James group voiced its approval of the accessibility of birth control information by sending letters of support to Nurse Palmer during her trial.[39] At the monthly meetings of the Women's Labour Conference, delegates from all affiliated groups discussed current issues and co-operated on certain city-wide committees, such as the Minimum Wage Committee and the Education Committee. By the late 1930s some thirty-six groups were affiliated, and the Conference was becoming vocal not only on local but also on international issues, urging a boycott of nickel to aggressor countries and the imperative of generosity towards Jewish refugees fleeing Germany. Although the women's CCF network was firmly rooted in its neighbourhood orientation, the city Women's Labour Conference was given strong leadership by Lucy Woodsworth, Beatrice Brigden, and Edith Cove.[40]

The commitment of these Winnipeg women to the semi-autonomous organization of CCF women emerged from their own histories and experience of women's labourite groups, and from their shared perception that in the socialist movement women's capabilities, needs, and concerns were sometimes different from men's. Lucy Woodsworth, for example, brought a keen sense of women's maternal "moral mission" to her CCF work and Brigden undoubtedly carried some similar ideas from her social gospel days, for she too saw women's primary social role as moral educator and nurturer in the family. Yet, Brigden's regular column in the Manitoba Commonwealth also included feminist views stressing women's economic contribution to society. Brigden firmly supported the right of all women--single and married--to gainful employment and decried the Depression-initiated hostility to working women, labelling efforts to push women back into the kitchen as "akin to feudalism."[41]

Brigden's distinct blend of socialist and feminist ideas, drawn from both a "maternal and equal rights feminism,"[42] saw hope for women's liberation in the alliance of women with the socialist movement: "if humanity is to advance, then all must march together; no lagging behind by one group; no suppression of one sex for the benefit of the other."[43] Still, in the march towards socialism, separate women's groups were essential to the development of women's skills and useful to the evolution of the CCF. In 1937, under Brigden's leadership, the Winnipeg women organized a conference to discuss the special contribution women might make to the CCF; to decide how to organize from a "woman's viewpoint"; and to explore the particular political needs of homemakers and rural women.

Brigden had already carried these ideas to the National Convention the year before, making a long report on the activities of Winnipeg CCF women, pointing to their study of social questions, social service work, and their government lobbying. She urged upon the party a more concerted policy of recruiting women members and of establishing women's CCF groups, citing the Winnipeg Labour Federation as a model. The response to her suggestions was mixed. Clearly, not all the delegates took these "ladies groups" seriously, nor did much of the CCF leadership see the need to discuss women's issues. Indeed, when Brigden described the establishment of women's groups to discuss birth control her report was greeted with "chortles" of amusement by the assembly.[44]

A small group of women participants who identified with Brigden's crusade to integrate women into the CCF were sympathetic, however, and voiced their support for her ideas. Louise Lucas approved of the Winnipeg approach, stressing that a flexible and moderate programme, which would not frighten women away, was the best tactic. It was necessary to move slowly, she counselled, through respectable women's groups: "we should use common sense...just broach the subject [of women and politics] in some districts and you will be boycotted...[so] be sensible...start a dramatic club or get into the Ladies Aid." Her views essentially coincided with those of Brigden, who included social service work and co-operation with liberal female reformers in her strategies to involve socialist women in politics. Two Toronto delegates, Jean Laing and Rose Henderson, spoke even more assertively of the need to politicize women. Laing echoed Brigden's suggestions that within the CCF there should be "a place for women to meet and discuss problems...a training ground for women to develop as public speakers." Henderson implied that the moderate approach suggested by others was not enough. It was necessary to directly address socialist issues, she maintained, for there was no such thing as "neutral" or non-political educational work; it had to be pointed out to women that every aspect of their life was affected by politics.[45] Despite this long discussion on the organization of women, no actual resolution on women was presented to the convention. The following year a resolution asking National Office for a woman organizer--"as little effort has been made in the past to organize women or interest them in the CCF"[46]--was presented by the Fort William CCF, but it was quickly put aside.

In Toronto, Rose Henderson and Jean Laing were active in a short-lived but significant women's CCF group, called the Women's Joint Committee (WJC). Prominent activists in the WJC, including Henderson, Laing, Elizabeth Morton, and Alice Loeb, brought to this group their experiences of both socialist and feminist causes. Henderson, for example, had been involved in the suffrage movement; Loeb in the birth control movement; while Laing and Morton had their political schooling in the trade union movement, especially in the union auxiliaries. The feminist-socialist aims of the Committee were twofold: first, to address "social problems, particularly those of women" and secondly to "act as a training school" for CCF women.[47] To the WJC, addressing the social problems of women primarily meant addressing the problems of the family. As John Manley has pointed out, it is likely that most of the WJC membership were married women; consequently the family and its fate during a period of intense socio-economic crisis became a central preoccupation of the WJC.[48]

The Committee, for instance, aided the establishment of a progressive summer camp for working-class children, even bringing old pots, dishes, and towels to a meeting as donations to the camp, and jokingly calling this meeting a "shower for the camp." The Committee also drew on other aspects of female culture, especially women's maternal concerns, in their work. They organized a Mothers' Committee to visit youths imprisoned in Mimico Jail after a relief strike; planned a Mothers' Day peace programme with the WIL; and sponsored a conference on unemployment, focussing on relief "in relation to the home and children in the home." As well, the Committee wrote letters protesting the plight of the single unemployed woman and expressed some interest in organizing around the birth control issue. Elizabeth Morton brought the director of the East York Parent Clinic, Miss E. Brandt, to speak to the WJC, and in response to her talk the Committee immediately suggested that Margaret Sanger be brought to Toronto. This plan, however, never materialized as Brandt suggested building more community support for the clinic first, and subsequently the CCF women found that within their movement "the clinic idea was well received by the women...but not by the men."[49]

The second aim of the WJC--to train women for leadership--was a less volatile issue. Explaining the function of the Committee to the Commonwealth, the WJC secretary, Miss M. Tilton, wrote that: "women are very diffident about engaging in discussion at a meeting where men are in the majority. As women in the future will play an important role in the building of Socialism and have a real contribution to make, they must be trained and encouraged to take their place."[50] To achieve this end, the more experienced CCF women in the WJC eschewed some executive positions and suggested a rotating chair to spread leadership experience more evenly. At one meeting, Elizabeth Morton suggested widening the basis of the WJC by electing a social committee that would not be drawn from the existing executive. This committee would make contact with women in CCF Clubs across the city, eventually augmenting the CCF "women's network."

However the WJC did not exist long enough to fulfill Morton's hopes. It was debilitated by its disputes with the CCF leadership, primarily over United Front work with the communists, but also over what the women called the CCF's obsessive electoral "vote catching policies."[51] Some of the prominent WJC women had briefly considered an electoral alliance with other leftists in the 1935 general election,[52] and they continued to work with communists in organizations like the League against War and Fascism, the Committee to Aid Spanish Democracy and the Toronto Progressive Women's Association. Acrimonious debate over the question of working with the communists persisted within the CCF and finally, in 1936, after a United Front May Day parade, Jean Laing and other CCFers were expelled from their party. The WJC's protests over the expulsions, including Alice Loeb's open letter to the Commonwealth, may have only exacerbated the differences between the WJC and the CCF leadership. Although the Committee tried to visit the executive "to explain our function"[53] the WJC disappeared from existence shortly afterwards, and WJC members probably took their energies elsewhere, into organizations like the League against War and Fascism, and the Toronto Progressive Women's Association.

Although the WJC had a brief history and minimal impact on the CCF, its existence indicated the presence of a small, but dedicated, group of socialist feminists within the party. At the time, though, many women and men in the CCF were unsympathetic to the WJC; they did not attach any priority to women's issues and they did not understand why these women felt the need to organize autonomously. Lacking a stronger feminist awareness among the party's female membership, a more significant feminist revolt had to await a future date.

IV

By the outbreak of World War II, the basis for women's participation in the CCF, and a rough understanding of what comprised "women's issues" had been established. The CCF did not include a list of women's demands in its platform; indeed, the Regina Manifesto barely acknowledged the massive sexual inequalities existing in Canadian society.[54] The woman question--that is, the origins of and solutions for women's oppression--was not routinely discussed by the party; as a result, the cause of women's equality and women's issues did not assume a place of importance in the CCF's appeal to the Canadian public.

The lack of concern is not particularly surprising, for the CCF did not inherit from its ideological ancestors a primary concern with the question of women's rights. Moreover, many CCF members, including women, were drawn to the party because of their experience of, or witness to, economic and social inequalities in general, not because of their concern for women's inequality in particular. Their ideas were further reinforced by common notions that women's work was secondary to the family wage and by the overwhelming magnitude of the Depression. Many women, newcomers to politics after the intense feminist experience of the suffrage movement and principally influenced by the current economic upheaval, simply failed to see women's issues as issues at all: "the question of women just never came up. Economics and war overshadowed everything else. I never thought about the woman question...except for resenting always being the stenographer."[55]

Despite the CCF's lack of interest in the woman question, many members believed that women's political concerns and their world view, conditioned by their central role in the family, were different than men's; hence the party often tried to appeal to women as homemakers and as mothers.

Women wage-earners were also a subject of concern. The CCF tried to publicize women's working conditions, intervene in wage-earning struggles, and alter existing labour legislation. But just as wage-earning women still constituted a minority of the population, so they figured less predominantly in CCF strategies.[56] This approach was, on the one hand, politically practical and astute. Since many women were primarily responsible for domestic labour, it was wise to appeal to women on the basis of their day-to-day experiences. At the same time, it held out the danger of confining women to a maternal and domestic stereotype. If woman's central role in the family was used to positive effect to involve and integrate her into one level of socialist politics, it also remained a central barrier to her involvement in areas of leadership and policy making. Women, underrepresented in the leadership and undervalued as candidates, had difficulties carrying the double burden of family responsibilities and political obligations. They probably had difficulties moving from the social committees into which they were channelled to the centres of decision making; and they may have had difficulties convincing themselves and others that their "maternal qualities" really suited them to positions of power and policy making in areas of economics and defence.

The underrepresentation of women in the leadership of the CCF did not mean that women's contribution to its growth was insignificant. On the contrary, women comprised an indispensible army of local educators, organizers, and electioneers who created the supporting edifice which allowed the socialist movement to build upwards. At the same time, the underrepresentation of women in the higher echelons did concern some women in the party and supplied one rationale for the existence of semi-autonomous women's committees, auxiliaries, and councils. These CCF women's groups grew organically from existing farm and labourite women's organizations or emerged as enthusiastic responses to the establishment of the CCF. At the local level, women's groups were created with an array of aims extending from fund raising to political lobbying. Some women pursued traditional support work in a comfortable social atmosphere while simultaneously developing their own understanding of socialist issues; others, like the Women's Joint Committee, became more militant feminist voices within the CCF. The women's auxiliaries reflected the easy integration of women into the CCF on the basis of culturally accepted norms; the more militant groups, like the WJC, pointed to the existence of pockets of socialist feminism within the party. This latter group was clearly concerned that women's concerns be more centrally addressed by socialists. Of course, in the context of the 1930s, "women's issues" often took on the shape of maternal and domestic concerns relating to children, education, consumer issues, and peace. Socialist feminists whose thoughts were shaped, in part, by prevailing notions of womanhood, agreed that women's issues included the problems of wage-earning women, but they still focussed *predominantly* on women's family-centred concerns, thus echoing the very contradiction which kept women isolated from the mainstream of the socialist movement.

At the time, however, neither the women's auxiliaries nor the women's committees saw their efforts limited by a "maternal mystique" and they quite rightly distinguished themselves from the liberal reformers in organizations like the Local Council of Women. As one member of the Saskatchewan women's club, Margaret Benson, said, CCF women, in their recognition of class issues, *were* different: "unlike ladies auxiliaries, were were militant!"[57] Indeed, for the Toronto CCF women who marched against fascism in the Mother's Day parade for peace, or for the Vancouver CCF women who demonstrated in the Mother's Day parade for the Relief Camp strikers, "mothering" did not have the same political meaning as it did for women in the Local Council of Women. To CCF women, their recognition of the class struggle, their fight against fascism, and their vision of a co-operative society made theirs a "militant mothering." Perhaps Beatrice Brigden, who had personally travelled the route from the era of maternal feminism to the one of militant mothering, best articulated this difference:

> Yes, the CCF woman does differ from others. Chiefly in this, we think, she has separated herself very largely from the prejudices and fallacies of the capitalist order. She repudiates the system of competition....She has accepted the cooperative principle, the well-tested recipe for success in her own homemaking: each giving according to her ability and each receiving according to [her] need. The CCF woman proposes to apply this same kindly, enduring fundamental to the social order.[58]

NOTES

1 Beatrice Brigden, Weekly News, Labour Day Supplement, September 1933.

2 The Regina Leader-Post, 18 July 1933, listed 21 women out of 131 delegates. This number may not be a precise count so the number of women delegates may have been slightly higher or lower.

3 Interview with Mildred Farhni, 3 December 1980; Interview with Sophia Dixon, 1 November 1980; Leader-Post, 18 July 1933.

4 Historians of the CCF have been predominantly concerned with elections, issues of leadership and policy, and the party's platform changes. Debates centre, for example, on the question of whether the CCF moved from a "movement" to a "party" and whether the Regina Manifesto was watered down to the detriment of the party's socialism. Such debates largely ignore the particular roles women played in the CCF, for women, more active at the grass-roots level, were less likely to be electoral candidates, or be in party leadership ranks. Secondly, the discussion of "women's issues" (seen even at the time by many CCF leaders to be peripheral) has been left unexplored. One exception is a good article by John Manley, "Women and the Left in the 1930s: The Case of the Toronto CCF Women's Joint Committee," Atlantis, 5, 2, (Spring, 1980), pp. 100-119.

5 Interview with Hilda Kristiansen, 8 December 1980. Hilda Kristiansen joined the CCF in the 1930s and became an important force behind the British Columbia CCF Women's Committee in the 1940s.

6 Interview with Nellie Peterson, 21 November 1980.

7 Irene Biss, "The Dressmakers' Strike," Canadian Forum, July 1931, p. 367; Pat Schultz, The East York Workers' Association: A Working Class Response to the Great Depression (Toronto: New Hogtown, 1975).

8 Interview with Sophia Dixon.

9 Interview with Marjorie Mann, February 1980. Marjorie Mann joined the CCF in the 1930s and became very active in the 1940s. She sat on Provincial Council, acted as a campaign manager in an Ottawa election and was one of the driving forces behind the formation of the later Ontario Women's CCF Committee.

10 Interview with Avis McCurdy, 30 May 1982.

11 For more information on Brigden see B. Brigden, "One Woman's Campaign for Social Purity and Social Reform" in Richard Allen, ed., *The Social Gospel in Canada* (Ottawa: National Museums of Canada, 1975), pp. 36-62.

12 Interview with Mildred Fahrni; Interview with Nellie Peterson.

13 The League's statement of purpose called for a far-reaching transformation of the social order: "We work for universal disarmament, the solution of conflicts by human solidarity...and by the establishment of social, economic and political justice for all, without distinction of sex, race, class or creed." (University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Rare Books Room, Flora M. Denison Collection, *Pax Internationale*, April 1930.) For more information on the WIL see G.C. Bussey and M. Tims, *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, 1915-1965: A Record of Fifty Years' Work* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1965), and the essay by Thomas Socknat in this book.

14 University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Rare Books Room, Kenny Collection, Rose Henderson, "Woman and War," no date.

15 Weaver's articles can be found in the later *B.C. Federationist/CCF News*, 22 June 1946, 29 July 1948.

16 Interview with Eve Smith, 19 July 1981 (emphasis in original).

17 Interview with D.L., 9 November 1980.

18 *Ontario New Commonwealth*, 27 April 1935.

19 Ibid., 10 August 1935.

20 Interview with Grace MacInnis, 17 July 1981.

21 Interview with L.M., 29 November 1980. Other women also referred to social disapproval of wives who spent long periods away from home, travelling and organizing for the CCF.

22 Georgina Taylor interview with Elsie Gorius. I would like to thank Georgina for letting me listen to this tape before it was available in the Saskatchewan Archives.

23 Interview with Nellie Peterson.

24 Ontario New Commonwealth, 23 November 1935.

25 Taylor interview with Elsie Gorius.

26 Interview with Mildred Fahrni.

27 SAB, Gertrude Telford Papers, volume 31, Typescript "Memories," and volume 20, "Education."

28 For example, see an article reprinted in the Ontario New Commonwealth, 25 May 1935, on "The Three Types of Women." The author pigeonholed women into three stereotypes--"the clinging vine," the "aggressive, mannish woman," and the "normal" woman who was neither superior nor inferior but interested in children, home, and career. Similar pseudo-psychological investigations of men's character types did not appear in any issue. Some oral evidence would also support this contention. (See SAB, G. Taylor Interview with Gladys Strum, 14 August 1981.)

29 PAC, Agnes Macphail Papers, volume 2, Jean Laing to Macphail, 28 March 1940; SAB, Telford Papers, volume 32, "Correspondence," Telford to C.M. Fines, 12 June 1944; L. Lucas to Telford, 5 May 1945 (emphasis in originals).

30 Ontario New Commonwealth, 18 May 1935, 8 June 1935, 3 August 1935.

31 Elizabeth Kerr, a Scottish emigrant, had in her pre-war days organized her sister nurses in Calgary for an eight-hour day, supported women's suffrage, and initiated the formation of the Calgary Consumers' League. As an aspiring writer and feminist, she joined the Women's Press Club, and as a socialist, she joined the British Columbia SPC. Kerr was sympathetic to the USSR, especially after making a tour of Russia in the late 1930s, and because of these sympathies she encountered severe criticism from other CCF members. In 1939 she publicly confronted criticisms of her views on Russia and her feminism in the B.C. Federationist, 28 December 1939.

32 Ibid., 7 July 1938.

33 Women's groups existed in Calgary and Edmonton and a very dynamic Women's Committee functioned in Vancouver. I have omitted discussion of these groups not because they were less important but simply for the sake of brevity. A longer discussion of all the provincial women's committees is contained in Joan Sangster, "Canadian Women in Radical Politics and Labour, 1920-50" (Ph.D. Dissertation, McMaster University, 1984).

34 The debate took place over a period of time. See SAB, CCF Records, minutes of Provincial Executive, 1936, and the Provincial Convention, 1937. Women who wanted voting status for CCF women's clubs failed to achieve their aim, but Cooper was hired as a "consolation prize" to prove the party's interest in boosting its female membership.

35 *New Era*, 28 January, 1938.

36 SAB, CCF Records, minutes of Provincial Convention, 1938.

37 In the late 1930s Cooper was expelled from the CCF for having dual membership in the Communist party. She subsequently became involved in the Communist party and the Labour Progressive Party in Saskatchewan and British Columbia.

38 Nutana CCF Women's Club Minute Book. (Material held by G. Taylor.)

39 Nurse Palmer was a social worker who was tried for distributing birth control information. See Diane Dodd, "The Hamilton Birth Control Clinic of the 1930s," *Ontario History*, LXXV, 1 (March, 1983), pp. 71-86.

40 Edith Cove, who was originally from the Maritimes, moved to Brandon about 1918-19, and married a railroad worker who was a war veteran and a sympathizer in the 1919 Winnipeg General Strike. Cove became involved in All Peoples' Church and in the ILP, becoming a close friend of Beatrice Brigden. In 1930 she moved to Winnipeg and subsequently became very active in the CCF. (Interview with G. and M. Fines, October 1980.)

41 *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 22 February 1935.

42 Carol Bacchi, *Liberation Deferred: The Ideas of the English Canadian Suffragists, 1880-1920* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1983).

43 *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 22 February 1935.

44 This amusement is echoed in David Lewis's recent memoirs. (See David Lewis, *The Good Fight* [Toronto: Macmillan, 1981], pp. 101-102.) Lewis refers to the "unintended comedy" which lightened the otherwise serious atmosphere of the convention: Brigden's report on groups to discuss birth control (which, she said, were growing by leaps and bounds) was greeted with "chortles." Also, when an aging Rose Henderson spoke of the need for a United Front and of her long fight in the mass struggle, one delegate answered "you look like it." This "amusing"(?) incident

also eased the tension on the convention floor. The latter remark may be construed as either sexist or ageist --it was certainly in bad taste. Henderson was probably in bad health; she died only six months later.

45 PAC, CCF Records, volume 10, CCF National Convention minutes, 3 August 1936.

46 Ibid., resolution presented by Fort William CCF for 1937 Convention, 26 July 1937.

47 University of Toronto, Thomas Fisher Rare Books Room, Woodsworth Memorial Collection, Women's Joint Committee minutes (WJC minutes), 6 March 1936, 20 March 1936.

48 Manley, pp. 112-14.

49 WJC minutes, 7 April 1936, 12 May 1936, 26 May 1936.

50 Ontario New Commonwealth, 21 March 1936.

51 WJC minutes, 9 June 1936.

52 Some CCF, trade union and communist women forced the Women's Election Committee to rally support for progressive candidates in the federal election. It was opposed by the CCF leadership as a communist front and died an early death, having little or no impact on the election. (Manley, p. 111.)

53 WJC minutes, 9 June 1936.

54 Section 7 of the Regina Manifesto did call for a labour code with equality of opportunity and equal pay enshrined in it.

55 Interview with D.L.

56 In the 1940s more CCF women became involved in the trade union movement. Women like Eileen Tallman, Margo Thompson and Margaret Lazarus played an important role in union work, but that story belongs to the later period.

57 G. Taylor :nverview with Margaret Benson.

58 Beatrice Brigden in the Labour Annual, September 1934.

Obscure Origins: The Confused Early History of the Alberta CCF

Alvin Finkel

When the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation was formed in Calgary in 1932, there was every prospect that the new organization would enjoy great strength in the province of its birth. The two Alberta organizations that attended the founding meeting and later both affiliated with the CCF in 1933 were believed to represent between them most farmers and workers in Alberta. They enjoyed overwhelming control of the provincial legislature and held a majority of the province's federal seats as well as control of the mayor's chair and city council in Edmonton.[1] Yet within a few years it became apparent that the provincial CCF had been stillborn. What had gone wrong?

The most obvious answer is that the Alberta CCF had been quickly eclipsed by the Social Credit movement, but Social Credit's meteoric rise must be seen, in part, as the result of the CCF's failure to capture the imagination of the Alberta public. Indeed the Social Credit movement was able to exploit the major weakness in the provincial CCF movement: its elitist character. It may appear surprising that the CCF, which has been regarded as one of the most democratic party organizations which Canada has ever known,[2] could be accused of having been elitist. To be sure after 1940 the Alberta CCF, like its provincial counterparts, was a reasonably democratic organization. Its origins, however, were very different. For eight years, in fact, the CCF was a vague entity in Alberta politics, with no provincial programme and few members affiliated directly to the party.

What had appeared to be the party's strength in 1932--the affiliation of the United Farmers of Alberta and the Alberta section of the Canadian Labour Party (CLP)--proved to be its undoing. The leaders of the UFA and the CLP were unwilling to sacrifice their existing organizations to the common cause. Indeed, as this essay will demonstrate, there is some doubt whether either of these organizations represented more than a handful of leaders by 1932 and, in the UFA's case, whether more than a section of the leadership supported the CCF's policies. There is also little doubt that the leaders of both organizations were unwilling to bury their organizations and to recruit members to a new organization.

Several studies of the UFA question how representative of farmers' opinion the organization had become by 1932. Carl Betke, for example, observes that during the period when it first entered the political arena the UFA enjoyed a mass membership among Alberta farmers. The farmers, tired of the old-line national parties which they regarded as eastern-dominated, had flocked to the UFA banner, believing that at last farmers would be able to directly influence the policies of government. However the UFA government proved unresponsive to the resolutions passed by UFA constituency groups and provincial conventions, preferring to rely upon the views of "experts" in the formulation of government policy. Partly as a result of the government's unresponsiveness, farmers became increasingly reluctant to participate in the organization. UFA membership declined from thirty-eight thousand when it was first elected as a government in 1921 to about fifteen thousand in 1923.[3]

Although its membership had dropped dramatically, the UFA had little difficulty winning re-election in the provincial elections of 1926 and 1930. Its major opponent, the Liberal party, which had governed the province from 1905 to 1921, had never been a mass party and its domination once in opposition by lawyers and urban professionals did not enhance its image in the rural areas.[4] The farmers, refocussing energies once spent on politics towards the building of the co-operative wheat pools, enjoyed good prices for wheat for several years and did not appear anxious to unravel the political status quo weaved in 1921.

Nevertheless the UFA had always included a radical contingent. Indeed the conservative leadership of the UFA, headed by Henry Wise Wood, had resisted taking the organization into the political sphere until it became clear that the radical Non-Partisan League (NPL) might otherwise mop up dissident farmers' votes. The NPL, with about six thousand members in 1919, advocated public ownership of utilities, railways, and grain elevators, positions rejected by the UFA leaders who were suspicious of state intervention. Most NPL members were also UFA members and the NPL agreed not to run candidates once the UFA decided to enter politics. In fact the radical NPL wing and the conservative leadership group comprised two poles within the UFA. The two groups were only able to coexist because they both accepted, at least rhetorically, the notion that the UFA was not a party and that UFA legislators answered to their constituents and not to a party caucus. In practice, however, constituency autonomy was a chimera and the UFA caucus behaved much like any other party caucus.[5]

The radicals dominated the UFA caucus in the House of Commons and, after 1930, largely replaced the conservatives at the head of the provincial organizational hierarchy. Nevertheless the radicals failed to win more than a handful of nominations for provincial seats and the provincial government, which had proven reluctant to consider policies approved by conventions in the 1920s, distanced itself completely from official UFA policies once the radicals took power within the organization. The premier was, in fact, a conservative with little taste for populist politics. J.E. Brownlee's election by the caucus in 1924 as the second UFA premier demonstrated the caucus's conservatism: Brownlee was a wealthy Edmonton lawyer whose connection with the farmers' movement was the legal work he had performed for the UFA and other farmers' organizations.[6]

Resource policy provides an example of the dissonance between the views of the farmers' organization and the government's actions. In 1930, the provincial convention of the UFA resolved that the principles governing natural resources policy ought to be "development in accordance with the principles of public ownership and second, proper conservation to make these natural resources of value to succeeding generations in this province." However the government, which won control over provincial resources from the federal government that year, followed a laissez-faire policy.[7]

The provincial conventions, dominated by the radical leadership, did not accommodate themselves to the continued conservatism of the government. In 1932, on the eve of the formation of the CCF, the UFA lurched further leftwards with a statement of principles in which state ownership of major industries was emphasized. While the UFA had always regarded voluntary co-operative enterprises as a useful means of moderating the excesses of unbridled capitalism, it now proclaimed its goal as: "A community freed from the domination of irresponsible financial and economic power, in which all social means of production and distribution, including land, are socially owned and controlled either by voluntarily organized groups of producers and consumers--or in the case of the major public services and utilities and such productive and distributive enterprises as can be conducted most efficiently when owned in common--by public corporations responsible to the people's elected representatives."[8]

Such a goal, of course, was not shared by the Brownlee administration. Most Albertans could not help but be confused by the spectacle of an organization whose conventions called for society to be turned upside down but whose elected provincial representatives called for restraint in government spending and the creation of a suitable climate for private investment.

Farmers were even more confused about the UFA's position on land ownership. The 1932 convention called for the nationalization of land that was not being farmed by farmer-owners. Such land would be leased to working farmers without right of purchase. The purpose of such legislation was to eliminate, in a roundabout way, the possibility of foreclosures of farms by banks and other financial institutions. Financiers, as non-farmers, would be ineligible to own land. Therefore it was argued that, in practice, the only land that would ever be "nationalized" was land already in financiers' hands, land which could be returned to prior owners via a leasing arrangement.[9]

Alberta's daily newspapers and some rural weeklies reported only that the UFA convention favoured nationalization of farm land, and because of the radicalism of other convention resolutions it was indeed easy to convince their readers that the UFA opposed the family farm. It was as much a sign of UFA organizational weakness by 1932 as of media irresponsibility that such charges were--as the UFA newspaper conceded--widely accepted.

Nevertheless, the impotence of the UFA organization in influencing the policies of the provincial government, rather than doubts about its proposals for radical reform, probably remained the major obstacle to UFA recruitment. The organization's membership increased from thirteen thousand to seventeen thousand between 1929 and 1931, the years when the radicals consolidated their hold, but quickly fell to less than forty-five hundred by the 1935 provincial election as the government remained intransigent and the Social Credit movement promised a political alternative.[10]

Radicals within the movement attempted to move the UFA government away from its tight-fisted fiscal policies, but without success. One MLA, for example, campaigned to convince the government that stamped scrip should be issued "to provide pensions for those over sixty-five as a start, and thus demonstrate the possibilities as well as the limitations of the Aberhart plan, but again I got no support." No more successful was G.G. Coote, one of the more moderate of the federal UFA group, with his suggestion that the government reduce mortgage interest rates by levying a tax of 100 percent on all interest charged above a government-specified interest rate.[11]

This failure to influence the provincial government did not lead socialists within the UFA to break away and form a new organization which would adopt CCF principles. Instead, they concentrated their energies on the national political arena. The proposal for a federation of progressive political organizations across the country originated with the left-wing UFA members of Parliament. The building of the national CCF rather than the reforming of the provincial administration became the priority for such men as William Irvine, MP at the time for Wetaskiwin, and MP Robert Gardiner, president of the UFA.

For Irvine and for other members of the federal caucus, the concentration on building a national political movement appeared natural. While they disapproved of the conservatism of the Brownlee administration, they believed that the federal government, because it controlled banks, railways, and interprovincial trade, must provide the major impetus for economic reform. Indeed, Irvine and others in the UFA group were regarded by many Albertans as social crediters first and socialists second. While Irvine and several of his colleagues believed that the rapacity of the banks was simply one facet of the exploitation inherent in the capitalist system, they tended to focus their attack on the financial institutions. In this regard they both reflected and reinforced the views of their constituents, who perceived themselves as the victims of monopolies such as the banking system and the railways but regarded such institutions as perversions of the capitalist economic system rather than its core element. Henry Spencer, for example, admitted that federal UFA members like himself, who embraced social credit theory at the same time as they pledged allegiance to the more radical analysis of the Regina Manifesto, were somewhat opportunist. Writing to a friend, he observed: "As you say, I supported the Douglas [Social Credit] theory thinking that while it was not the goal, it might be an easier step towards the economic freedom which we are working [sic] than by a direct socialization which might be harder to meet with general public support. It was a plan I felt might be our economic salvation along with public ownership of our great national resources and natural monopolies."[12] UFA radical MPs like Spencer agreed with Brownlee that social credit could not be established provincially,[13] and the failure either to distance themselves publicly from the Brownlee administration or to associate with the Aberhart movement doomed them to the same fate as the UFA provincial government.

A rank-and-file CCFer summed up rather well in a letter to Coote before the provincial and federal elections of 1935 why radical Albertans had turned away from the provincial UFA and might be persuaded to forsake the federal wing. With regard to the provincial election, the CCFer wrote: "If there is a place in our provincial politics for our CCF program of reform then to my mind it is not such a disaster for our provincial political organization to be defeated which we are sure it is going to be....Our members are refusing to pay their dues because they say it is just for a political party to fight the things we want done." He added that Albertans, including CCFers, wanted their federal MPs to declare publicly that they would oppose federal intervention against provincially-introduced social credit; otherwise they would doom themselves to defeat in the federal election. Finally he noted that Albertans, while they supported the parliamentary efforts of the UFA MPs, had lost hope that action by the federal government along CCF lines was likely in the near future.

> ...We know well enough that the dominion government is the place the reforms we want must finally be brought about. But we have sent you men there for fourteen years and we know you have worked hard for our cause and to help educate the other members and provinces along the lines of social justice...but the other provinces have not seen fit to do what we have done, and it is beginning to look to us as if we would pass from the scene of action before we will accomplish our purpose unless we give them an object lesson by showing them what we can do for ourselves.[14]

The CCF's failure to establish a grass-roots organization among the farmers which would provide this group with the sense of participation in their own affairs that the UFA had provided in the early 1920s was coupled with a similar failure among the urban work force. The Alberta wing of the Canadian Labour Party, on the face of things, was a more likely participant in the CCF than the UFA. Socialist ideology, a divisive force in the farmers' movement, was the accepted ideology of Alberta's CLP. The Alberta wing, formed in 1921, declared in 1928 that its aim was "the social ownership and effective control of the means of production, distribution and exchange to the end that the results of productive industry may accrue to the whole social membership."[15] The labour contingent in the provincial legislature--four members when the CCF was formed in 1932 but six members at its peak after the provincial election of 1926--pressed for socialization of resource industries as well as a broad array of public works and social insurance programmes. The Alberta Labour News, organ of the Alberta Federation of Labour (AFL), edited by Elmer Roper, a future CCF provincial leader, propagandized on behalf of both the CLP and socialism.

The CLP appeared to be on the upswing at the time of the CCF's formation. Although the party had lost two seats in the 1930 provincial election, it quickly bounced back to win the mayor's chair and control of the city council in Edmonton as well as half the council seats in Calgary and Lethbridge. Provincial by-election results in Edmonton and

Calgary from 1931 to 1934 indicated more support for the party in the cities than it had ever enjoyed.[16]

In fact neither the CLP nor the CCF gained much from the former's adherence to the new party. In the first place, adherence to the CCF placed the CLP in a delicate situation with regard to the UFA. The CLP had always maintained an electoral understanding with the UFA: the two parties did not oppose one another during elections and each encouraged its supporters in seats where one of the parties had no candidates to vote for the other party.[17] The arrangement was opportunistic, based more on a mutual hostility to the Liberals than on shared policy goals, but it created problems for the Labour representatives. While their policies were more at odds with government policies than were the Liberals' policies, the Liberals could use more venom in their attacks on the government than could Labour. Attempting to avoid antagonistic relations with the UFA, Labour members tended to adopt the approach of using the legislature as a forum for their own programmes and for socialist ideology in general rather than for close scrutiny of government programmes. The daily newspapers gave the Labour group little coverage and only readers of the *Alberta Labour News* would have had regular access to the views of the group. Even the *News*, despite its left-wing commitment, was cautious in its criticism of the UFA government, preferring to devote space to the views of the left-wing UFA MPs rather than to the problems created for working people by the conservative provincial government.

The formation of the CCF made the CLP's position vis-à-vis the UFA and the UFA government even more untenable. The UFA's stinginess in providing funds for urban relief made it impossible for the CLP not to criticize government policies, yet it was forced to mute its criticism in the vain hope that the UFA organization would force the government to change its course. At a time when the UFA government had lost its credibility among farmers, never mind urban workers, the CLP felt compelled to adopt a moderate stance regarding the government's deficiencies so as to pursue an elusive alliance with the organization which bore the same name as the government but supported policies opposite to those followed by the government. As late as July 1934, when Richard Gavin Reid became UFA Premier after a sex scandal had forced Brownlee's resignation, the *News* could comment in Alice-in-Wonderland fashion:

> Labour will watch very closely the actions and attitudes of the Reid Government with respect to matters in which Labour is particularly interested, such as the administration of unemployment relief. Not with any prejudice, favourable or un-

> favourable, but strictly from the standpoint of performance will the labour movement of the province judge the UFA government when the time of judging arrives. It is the earnest hope of the Labour News that the new Government will conduct itself in such a way as thoroughly to merit Labour's wholehearted support.[18]

The CLP's unholy alliance with the UFA via the CCF goes only part way to explaining why the early CCF failed as dismally in urban Alberta as in rural Alberta. The structure of the CLP and the party's record as a government, albeit only a municipal government in Edmonton, hampered its success. The CLP, unlike the UFA, was never truly a grassroots organization. It was a party whose purpose was to represent the viewpoint of the organized working class and its membership consisted mainly of affiliated unions rather than individuals.[19] Most unions sent executive members as delegates to CLP meetings. By the early 1930s, even activists complained that the party was too narrowly based and appeared to most people as simply the political vehicle of a small self-interested group.[20]

The elan of that group was eroded by unpopular actions undertaken by the CLP-dominated city council in Edmonton. While resisting demands from right-wing aldermen to cut relief payments, it insisted on earmarking payments--for food, rent and so forth--rather than on simply issuing cheques to relief families. The single unemployed were required to eat in city-run "soup kitchens." The unemployed regarded both the food relief vouchers--accompanied by lists specifying what foods the unemployed could buy--and the soup kitchens as attacks on the dignity of the unemployed, and demanded their replacement by unconditional--and more generous--relief payments. The Labour majority on council, faced with a limited ability to raise tax revenues, would not consider increased relief payments however. Although the CLP argued that the unemployed were victims of the economic system rather than the authors of their own misery, several Labour aldermen feared that relief recipients might squander relief cheques on liquor and entertainment rather than food for their children. Ironically, the CLP changed its view on the subject only after the party had lost both its council majority and much of its voting support.[21]

The Labour mayor and council also made themselves unpopular by joining forces with the provincial government to ban a communist-initiated hunger march in the city in December 1932. When the ban was defied, police beat up and arrested large numbers of marchers to enforce the ban. A crowd of about twelve thousand witnessed the event and many Labour supporters were shocked that a Labour council should be involved in the repression of a demonstration by working people. The Labour mayor, Dan Knotts, was afterwards unable to win a nomination for the party provincially or for the CCF for a federal seat. He later joined a rival municipal group, but the damage to the CLP's image as fighter for the underdog had been done.[22]

Labour also proved reticent to recruit the unemployed to the CLP. A suggestion in May 1935 that the Edmonton branch of the party create an affiliate for the thirteen thousand people on relief in the city met with a hostile reception from trade union representatives. Carl Berg, a long-time AFL executive member, claimed: "We do not want a lot of people brought in just to get a few votes, but must insist on our members having the Labour discipline and our principles at heart." Alf Farmilo, secretary-treasurer of the AFL, observed that "last year when we had a majority in council they [the unemployed] did not seem to think that sufficient was being done for them." A later meeting of the party did agree to establish an unemployed organization, but it would appear that no such organization was in fact established. Berg and Farmilo ran as CLP candidates in the provincial election of 1935 and received negligible numbers of votes.[23]

The fledgling Social Credit movement which, unlike the CLP or the UFA, had formed no part of any administration at any level before the 1935 provincial election, supported the demands of the unemployed for an end to soup kitchens and earmarked relief. The party also promised to abolish the provincial labour camps which the UFA had established to supplement the Department of National Defence camps for single unemployed males. Both sets of camps paid inmates only twenty cents a day and camp conditions, while varying from camp to camp, were generally bleak.[24] Above all, of course, Social Credit promised to pay twenty-five dollars a month as a "social dividend" to every adult Albertan. As their letters to Aberhart indicated, many of the unemployed expected that they, if not all Albertans, would receive social dividends.[25] The party's promises proved a magnet for the unemployed and the under-employed.

Urban workers and the unemployed were attracted by another feature of the Social Credit party: its apparent--though this turned out to be illusory--democratic and open structure. Any ten people could form a social credit club which would then be recognized by Aberhart and become part of a constituency organization.[26] The grass-roots structure of Social Credit in the party's earliest days gave it the appearance of a people's party whereas the CLP appeared increasingly to be the party of the tired group of labour bureaucrats who had run the province's unions for several decades.

Thus the CCF was at the outset a loose alliance of two discredited parties. Neither group was willing to go out of existence and allow a merger of the two organizations. In January 1935 the Provincial Council of the CCF, composed of equal representation from the UFA and the CLP, confirmed this unwillingness by passing the following resolution which ignored completely the question of the record of the provincial government and the question of how socialism was to be promoted in Alberta:

> Whereas, the United Farmers of Alberta and the Canadian Labour Party are affiliated with the CCF, and in pursuance of the affiliation are cooperating in holding joint conventions for the nomination of candidates in the federal field; and
>
> Whereas it becomes necessary to clarify the relations between the two organizations in provincial affairs; and
>
> Whereas in the Province of Alberta the predominant occupational grouping in each constituency lends itself to the nomination of either a Labour or a Farmer candidate; therefore be it
>
> Resolved that this Council recommend to the Canadian Labour Party and the UFA that the two groups contest the forthcoming provincial election as separate entities.[27]

In the 1935 provincial election, neither group used the CCF label and neither ran on a platform that resembled the Regina Manifesto. The UFA defended its record and promised a variety of reforms, including an increase in the scale of relief payments and greater help to farmers in rescheduling their debts with their creditors. The CLP stressed its record of defending the interests of the workingman and promised to push for improved social services, improved workmen's compensation, minimum wages, and a maximum forty-hour week in industry. None of this proved particularly exciting to voters who believed Social Credit's promises of social dividends and fixed prices for commodities. Neither the UFA nor the CLP retained any seats in the 1935 election.[28]

Ironically, Social Credit, which later became the most right-wing of Alberta's political parties, won on a campaign of extensive government intervention. As for the socialist alternative, it was simply not an issue. The two organizations which claimed to have joined the socialist CCF ran on separate--and non-socialist--platforms. The CCF had proven stillborn in the province of its birth.

Could the emergence of a grass-roots socialist organization have forestalled Social Credit's meteoric rise? One can only speculate, but there was much interest in the CCF programme if not in the organizations which claimed to subscribe to that programme. Chester Ronning was elected in a provincial by-election in Camrose as a UFA-CCF candidate in October 1932. Amelia Turner, an executive officer of the UFA, running on the CCF ticket in a Calgary-wide by-election in January 1933, received 12,307 votes against 14,128 for a candidate supported by both old-line parties.[29] The socialist platform did not appear to scare Calgary voters, who had never before given a Labour candidate even half as many votes for a provincial seat. Ironically, however, Turner's socialist views were a repudiation of the views of the government which bore the same name as the organization of which she was an employee. By the time the general election occurred, it was no longer credible for a candidate to be at once a propagandist for socialism and an apologist--if only by virtue of silence--for UFA inaction.

The Social Credit government failed to deliver on most of its promises. It did not change UFA relief policies, much to the chagrin of many of its own members. Demands for socialized medicine, price controls, and state-run industries to absorb the unemployed, all of which had been approved by the provincial conventions, were ignored by the government. The Aberhart government became as unresponsive to grass-roots pressure as its predecessor, and blamed most of its failures on federal government disallowance of social credit legislation.[30] The party's membership, after peaking at about forty-one thousand in 1937, declined to about twenty-four thousand by the election of 1940.[31]

However the CCF was unable to capitalize upon increasing disillusionment with Social Credit. It remained a prisoner of its two unsuitable hosts even though some attempts to strengthen the CCF did occur after the election. Roper, editor of the Alberta Labour News, changed the weekly's name to the People's Weekly, claiming that he hoped to broaden the readership base of the socialist publication.[32] It soon became clear, however, that Roper and his associates were pursuing a larger goal: providing the CCF with an unofficial house organ whose job would be to encourage the formation of CCF groups. Roper urged the formation throughout the province of CCF Clubs that were affiliated neither to the UFA nor the CLP.[33] At Roper's encouragement, the provincial board of the CCF hired Henry Spencer and William Irvine as provincial organizers, but the recruitment of new members proved difficult. Social Credit's tarnished aura had not destroyed the party and the constant attack on Aberhart by the business community and the daily newspapers convinced many that the government, for all its faults, championed the causes of little people against the big interests.[34]

Furthermore the CCF had not divorced itself from the UFA or the UFA policies repudiated by the voters in 1935. The shrunken UFA organization annually passed resolutions maintaining its allegiance to the federal CCF but reiterating its intention to participate under the UFA banner in provincial elections.[35] In 1939, however, the organization withdrew from politics altogether. Several factors contributed to this decision. The right wing of the movement, unhappy with the CCF affiliation, wished to join forces with the "People's Leagues" which were springing up across the province. The Leagues called for the unity of all anti-Aberhart forces in the next provincial election, that is the temporary setting aside of partisan differences in order to defeat Social Credit. Their platform was rather vague, calling for businesslike government and an end to social credit experiments, but it appealed to that section of the UFA which had supported the policies of the UFA government.[36]

While the right within the UFA wished to be free to co-operate with the Leagues, the left wished to give the CCF the opportunity to organize at the grass-roots in the countryside. The CCF, not surprisingly, rejected membership in the People's Leagues, arguing that they were dupes of the provincial business community and the old-line parties. After the demise of the UFA as a political organization, the CCF organizers moved swiftly to build CCF organizations in the countryside. Meanwhile the CCF Clubs and the CLP in Calgary and Edmonton agreed to nominate joint candidates on a CCF ticket, and a party leader was elected at a 1939 provincial convention: Chester Ronning, the former UFA-CCF MLA.[37]

The party reorganization occurred too late for the CCF to pose a serious challenge in the provincial election of 1940. Many progressive-minded Albertans, frightened that the right-wing League candidates would win the election, preferred to vote Social Credit rather than risk their votes on the "third party" CCF candidates. The CCF was able to nominate only thirty-four candidates for the fifty-five legislative seats. It earned a respectable 11 percent of the vote, though it failed to elect a single member.[38]

The party floundered for a few years after the election but experienced growth from 1942 to 1944, as it did elsewhere in the country, as fears of a postwar depression led people to support the party that advocated peacetime state intervention to keep the economy booming. Party membership rose from twenty-five hundred in 1942 to twelve thousand in 1944, compared to only eight thousand for Social Credit in the latter year,[39] and Elmer Roper won a city-wide by-election in Edmonton in April 1942. The Social Credit leadership were shocked when the bulk of the second preferences marked for their candidates (Alberta employed a proportional-voting rather than a "first past the post" system) went to Roper.[40] Roper was elected party leader in December 1942 after Ronning's resignation.

Even before assuming the party leadership, Roper, as party president, had moved to finally dissolve the CLP as a separate organization from the CCF. A one-day convention in January 1942 agreed that the CLP and the general membership section of the CCF be fused "to form a single political party to be known as the Co-operative Commonwealth--the Alberta Farmer-Labour Party."[41]

Although some Edmonton members of the CLP resisted the passing of their party to the end, both the Edmonton and Calgary branches of the party agreed to submerge themselves within the CCF. Under Ronning and Roper, the Alberta CCF stuck rather close to the rhetoric of the Regina Manifesto. The need to distinguish itself from Social Credit, which retained its reformist image, may have contributed to the maintenance of a degree of ideological purity that was only equalled by the British Columbia party.[42]

In the meantime Social Credit, alarmed by Roper's by-election upset, turned its fire from the banks to the socialists. After Aberhart's death in 1943, his successor, Ernest Manning, and other party leaders carried on a vicious campaign against the CCF. Manning identified CCF socialism with the national socialism of Hitler and warned of a conspiracy of bankers and socialists to deprive individuals of their freedom.[43] He wrote one CCF supporter: "...it is an insult to suggest to the Canadian people who are sacrificing their sons to remove the curse which the socialism of Germany has brought to the world that their own social and economic security can be attained only by introducing some form of socialism in Canada."[44]

The vitriolic anti-socialist campaign of Social Credit plus an end to any serious attempts to implement social credit schemes caused a turn-around in business attitudes towards the provincial government. Conservatives came to regard Social Credit, rather than the Independent (People's Leagues) movement, as the major force for the protection of free enterprise in Alberta.[45] At the same time, the populist origins of the party, and a series of welfare and agricultural support measures implemented by the Aberhart and Manning administrations, enabled the government to retain the confidence of its earlier supporters.

For its part, the CCF failed to win significant direct support from unions to counter the new support Social Credit received from business. In late June 1944, only two months before the provincial election, the CCF could claim only 357 members in affiliated unions in Calgary and Edmonton.[46] The trade unions had shied away from direct partisan participation in Alberta after the 1935 debacle, and labour leaders who had kept their organization at arm's length from the CCF in the 1930s (at the same time as they claimed to endorse CCF aims) remained aloof from the CCF even after the CLP collapsed.

The CCF also faced a challenge for the left-wing vote from the Labour Progressive Party (LPP), the old Communist party under a new name (the latter having been banned in 1939). The LPP enjoyed a following in mining communities, particularly in the polyglot Crowsnest Pass area where the CCF was too weak to establish a viable constituency organization, and among farmers of eastern European background. The LPP, both provincially and nationally, sought an entente with the CCF, a party which communists had denounced ten years earlier as "social fascist." Some Alberta CCF leaders, particularly William Irvine, believed that an electoral understanding with the LPP might be advantageous to the provincial CCF. The preferential voting system in Alberta made an informal coalition possible. CCFers and LPPers could run against one another in a constituency but agree to ask their supporters to give their second preference to the other party of the left. However, the national CCF opposed any alliance with the communists. The Alberta CCF, having argued for a more conciliatory stance regarding the LPP, accepted a decision by the National Council of the party rejecting any co-operation with the LPP. Although CCF national secretary David Lewis complained that some CCF groups in Alberta continued to work too closely with communists, the provincial leadership abided by the national party's decision and refused any co-operation with the LPP in the provincial election of 1944.[47]

The provincial election results call in question the wisdom of the CCF's refusal to co-operate. The CCF received 25 percent of the first-preference votes but won only two of fifty-five seats in the assembly. The LPP received 5 percent of the vote and no seats. In four seats won by Social Credit, however, the combined CCF-LPP vote was greater than the combined votes of all other candidates. The Social Crediters won because most independents gave their second preferences to Social Credit. Most CCFers and LPPers, on the other hand, did not bother to mark second preferences and those who did were as likely to give their votes to Social Credit as to the other left-wing party. An electoral pact might have resulted in the election of a total of five CCFers and one LPPer. Even this might have seemed a pittance when one considers that three in every ten voters had marked their first preference for candidates of the left. It would, however, have provided a stronger presence of the left in the legislature, and might have mitigated the disillusionment and defeatism which seemed to overtake the CCF after the election. Of course, it is possible that an electoral pact with the communists might have backfired by providing Manning with more ammunition for his claims that the CCF proposed to regiment people's lives and impose an atheistic materialism on an unwilling Christian people. Nevertheless the two parties did espouse similar provincial programmes and, as it turned out, the LPP resorted to slanderous attacks on Roper rather than attack the CCF programme as such to convince LPP sympathers not to give any support to the party's left-wing rival.[48]

The dramatic increase in CCF votes and members between the 1940 and 1944 provincial elections could have been interpreted by its supporters as a sign that the party would eventually triumph in Alberta. Roper, not surprisingly, stressed the positive in his post-election analysis. Other observers, however, believed that Roper had erred in stressing nationalization of industries--particularly resource industries and utilities--during the election rather than immediate reforms as the Saskatchewan party had stressed in its provincial election victory just six weeks before the Alberta election. Roper pointed out that Social Credit's record of reforms made it necessary for the CCF to clarify the differences in its approach to public affairs from that of Alberta's governing party: "Through a superb political organization, the Alberta Government has sold the people of Alberta the idea that it had done wonders in health and education...we, therefore, had to choose between a campaign of promising something better in the way of social services than the perfection the government was claiming...or put forward a program of social ownership of the rich natural resources of the province."[49]

Roper's optimism that the popular vote in 1944 heralded an ultimate victory for socialism in Alberta was not shared by CCF members generally. The lopsided distribution of seats in Social Credit's favour and the failure of the party even to achieve official opposition status--the independents, with half the CCF vote, had won three seats to the CCF's two--caused disillusionment. Interest in the party subsided and membership levels began a steep decline.[50]

A growing disinterest in politics was not only characteristic of former CCF members in Alberta during this period. Social Credit members complained that their party's clubs, hubs of activity in the 1930s, had become moribund and that young people were not joining the party.[51] After the orgy of political activity of the 1930s and early 1940s, most Albertans had become politically apathetic, an attitude which was unfavourable to the prospects of opposition parties. The Great Depression, followed by the fears of a postwar depression, which had been catalysts for political activity, faded into history as buoyant agricultural markets made it appear that prosperity had been achieved at last. Then the oil boom, which began with the discovery of major deposits of crude oil near Leduc in February 1947, erased for many Albertans the view that their province was a "have not" province which would never find its place in the sun unless radical changes occurred in the organization of its political and economic life.

Instead of working in political parties, workers and farmers joined economic organizations whose purpose was to win economic gains for their members rather than to effect structural economic changes. The Alberta Farmers' Union and the trade unions enjoyed rapid membership growth during and after the war.[52] Although individual farm and labour leaders were active in the CCF, none supported a close association between their economic organization and the political parties.[53]

The CCF gave its support to the major demands of both the Farmers' Union and the two provincial trade union federations,[54] but the party continued to decline even as the economic organizations grew. The party's convention in 1945 had approved a plan to hire two provincial organizers as well as other staff as funds permitted in order to ensure a co-ordinated campaign of constituency organization. However the 1948 convention, recognizing that funding for such a campaign was unavailable, reduced the budget for provincial organization and placed the major responsibility for organization in the hands of the constituency associations.[55] They proved unequal to the task.

By 1949 party officials admitted to great difficulty just finding candidates willing to stand for the party and people to work for those who agreed to stand as candidates. Provincial president Nellie Peterson wrote a candid note to the national research secretary about the party's inability to field good candidates in the federal election that year. In Vegreville, the local party organization had declined to nominate in order tacitly to back a Liberal who might defeat the right-wing Social Credit MP. Pleas by Peterson and Calgary MLA Aylmer Liesemer that the party nominate a candidate were ignored. Peterson then went on to point out that

> Calgary is in a somewhat different position. There every attempt was made to find a candidate ...I would judge that it was a fruitless search. After all, "commandeering" a sacrifice candidate

> is not always possible. Incidentally, there's many an Edmonton CCFer who thinks we'd be much better off provincially and federally if West Edmonton hadn't insisted on a candidate when only one was available...Medicine Hat is very hesitant about putting up a candidate. They have no one willing to accept, no funds, and little organization, and less CCF support....
>
> ...An election battle in Alberta is more closely related to one in Quebec than you think.[56]

The CCF's slow start during the Depression years and its inability to translate its significant popular support into seats in 1944 left the party with too weak a base to withstand the ideological onslaught of the Social Credit party, which had shed its radical Depression image for the mantle of a free-enterprise party which was guiding Alberta into a period of seemingly unending economic growth and prosperity. By the late 1950s, the CCF was a non-entity in Alberta politics and only the formation of the NDP in 1961 gave supporters of social democracy a second chance to slowly win the affections of the Alberta electorate.

NOTES

1 The United Farmers of Alberta held thirty-nine of sixty-three seats in the Alberta legislature; the CLP held four. The UFA also held nine of the province's sixteen federal ridings. (*Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1931, p. 361; 1934, p. 327.) Labour's provincial and municipal electoral record is outlined in Myron Johnson, "The Failure of the CCF in Alberta: An Accident of History" in Carlo Caldarola, ed., *Society and Politics in Alberta: Research Papers* (Toronto: Methuen, 1979), p. 92.

2 Walter D. Young, *Democracy and Discontent: Progressivism, Socialism and Social Credit in the Canadian West* (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1978), p. 60.

3 Carl F. Betke, "Farm Politics in an Urban Age: The Decline of the United Farmers of Alberta After 1921" in Lewis H. Thomas, ed., *Essays on Western History* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1976), pp. 175-89; C.B. Macpherson, *Democracy in Alberta: Social Credit and the Party System* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1953), p. 64.

4 The Liberals' three provincial leaders from the party's fall from power in 1921 to the election of the Social Credit in 1935 were lawyers. Conventions of party members appear to have been held irregularly, mainly when it was necessary to select a new leader. The party held conventions in 1924, 1929, 1932 and 1934; only in the latter year was no leadership contest scheduled. (Glenbow Alberta Institute [GAI], Alberta Liberal Association Records, box 21, file 120.)

5 Macpherson, pp. 26, 79-81.

6 On Brownlee's background, see *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1930, p. 342.

7 *UFA*, 1 February 1930; John Richards and Larry Pratt, *Prairie Capitalism: Power and Influence in the New West* (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), pp. 54-55.

8 *UFA*, 1 February 1932.

9 Ibid., 1 March 1932.

10 Ibid.; J.F. Conway, "To Seek a Goodly Heritage: The Prairie Populist Response to the National Policy" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Simon Fraser University, 1978), pp. 428-29.

11 GAI, G.G. Coote Papers, file 28, W.A. Shields to Coote, 14 September 1935; file 9, Coote to Premier Reid, 22 February 1935.

12 GAI, Henry Spencer Papers, file 3, Spencer to A.P. Waldron, managing editor, Western Producer, 23 June 1937.

13 Ibid., file 3, Spencer to W.A. Tutte, Douglas British Columbia Social Credit Section, 7 February 1935.

Brownlee, it should be noted, did not favour notions of social credit regardless of what level of government attempted to implement them. Indeed, he denounced proposals for currency reform even as the UFA federal MPs were espousing them in the House of Commons. He told the UFA convention in 1931: "Reformation of the currency system provides no logical solution for our problems. A study of conditions in Russia convinces us that nothing is to be gained by relinquishing our faith in the power of the ballot and our religious beliefs." (Edmonton Journal, 23 January 1931.)

14 GAI, Coote Papers, file 28, R.W. Clow to Coote, 8 August 1935.

15 GAI, United Mine Workers of America Papers, box 4, file 20, "Report of the Canadian Labour Party Provincial Convention, 1928."

16 Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1934, pp. 353-54.

17 Alberta Labour News, 21 July 1934.

18 Ibid.

19 Non-unionized members could, however, form clubs which would elect delegates to party meetings.

20 For example, a chairman of a Calgary branch of the party observed in 1933: "We realize that there is a certain amount of prejudice against the Labour Party but as a whole in this district at any rate, the prejudice as I have found it personally, and also those assisting in the canvass, is that the Labour Party forgoes any real action until a few weeks prior to an election, and most people thereby, come to a conclusion that the Labour Party is only a machine organized by certain dominating influences to catch votes." (Alberta Labour News, 16 September 1933.)

21 Edmonton Journal, 29 May 1935. The revolt of the reliefers is recalled in Ben Swankey, "Reflections of an Alberta Communist: The Hungry Thirties," Alberta History, 27, 4 (Autumn, 1979), pp. 1-12.

22 Alberta Labour News, 24 December 1932; Edmonton Journal, 2 May 1935; People's Weekly, 30 October 1937.

23 *Edmonton Journal*, 29 May 1935, 26 June 1935; *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1936, pp. 396-97.

24 William Aberhart, *Social Credit Manual: Social Credit as Applied to the Province of Alberta, 1935*, p. 5; *Social Credit Chronicle*, 12 July 1935; *Alberta Labour News*, 9 September 1933.

25 Provincial Museum and Archives of Alberta (PMAA), Premier's Papers, various files.

26 Ibid., file 1125 B.

27 *Alberta Labour News*, 19 January 1935.

28 J.A. Irving, *The Social Credit Movement in Alberta* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1959), pp. 352-54; *Edmonton Journal*, 17 April 1935; *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1936, p. 366.

29 *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1934, p. 353.

30 PMAA, Premier's Papers, files 1105, 1106, 1117B; Macpherson, p. 178. Aberhart firmly believed that his government could not introduce state medicine, adequate relief for the needy, or even free textbooks until the financial system was changed. On his copy of the resolutions, he scribbled "This impossible under the present financial system" and other similar phrases next to resolutions calling for these reforms.

31 The League's 1937 membership was reported as 40,782. (PMAA, Premier's Papers, file 1124.) Membership had dropped to 23,370 by September 1939. (Ibid., file 1176.)

32 *People's Weekly*, 25 January 1936. The newspaper also dropped the words, "official paper of organized labour in Alberta," which had been placed under the title of the *Alberta Labour News*.

33 *Alberta Labour News*, 23 November 1935.

34 Most businessmen viewed the Aberhart administration as socialist. (See GAI, Calgary Board of Trade Papers, box 1.) Organized business opposed most of the major pieces of legislation introduced by the first Aberhart administration.

35 In 1938, however, only 57 percent of the delegates favoured any affiliation of the organization with the CCF. (*People's Weekly*, 5 February 1938.)

36 The evolution of the People's Leagues and the attitudes of the Liberals, Conservatives, and the UFA to the anti-Aberhart movement is described in Mier Serfaty, "Structure and Organization of Political Parties in Alberta, 1935-71" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Carleton University, 1977), pp. 49-108.

37 *People's Weekly*, 27 November 1937, 5 August 1939.

38 *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1944, p. 388. An analysis of the 1940 election is found in Harold J. Schultz, "A Second Term: 1940," *Alberta Historical Review*, 10, 1 (Winter, 1962), pp. 17-26. Roper commented after the election: "It is recognized that the progressive voters of the province are remaining loyal to the government they elected in 1935 and the turn of the CCF will only come when it is seen that the Aberhart policies or lack of policies are not beneficial to the province." (*People's Weekly*, 30 March 1940.)

39 GAI, CCF Records, box 5, file 42, William Irvine to David Lewis, 28 June 1944; Alberta Provincial Office to Margaret Telford, CCF National Office, 4 November 1944.

40 *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1944, p. 389.

41 *People's Weekly*, 31 January 1942.

42 Ibid., 14 February 1942; 28 March 1942. The party's 1940 provincial election programme, for example, began with the following plank:

> 1. Public ownership
>
> Progressive socialization of natural resources, industries and services such as electrical power, oil production and distribution, packing plants or any other property or service the public ownership and operation of which is necessary for the common good. (*People's Weekly*, 10 February 1940.)

43 Manning wrote in part: "...finance is today seeking to strengthen its dictatorship by subtely [*sic*] advocating the doctrine of a supreme state. In other words it is determined to strengthen its now shakey [*sic*] position by augmenting its present control by the establishment of dictatorship in another field, namely that of Government. That is the ultimate end of all forms of socialism including the CCF." (PMAA, Premier's Papers, file 1113, Ernest Manning to William Wray, 30 June 1943.)

44 Ibid., file 1242, Ernest Manning to J.B. Hayfield, 3 February 1944.

45 Macpherson, p. 206.

46 GAI, CCF Records, box 5, file 42, William Irvine to David Lewis, 28 June 1944.

47 Ibid., Alberta Provincial Office to Margaret Telford, CCF National Office, 4 November 1944; William Irvine to David Lewis, 2 March 1944.

48 Canadian Parliamentary Guide, 1945, pp. 581-82; Morris Shumiatcher, "Alberta Election," Canadian Forum, September 1944, pp. 127-29. The Labour Progressive Party's attacks on Roper were reported in two daily newspapers during the election and are detailed in People's Weekly, 16 September 1944. After the election, the two newspapers agreed to print refutations of the LPP's charges as well as apologies for having reported the accusations.

The left-wing tone of CCF pronouncements in Alberta is illustrated by the following resolution introduced by Roper in the legislature in 1944 and seconded by a breakaway Social Credit MLA:

> Whereas wealth comes into being as the property of those who own the means by which it is produced; and Whereas the exploitation of the natural resources of the nation for private profit, and the private ownership of the means of wealth, production, distribution and exchange, has resulted in gross inequalities and inefficiencies in the economy of Alberta and Canada, be it therefore
> Resolved that this legislature is of the opinion that future development of the natural resources of the province should be by public ownership and that the whole future economic development of the province should, as far as practicable, be on the basis of social ownership of the principal means of production and distribution. (Today and Tomorrow, 9 March 1944).

The tone of this resolution and other statements by Roper and Irvine, as well as other CCF leaders, was indistinguishable from the tone of the pronouncements of LPP leaders.

49 Canadian Forum, October 1944, pp. 161-62.

50 The CCF, after having peaked at twelve thousand members during the election of 1944, had to be content with a goal of signing four thousand members in 1948, the year of the subsequent provincial election. (People's Weekly, 24 April 1948.)

51 The weakened state of the Social Credit organization, even though the party held almost all of the province's legislative seats, is revealed by these extracts from a resolution passed at the party's provincial annual convention in 1951:

> Whereas it was greatly due to the influence and activities of the study groups, particularly in rural districts that Alberta was won for Social Credit, and
> Whereas the rural groups have almost ceased to exist, or are in a dormant condition and
> Whereas hardly any of our younger generation or the newcomers to the province have any understanding of the Social Credit proposals and their applicability to the better distribution of the nation's potential productive wealth...(PMAA, Premier's Papers, file 1846 B, "Resolutions of the Seventeenth Annual Convention of the Alberta Social Credit League.")

A Social Credit supporter indicated to Manning that the study groups were equally moribund in Edmonton and that few young people were active in the party in the city. Manning responded that he shared these concerns. (Ibid., Mrs. Marion Krogh to Ernest Manning, 21 November 1947; Manning to Krogh, 5 December 1947.)

52 The Alberta Farmers' Union membership, for example, increased from fifteen thousand to thirty thousand during a farmers' strike for "parity prices" for farm products in 1946. (People's Weekly, 28 September 1946; 5 October 1946.) Trade union membership, which had stood at twenty thousand in 1931, had more than doubled to forty-three thousand by 1952. (Jack Masson and Peter Blackie, "Labour Politics in Alberta" in Caldarola, pp. 274-75.)

53 The Social Credit stranglehold on the legislature caused farm and labour leaders to fear the consequences of any apparent partisanship on the part of their organizations. While the tone of resolutions passed at labour and farm conventions suggested that many activists might have preferred Saskatchewan's CCF administration to Alberta's Social Credit regime, statements denouncing government actions or inaction were few and far between.

54 The Farmers' Union of Alberta (the renamed Alberta Farmers' Union) tended to support the state intervention in the economy that the CCF championed and Social Credit increasingly repudiated. For example, the 1951 convention of the Farmers' Union indicated its support for the following policies which paralleled long-standing CCF commitments rejected by Manning: establishment of a provincial Producers' Marketing Board, opposition to the export

of natural gas, provision of public power and initiation (through federal-provincial co-operation) of "complete, non-contributory health services." (PMAA, Premier's Papers, file 1906, Farmer's Union of Alberta, "Resolutions Passed at Annual Convention December 10-14, 1951.")

55 GAI, CCF Records, box 12, file 129, "The Story of the Alberta CCF 1932 to 1948" in 1948 "Provincial Convention Program."

56 Ibid., box 43, Nellie Peterson to Lorne Ingle, 20 May 1949.

In Pursuit of the Voter:
The British Columbia CCF, 1945-1950

Christina J. Nichol

Between the years 1945 and 1950 the British Columbia-Yukon section of the CCF, which had long been regarded as the home of radicals and Marxists, underwent a marked rightward shift in its policies. There are a number of explanations for this phenomenon, the most obvious being the Cold War, but it is the purpose of this essay to examine how closer ties with the trade unions assisted in effecting the change.

It is useful at the outset to consider briefly why the British Columbia-Yukon section retained an uncompromising socialist character for some time after other parts of the movement, most notably the Ontario section, had been moulded into a moderate social democratic party working in close alliance with the non-communist trade unions--in essence the labour party which David Lewis indicated the CCF must become in order to achieve electoral success.[1] The first and most obvious reason for the distinctive character of the British Columbia CCF was geographic isolation, but the province was isolated in other ways as well. A significant number of its residents originated from Great Britain, including radicalized trade unionists and displaced members of the middle class. In either case they were people who were determined not so much to make good in the new country as to reshape it to create the just society denied them in Britain. There were other important radical elements among the immigrants; the woodworkers and fishermen included many Scandinavians with traditions of socialism and communism, and in the mines of the Kootenays there were eastern European immigrants, many of whom had strong Marxist loyalties. The number of residents originating from Ontario and the Maritimes was relatively small in those years; the ties between British Columbia and the rest of Canada were apparently little more than "a pair of railway tracks."[2] The journey from Vancouver to CCF headquarters in Ottawa was long and expensive, and though British Columbia was a centre of CCF strength, along with Saskatchewan and Ontario, no National Convention was held in Vancouver before 1950. The National Council sometimes met in Winnipeg, but even that is rather closer to Ottawa than Vancouver.

Despite its isolation the British Columbia CCF fared well during the wartime years, and radical socialist tendencies were both tolerated and accepted. The same was not true of communism, and pro-communist leanings were promptly dealt with. When some CCF members decided to attempt to co-operate with the communist Labour Progressive Party in 1945, which was an election year, the provincial executive abruptly expelled them.[3] CCF candidates in the 1945 election walked a tightrope; on the one hand labour support was essential for electoral success, but on the other the communists dominated the major unions of the province: the Shipyard Workers, the International Union of Mine Mill and Smelterworkers (IUMMSW), and the International Woodworkers of America (IWA). The problem the CCF faced was to attract the votes of the union membership without engaging in any sort of united front with the communist leadership. The majority of the party agreed that any attempt to work with the communists would result in the destruction of the CCF as an independent entity; moreover the communists, as a party and as individuals, were viewed with hostility and distrust. Though the communists controlled the majority of the executive positions in the major unions, rank and file members did not have any allegiance to the LPP since it never garnered more than a tiny fraction of the popular vote in British Columbia.

The drive to dislodge the communist leadership, begun in the late war years, was both a logical political move, and a drive which had strong appeal for all democratic socialists because there were real and serious questions about the means used by the communists to retain control of the unions. Socialists and non-communist trade unionists worked together in the struggle for a common cause, but in time it became impossible to ignore the differences between trade union goals and socialist goals. A clear line between the ideology of the right and left began to appear in the British Columbia CCF, a demarcation which had profound effects and all but shattered the party before it was restructured as a reformist social democratic party.

British Columbia was not, of course, the only province where the communists were under attack. In Ontario Charles Millard and the Steelworkers spearheaded the anti-communist drive. To quote Gad Horowitz: "Millard's goals...were to strengthen the Steelworkers' Union in particular and the labour movement in general; to build the CCF as the political arm of labour; and to drive the Communists from the labour movement."[4] However, there was in British Columbia no figure like Millard, simultaneously powerful in the labour movement and a CCF member of the provincial legislature. There were trade unionists who were also members of the CCF, for example Jim Bury and George Home; there were CCF MLAs who interested themselves in the trade unions, for example Bert Gargrave and Arthur Turner, but there was no Millard.

Though the Canadian Congress of Labour (CCL) had endorsed the CCF as the political arm of labour, and had established a Political Action Committee in Ontario which had provided real help to the CCF in the 1948 election, nothing like this was possible in British Columbia. The communists controlled the major unions, the Vancouver Labour Council and the British Columbia Federation of Labour (BCFL). Under these circumstances there was no way the CCL could assist the CCF in the province.

The first organized attempt to challenge the communists in British Columbia came with the formation of the CCF Trade Union Committee (TUC) in 1943. Its members were Eileen Tallman, sent by the Steelworkers' Union from Ontario, Lloyd Whelan and Tom Bradley from the IWA, and Reg Bullock from the Shipyard Workers' Union. Although the TUC was a CCF committee, the attitude of the CCF towards unions was distant, ranging from condescension to a wary distrust rooted in the old Socialist Party of Canada which tended to view unions as an impediment to fundamental social change. Eileen Tallman tackled the job at hand gamely but she was baffled by the attitude of the British Columbia CCF: "they were just talking about socialism and how to change everything; we just wanted to build stronger unions."[5]

The TUC had neither money nor power; it was limited to trying to "activize" the CCF membership in the communist-dominated unions in order to encourage internal revolt against the communist leadership. In this they had little success; Denny O'Brien, president of the BCFL reported: "Miss Tallman and her group who have done so much talking, simply fizzled out."[6] Even the provincial executive of the CCF was not wholly enthusiastic about its Trade Union Committee. In 1945, under Tom Alsbury's presidency, the executive administered a stern rebuke about a cartoon used in the TUC bulletin. The offending cartoon depicted the LPP as a prostitute soliciting a customer, the customer being the Liberal-Conservative government of the province. The CCF did not disagree with this view of the LPP and its activities; nonetheless it considered the cartoon in bad taste and regretted any offence it had given CCF members. As Eileen Tallman was later to remark: "They simply have no idea how to go about attracting trade union support."[7]

The British Columbia CCF went into the provincial election campaign of 1945 with an enthusiasm and optimism at odds with the obvious electoral realities.[8] The Liberal-Conservative coalition was strongly against them and the LPP had placed candidates in fifteen of the forty-eight constituencies. Further, the LPP used an election leaflet which was virtually identical in content to the CCF leaflet; both emphasized housing, jobs for veterans, and a new labour code. The LPP version was rather more attractively packaged and there was no apparent shortage of funds for advertising --funds which came, it was suspected, from the coffers of the IWA and the IUMMSW. The CCF campaign was run on private donations from members and supporters; less than one hundred dollars could be sent from the National Office.[9]

The LPP was a serious threat, so much so that the CCF provincial executive was persuaded by the TUC to hire one of its members as an organizer specifically charged with working in the logging camps to bolster the CCF vote.[10] Overall the situation was bleak. The LPP constantly attacked the CCF for its refusal to co-operate and field "unity candidates"; there was the nagging shortage of funds; and M.J. Coldwell declined to undertake a speaking tour. Much had been hoped for but the results were disappointing. The popular vote rose from 33 percent to 39 percent but five seats were lost, two of which were directly attributable to LPP intervention, though overall the LPP vote was a mere 3 percent. The effect of the LPP campaign tactics cannot be measured precisely, but certainly they made the CCF look suspiciously like the LPP in the eyes of unsophisticated voters and that alone gave a considerable boost to the Liberal-Conservative coalition vote.[11]

Having effectively stopped the CCF advance at the polls, the LPP next demonstrated its power in the trade union movement. In May 1946 the communist leadership of the IWA called the first ever province-wide strike and got the full support of the membership. Harold Pritchett, president of District 1 (British Columbia) of the IWA, asked for and received a deluge of letters and telegrams in support of the strike.[12] He called upon the CCF for its endorsement but provincial leader Harold Winch's carefully worded reply offered only the use of CCF halls and platforms and little more than that.[13]

The strike was a success, achieving a wage gain and the check-off, and for the CCF this result was significant. First, it meant that the communist leadership of the union was more firmly in place than ever, and that the LPP could expect to obtain continued financial support from the union. Second, the strike demonstrated that a communist union was as effective as any other in winning improved economic conditions for its members without in any way disturbing the basic relationship between capital and labour. The CCF was, on the other hand, committed at the time to a programme of government control with some degree of public ownership in the forest industry.[14] This was not a goal of the IWA, nor would it be, no matter what the political colour of its leadership. Yet the CCF would need the support--both the votes and the financial contributions--of this powerful union if it hoped to win an election.

The owners of the logging industry, along with other employers, responded to the 1946 strike with a proposal for labour legislation which was accepted by the Coalition Government and enacted as Bill 39 in the spring of 1947. The new law would make it much more difficult for a union to succeed in calling a province-wide strike. Under the new rules, once conciliation had broken down a government-supervised strike vote was required. After that there was to be a lengthy "cooling off" period before a strike could be called. The whole process might take three months, during which employees were unprotected, for all practical purposes, from employer intimidation and dismissal. It was pointed out that the time taken to conduct a strike vote in widely scattered logging camps and among fishermen would be so long as to render the position of the union untenable; nonetheless the legislation was duly passed and proclaimed.[15]

Labour and the CCF reacted angrily. Numerous resolutions dealing with Bill 39 were presented to the 1947 convention of the British Columbia CCF,[16] but the CCF was in a difficult position. The caucus had declined to participate in the deliberations of a government-labour committee struck in 1945 because it would have meant they would be working side-by-side with the LPP. They also suspected that the committee had far less to do with producing good labour legislation than it had to do with diverting the energies of labour away from a direct attack on the Coalition government. Indeed, the history of the government-labour committee suggests that that was exactly its purpose. The members appointed by the communist dominated BCFL agreed to accept the forty-four hour week as the provincial standard, despite the fact that the BCFL had already committed itself to fight for the forty-hour week. The discrepancy was not revealed for some weeks, not until Harold Winch, CCF leader in British Columbia, demanded that the committee's recommendations be tabled in the legislature. Then the CCF MLAs found that they had persisted in the forty-hour week demand long after the leaders of the BCFL had abandoned it.[17]

When Bill 39 was introduced in the legislature a year later, the CCF, of course, attacked it, but perhaps with some caution. Alex MacAuslane, vice-president of the CCL and a member of the CCF, complained that the CCF caucus had not taken the fight far enough and urged a combined attack by labour on the new legislation.[18] The BCFL called for labour to unite behind "progressive forces" to oppose the legislation, but the CCF was not inclined to be drawn into an alliance. The provincial president, Colin Cameron, ironically remarked: "This proposed union of progressive forces bears all the earmarks of another attempt to head off the possible electoral success of the CCF. This move for a united front against Bill 39 [will] provide the excuse for putting candidates in the field who may defeat the CCF and return those great friends of labour--the coalition government."[19]

This statement is a fair representation of the difficulties the CCF faced in dealing with the communists in the late 1940s. The communists held control of the major unions and labour councils of the province. While the membership of those unions was politically unsophisticated, they were far more likely to vote CCF than LPP. By various manoeuvres--adopting the CCF platform for example, and calling for "unity" candidates--the communists managed to deflect support from the CCF, while the principal beneficiaries of their efforts were apparently the members of the Liberal-Conservative coalition.

By 1947 anti-communist feeling was on the rise in British Columbia as in the whole of the western world and Dorothy Steeves sounded a prophetic warning at the 1947 provincial convention: "Make no mistake about this--this present anti-communist drive will become a drive against any organization and individual which threatens vested interests and that means the CCF." The Taft-Hartley Law was enacted by the American government in mid-1947 and immediately restricted the scope of the communists in the international unions, including the IWA and the IUMMSW. In Canada the CCL again endorsed the CCF as its political arm, and for the first time there was sufficient anti-communist strength in the CCL to allow some action to be taken.[20] William Mahoney of the Steelworkers was appointed Western Director of Organization for the CCL in late 1947 and launched an all-out drive against the communist leadership in the British Columbia unions, a drive which was to alter the course of the CCF there. One event in late 1947 signalled the changes which were to occur.

The British Columbia CCF still adhered to a policy of non-alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union, and instead placed its hopes for world stability and peace in the United Nations. But the Canadian government had signed a contract to send munitions to Chiang Kai-Shek, who was then engaged in a war against the communists in China. When a Panamanian freighter arrived in Vancouver to take on a load of arms and ammunition, a picket line was thrown up on Ballantyne Pier. The University CCF club, at least one CCF MLA, and a number of CCF members joined the picket line along with a number of communist front organizations.[21]

The longshoremen respected the picket line, and the boilermakers announced they would not undertake the repairs the vessel needed. But the longshoremen's union was non-communist and the boilermakers' communist. Before the familiar cry for unity behind progressive forces could be raised, a telegram arrived from the president of the CCL instructing all affiliates to "refrain from picketing and other unauthorized activities."[22] The same day the telegram was received, the executive of the British Columbia CCF met, assisted by Alex MacAuslane of the CCL, and they issued this statement: "the CCF wishes to reiterate its position that it in no way interferes in trade union affairs...we advise our members and supporters to refrain from...picketing." Then with a deft switch it declared: "we will continue to give publicity to the need for cancellation of the shipment of munitions to China."[23] With this statement the British Columbia CCF stepped back from its policy of non-alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union in order to accommodate the more pressing demands of the CCL.

The Vancouver Labour Council and the BCFL were both reclaimed from communist domination in 1948, the former by a large margin, the latter by a single vote. Eileen Tallman claims that the groundwork for the capture of the Vancouver Labour Council was laid well before Mahoney's arrival in Vancouver, Irving Abella gives the credit to Mahoney; either way it was a decisive victory.[24] However the BCFL, dominated by the IWA and the IUMMSW, proved to be a more difficult objective. By this time the end of wartime contracts had so reduced the size of the Shipyard Workers' Union that it was no longer a factor in the power struggle. Mahoney canvassed support and assigned credentials to reliable delegates.[25] It is unlikely that these manoeuvres could have succeeded by themselves, but by happy coincidence the IUMMSW was suspended from the CCL, and therefore from the BCFL, before the voting for executive positions took place. This tipped the balance and allowed the election of a bare majority of non-communists.

Simultaneously the IWA was under attack. The New Westminster local had voted in a non-communist executive. Mahoney worked with this group and with the International officers to undermine the communist leadership in British Columbia. The handling of District funds was questioned. An audit showed that substantial sums of money had been disbursed without supporting vouchers, and the leadership of the District unwisely tried to conceal this. Lloyd Whalen created a sensation at the District quarterly meeting when he arose with two different versions of the audit in his hand, one of which showed several items which did not appear on the other.[26] The battle raged; the International officers moved to investigate; the District executive protested against interference in its affairs. In the end nothing could be proven about the use or misuse of funds because the supporting vouchers were missing. The communist leadership realized this was only the opening round and rather hastily moved to disaffiliate the British Columbia District from the International and to form the Woodworkers' Industrial Union of Canada (WIUC).[27]

The CCF was inevitably drawn into the turmoil. It was essential that the woodworkers' union be non-communist if the CCF was ever to achieve electoral success. While the IUMMSW remained an unassailable bastion of communist strength in the Kootenays well into the 1950s, among the woodworkers there was enough anti-communist feeling that it was possible to tackle the LPP head on. A defeat of the WIUC would be a defeat for the LPP; despite the CCF's professed policy of non-intervention in trade union affairs it had a large stake in the outcome of this particular struggle. As well, there was a genuine revulsion against the communist tactics in the woodworkers' union dispute, a feeling that the CCF had a responsibility to take a stand to protect the interests of democratic socialists in the trade union movement.[28] No longer could the CCF stand apart, asking for labour support at the polls, unless they were prepared to join directly in the anti-communist battle. A closer alliance with the CCL was required and this meant, inevitably, some loss of traditional CCF independence. One episode immediately made this clear.

In November 1948 the CCF Trade Union Committee prepared to hold conferences throughout the province to hear labour's proposals for amendments to the labour code. Representatives from unions were invited to meet with CCF MLAs in a number of centres, including Cranbrook, where the WIUC had a number of functioning locals. Representatives of the WIUC would therefore be invited to participate in the conference. Mahoney intervened; Arthur Turner, chairman of the TUC, saw the difficulty and sent a second letter to Cranbrook: "The TUC regrets to announce that the conference scheduled to be held in Cranbrook...has been postponed. The difficult and confused situation now existing in certain trade unions caused us to take this course. The CCF is not prepared to provide a battleground for conflicting elements...."[29] The CCL representative in Cranbrook, Tom Anderson, also an active CCF member, protested to Mahoney and to the CCF provincial executive pointing out that the WIUC had two thousand members in Cranbrook and that several staunch CCF workers had joined the WIUC.[30] But it was to no avail; no Trade Union Conference was held in Cranbrook that year.

The WIUC had an existence of little more than a year, from October 1948 to the spring of 1950. During that time it faced the full force of the International organization of the IWA, which sent about fifteen organizers into British Columbia; the courts, which demanded that the WIUC relinquish the District assets; the Labour Relations Board, which dealt very slowly with WIUC applications for certification; and finally the Provincial Police, which assisted the IWA in breaking a WIUC picket line at Iron River. All this has given the WIUC some claim to trade union martyrdom, and there is a tendency to overlook the fact that the differences between the two versions of the audit of District finances must have arisen from something other than "sloppy bookkeeping."[31]

As the Cold War intensified internationally, a cautious reconsideration of the meaning of socialism was underway in the British Columbia CCF. In 1947 the president's address to the convention called for a revolutionary programme for the removal "boldly and ruthlessly of production from private hands." In 1948 the tone was more moderate: "The philosophy of democratic socialism must be neither watered down communism nor reformed capitalism."[32] In economic terms the definition of socialism might be elusive, but in foreign affairs the goal was still clear--non-alignment with either the United States or the Soviet Union and the creation of a third bloc of socialist nations.

Dorothy Steeves, the provincial party's foreign affairs expert, got the support of the Provincial Council in 1948 for a resolution which expressed vigorous opposition to world domination by these two power blocs. She was able to carry this through the National Council as well; the resolution declared that "the CCF will resolutely resist any attempt by the forces of capitalism to dominate the world."[33] Neither David Lewis nor Angus MacInnis, the veteran MP from Vancouver East, agreed. MacInnis assured Lewis that "Mrs. Steeves does not have any amount of solid backing here," but Lewis was uneasy: "her views are in my opinion so confused, she has this deep seated urge to put the United States in exactly the same category as the Soviet Union...it is difficult for me to put into concrete words why I am so anxious to understand the situation."[34]

When Lewis arrived in Vancouver to attend the 1949 provincial convention, he discovered there was good reason for his anxiety. The debate on the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) dominated the convention debate and it impacted directly on the CCF-trade union alliance. The CCL supported NATO and in general the issue divided the communist and non-communist trade unions. The communist unions and the LPP opposed the entry of Canada into NATO, the non-communist unions supported NATO. The National Council of the CCF had voted support for NATO. This left socialists like Dorothy Steeves in the difficult position of trying to defend a non-existent third power bloc, one which would oppose the United States and NATO but would also oppose communism.[35]

The extent of support for Steeves' view is a measure of how profoundly the British Columbia CCF remained a socialist rather than a reformist party. The convention refused to approve the National Council's action in support of NATO, but the new executive, still headed by Dorothy Steeves, met immediately after the convention and NATO was again up for debate. George Home of the Packinghouse Workers' Union and Mahoney, CCL representative, assisted in the deliberations. The meeting recessed at 6:00 p.m. and reconvened at 8:00 p.m., and discussion continued with the executive apparently evenly divided. Finally the tie was broken by John Meyer, the nineteen-year-old CCYM representative who finally voted to support NATO because "I was afraid of Harold Winch."[36] That was the end of the non-alignment policy; the CCF was fully committed to the western military alliance.

There were both federal and provincial elections in the summer of 1949, and the campaigns were the first in which the British Columbia CCF had the full support of the CCL. Bill Mahoney directed the Political Action Committee of the CCL in the province until his return to Ontario in August. One important function of the Committee was the screening of prospective CCF candidates.[37] For Cranbrook, Mahoney favoured Bernard Webber, but instructed Percy Lawson to stay in Cranbrook for the nominating convention "because Webber is not at all familiar with the part the Congress intends to play...and further while I realize it is not wise to interfere too openly, anything you can do to discourage the possibility of Tom Anderson being chosen would be helpful." For Nanaimo, two prospects got the nod from the CCL--Percy Lawson and Rod Glenn. Two others did not—Joe White of the United Mineworkers, which had endorsed the WIUC, and Dave Stupich.[38]

Nevertheless Cranbrock continued to be a problem. Mahoney wrote angrily to the CCF provincial executive about Leo Nimsick who "took the position that the WIUC and the IWA were both Workers organizations and he was pursuing a course of strict neutrality!" Mahoney went on to demand that "Nimsick be made to adhere to the CCF position in the dispute and that he be given a clear understanding of the mutual obligations of the CCF and the free Trade Union Movement."[39] In fact the CCF had no explicit policy on the WIUC; not a single resolution referring to either the IWA or to the WIUC had been presented to the 1949 convention. In theory at least, the CCF continued its policy of non-intervention in trade union affairs.

The LPP fielded only two candidates in the provincial election of 1949, and otherwise enthusiastically endorsed and supported the CCF with predictable results. The Liberal-Conservative coalition was able to claim that the CCF was one and the same as the LPP, that the CCF was a communist front organization. The newspapers carried advertisements warning voters of the kind of totalitarian government the CCF would create if elected and president Dorothy Steeves threatened libel action.[40]

The results were again a disappointment both federally and provincially. The vote rose 2 percent in the federal election with a loss of four seats across the province, while the vote dropped 3 percent in the provincial election with a loss of three seats. A furious debate broke out as to the reasons for the failure. Angus MacInnis blamed it on the NATO debate and on the slackening of the drive towards socialism internationally. Colin Cameron, executive member and former MLA, blamed it on watered down socialist policies that made the party look ridiculously like Liberals-in-a-hurry.[41] A clearly identifiable right and left wing formed up, with the stand on NATO as one of the main distinguishing features, but that was only one of a number of profound differences. The right included the reformists, the left the more fundamental socialists. Naturally the trade unionists supported the right, thereby engendering the hostility of the left. Feelings ran high in an atmosphere of intrigue and suspicion. A group of young left-wingers began publishing an anonymously written newsletter, "Material for Thought," with the intention of introducing a greater degree of socialist theory into party discussions.[42] Meanwhile the pro-Nato group prepared to take on the left at the 1950 convention.

There was a dispute about delegates' credentials as soon as the convention got underway. One delegate asked why it was that so many delegates did not apparently belong to the clubs they purported to represent and asked bluntly "who was building a machine?" Eventually the credentials committee declared that everything was in order.[43]

The simmering trade union issue was sparked by the ongoing confrontation between the Steelworkers and the IUMMSW in Trail. Former MLA Bert Gargrave, defeated in the 1949 election, had been conducting a raid on the IUMMSW local at Trail for the Steelworkers. He worked out of the Vancouver office and was directly supervised by Bill Mahoney, while at the same time Mahoney was closely identified with the CCF through the Political Action Committee of the CCL. Leo Nimsick, MLA for Cranbrook and a member of the IUMMSW, brought forward a resolution "that there should be absolutely no interference in trade union disputes by the CCF." This was plainly an attack on Gargrave and the tension was heightened by the fact that the Steelworkers had made an application for certification which was to go before the Labour Relations Board in June,[44] and further by the presence of Murray Cotterill, national director of the Political Action Committee, at the convention.

A bitter debate ensued between Nimsick and Gargrave, with Gargrave hinting that Nimsick had LPP connections, and Nimsick defending the IUMMSW as having won for Trail the best contracts they had ever known. He went on to taunt Gargrave with a reminder that the IUMMSW had gone in and organized Trail when it was in the grip of a company union and at a time when the Steelworkers had refused to do so. Gargrave was able to amend the resolution to read "non-interference in jurisdictional disputes" and it was passed.[45] The convention was generally unsympathetic to the left. They claimed only three executive positions; important constitutional changes which would reduce the power of clubs were then referred to the new executive for action; attempts to debate NATO again were stopped; resolutions which would allow expropriation of forest lands were defeated.[46]

The struggle between the left and right in the party continued through the National Convention which was held in Vancouver in July 1950. Again the left was out-numbered and out-manoeuvred, but they decided to organize and fight back.[47] They formed a group which was to become the Socialist Fellowship and with that step embarked on a course which led to the virtual destruction of the left wing.

The aftermath of the two conventions was what Grant MacNeil, provincial party president, called a "terrible apathy" but apparently he did not discern its cause. When the Socialist Fellowship was forced to disband in 1951, a number of socialists left the party for good, including younger members who would have been the CCF's new generation of activists and intellectuals. Members complained that the CCF had sold itself to the trade unions and that the trade unions had undue influence in shaping party policies.[48]

In retrospect it seems clear that the assistance of the CCL had made little difference to the electoral fortunes of the CCF. There had been a drop of 3 percent in the popular vote and seats were lost; evidently no large blocks of labour support could be delivered which is not surprising when it is realized that only about 35 percent of the labour force was organized in 1949.[49] The trade union connection had had an important effect on CCF policy. The anti-communism of the CCL did not stop at the level of the trade unions in the province or in Canada. It extended to an anti-Soviet, pro-American policy and to support for the Western military alliance. When the CCL made the CCF its political arm, and the CCF accepted the designation, it had to relinquish its socialist foreign policy objecrives.

NOTES

1 David Lewis, The Good Fight (Toronto: Macmillan, 1981), Chapter 6.

2 PAC, CCF Records, Colin Cameron to David Lewis, 5 March 1948.

3 Ibid., Grant MacNeil to David Lewis, 28 October 1944; Pacific Advocate, 11 May 1945; UBCA, Angus MacInnis Papers.

4 Gad Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1968), p. 86.

5 Interview with Eileen Sufrin (née Tallman), 1983. Throughout this essay Eileen Sufrin will be referred to as Eileen Tallman. As an example of this condescension, Angus MacInnis informed David Lewis that "trade union executives, yes, and the intelligent ones in the rank and file, must play their hands realistically. If you can get that over to Moser et al it will be something worth doing." (UBCA, MacInnis Papers, MacInnis to David Lewis, 17 November 1943.)

6 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, review of the work of the full-time organizer, 25 May 1946; PAC, Canadian Labour Congress Papers (CLC Papers), Danny O'Brien to Pat Conroy, 12 August 1946.

7 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of Provincial CCF Executive, 29 September 1945; minutes of Table Officers meeting, 6 October 1945; Eileen Tallman to Pat Conroy, 23 January 1947, quoted in Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1973), p. 116.

8 PAC, CCF Records, Grant MacNeil to David Lewis, 13 September 1945.

9 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, LPP election leaflet, CCF election leaflet, CCF election platform, 1945; PAC, CCF Records, David Lewis to Grant MacNeil, 16 October 1945, 13 November 1945.

10 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of Provincial CCF Executive, 24 August 1945; minutes of TUC Executive, 26 August 1945; minutes of Table Officers meeting, 31 August 1945; minutes of CCF Provincial Council meeting, 17 November 1945.

11 CCF News, 1 November 1945; PAC, CCF Records, Grant MacNeil to David Lewis, 22 October 1945.

12 Letters and telegrams to IWA officers from the Lumber and Sawmill Workers, Thunder Bay; IUMMSW, Sudbury; Montreal Labour Council; Hoover Workers, Hamilton; Vancouver and Victoria Gas Workers; Madeline Parent, H.G. Rhodes, CCL Windsor; United Textile Workers, local 102; Hotel and Restaurant Employees of Vancouver; Ladies Auxiliary IUMMSW, Sudbury; H.W. Herridge M.P.; Cape Breton Labour Council; United Auto Workers, Windsor all endorsed the strike. The City Clerks of both New Westminster and Victoria both urged immediate government action in May 1946 as well. (UBCA, International Woodworkers of America Papers [IWA Papers].)

13 Ibid., Harold Pritchett to Harold Winch, 20 May 1946; Winch to Pritchett, 21 May 1946.

14 Myrtle Bergen, Tough Timber: The Loggers of B.C. - Their Story (Toronto: Progress Books, 1966), p. 236; CCF News, 19 October 1945.

15 Vancouver Daily Province, 28 February 1947; Vancouver Sun, 10 March 1947, 12 March 1947; PAC, CCF Records, Report to the People, 21st Legislature, Second Session 1947.

16 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, report of the British Columbia - Yukon CCF Convention, 1947.

17 Horowitz, p. 127.

18 UBCA, IWA Papers, Fourth Annual British Columbia Federation of Labour Convention, June 1947.

19 CCF News, 6 November 1947.

20 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, report of the British Columbia - Yukon CCF convention, 1947; Abella, pp. 95, 96, 119; Paul Phillips, No Power Greater: A Century of Labour in British Columbia (Vancouver: British Columbia Federation of Labour, Boag Foundation, 1967), p. 142; Morden Lazarus, The Long Winding Road: Canadian Labour in Politics (Vancouver: Boag Foundation, 1977).

21 Vancouver Sun, 18 December 1947.

22 PAC, CLC Papers, Pat Conroy to Alex MacAuslane 20 December 1947.

23 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of Provincial CCF Executive, 20 December 1947; Vancouver Sun, 20 December 1947; PAC, CCF Records, David Lewis to H.J. Mouncy, 16 January 1948.

24 Interview with Eileen Tallman; Abella, p. 118.

25 PAC, CLC Papers, Dan Radford to Pat Conroy, 3 February 1950; ibid., United Steelworkers of America Papers (USWA Papers), Tom Anderson to William Mahoney, 20 November 1948. The Cranbrook Labour Council learned after the BCFL convention that its delegate had been Sam English, who was not a member of any Cranbrook union.

26 Abella, p. 127; PAC, CLC Papers, Riddell, Stead, Graham and Hutchison to British Columbia District Council, IWA, 12 May 1948; UBCA, IWA Papers, report of the District Quarterly Meeting, IWA, 18 July 1948.

27 *B.C. Lumberworker*, 19 January 1950.

28 Colin Cameron and Grant MacNeil established a labour research bureau in 1948 producing radio scripts and a newspaper for the IWA. (PAC, USWA Papers, Williams to William Mahoney, 21 September 1948; Mahoney to Pat Conroy, 27 September 1948; ibid., CCF Records, Grant MacNeil to Angus MacInnis, 2 February 1949.)

29 PAC, USWA Papers, Arthur Turner to William Mahoney, 19 November 1948.

30 Ibid., Tom Anderson to Provincial Executive CCF and TUC, 19 November 1948.

31 J. Lembcke, "The International Woodworkers of America in British Columbia, 1942-1951," *Labour/Le Travailleur*, 6, (Autumn, 1980), pp. 113-48; UBCA, IWA Papers, writ filed in British Columbia Supreme Court, 29 March 1949; radio scripts for "The Voice of the IWA," 14 January 1949, 4 February 1949; PAC, CLC Papers, Percy Lawson to William Mahoney, 12 October 1948; *CCF News*, 12 July 1950.

32 *CCF News*, 24 April 1947; UBCA, MacInnis Papers, report of the British Columbia - Yukon CCF convention, 1948.

33 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of CCF Provincial Council, 13 April 1948; PAC, CCF Records, minutes of National Council 16-18 April 1948.

34 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, Angus MacInnis to David Lewis, 18 October 1948; Lewis to MacInnis, 25 October 1948; PAC, CCF Records, Lewis to Frank MacKenzie, 2 December 1948.

35 PAC, CCF Records, report of the British Columbia - Yukon CCF convention, 1949.

36 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of CCF Executive meeting, 17 April 1949; *CCF News*, 2 April 1949; interview with John Meyer, 1983.

37 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of Table Officers meeting, 30 April 1949.

38 PAC, USWA Papers, William Mahoney to Percy Lawson, 22 March 1949; ibid., CLC Papers, Dan Radford to Pat Conroy, 9 November 1948; UBCA, MacInnis Papers, minutes of CCF Executive meeting, 17 April 1949.

39 PAC, USWA Papers, William Mahoney to Provincial Executive, British Columbia CCF, 2 June 1949.

40 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, clipping file, 1945 election.

41 *Vancouver Sun*, 16 June 1949, 27 June 1949; *CCF News*, 6 July 1949, quoted in Elaine Bernard, "The Rod Young Affair in the British Columbia CCF" (M.A. Thesis, University of British Columbia, 1979), pp. 42, 46. Cameron was immediately forced to give up his partnership in the labour research bureau he had established. (Interview with Dorothy Cameron, 1983.)

42 D. Cameron to Meg Sears, July 1950. (Letter in author's possession.)

43 UBCA, MacInnis Papers, report of the British Columbia - Yukon CCF convention, 1950; *CCF News*, 12 April 1950; *Labour Challenge*, April 1950.

44 PAC, CLC Papers, Pat Conroy to William Mahoney, 12 July 1949; B. Gargrave to Conroy, 6 October 1949, 4 November 1949; Alex MacAuslane to A.R. Mosher, 8 November 1949; Pen Baskin to J. Mitchell, June 1950.

45 *Vancouver Sun*, 10 April 1950; interview with M. Sears, 1983.

46 *Vancouver Sun*, 10 April 1950.

47 PAC, CCF Records, report of the National Convention of the CCF, July 1950; *CCF News*, July 1950; D. Cameron to M. Sears, July 1950. (Letter in author's possession.)

48 PAC, CCF Records, Grant MacNeil to Lorne Ingle, 7 November 1950; UBCA, MacInnis Papers, letter from 'Bill'; Marie LeBrun to Harold Perry, 1 February 1950.

49 Phillips, appendices A and B. Federal statistics give 32 percent, provincial statistics 42 percent, for the year 1949.

"The Women...Shall Help to Lead the Way": Saskatchewan CCF-NDP Women Candidates in Provincial and Federal Elections, 1934-1965

Georgina M. Taylor

The Saskatchewan CCF espoused the equality of women and promised that when it attained power women would be equals and partners with men.[1] CCF supporters believed that because of the democratic structure of the party women would have equal political opportunities. In 1934 Sophia Dixon, then the Woman President of the UFC (SS) and a member of the CCF National Council, articulated this socialist dream when she wrote that "the sun shall soon rise on a brighter day and the women, who too often have been the slaves of men who are themselves slaves of the present crumbling system, shall help to lead the way."[2]

An examination of what happened when Saskatchewan CCF women sought the party's nomination for the offices of MLA and MP shows that, in spite of the sincere efforts of many CCF people, their egalitarian beliefs were not reflected in what actually happened to women who aspired to public office. From 1934 to 1964 there were 429 contests in which the CCF-NDP sought to elect a party representative to the provincial legislature, but only twelve of those candidates were women (2.8 percent female versus 97.2 percent male). Of the 187 federal CCF-NDP candidates nominated in Saskatchewan between 1935 and 1965, only seven were women (3.7 percent female versus 96.3 percent male). Only three Saskatchewan CCF women sat as MLAs--Marjorie Cooper, Gladys Strum and Beatrice Trew--and Strum was the only CCF woman MP elected in the province.[3] (See Table 8.1 and Table 8.2.)

In 1959 Gertrude Telford explained the situation:

> We have few women candidates in the political arena...partly because men are subconsciously unwilling to give up their age old prerogatives of dominance, but also because women are willing to let them maintain that dominance. It takes years of study and forceful activity for a woman to gain recognition, then all too often prejudice can oust her from her hard earned place of leadership. It is not a pretty picture and yet it is up to the women of democracies to assert themselves....There

TABLE 8.1. Election Results for CCF Women Candidates in Saskatchewan Elections, 1934-1964

ELECTION	CANDIDATE	CONSTITUENCY	% OF VOTE	POSITION	RESULT
1934	Gladys Salisbury	Saskatoon City (two members)	8	5th of 7	Lost
1938	Gladys Strum	Cannington	44	2nd of 2	Lost
	Gertrude Telford	Pelly	49	2nd of 2	Lost
1944	Gladys Strum	Cannington	45	2nd of 2	Lost
	Beatrice Trew	Maple Creek	49	1st of 3	Won
1948	Beatrice Trew	Maple Creek	42	2nd of 3	Lost
1952	Marjorie Cooper	Regina City (three members)	20	3rd of 11	Won
1956	Marjorie Cooper	Regina City	20	2nd of 10	Won
1960	Marjorie Cooper	Regina City	11	3rd of 19	Won
1960	Gladys Strum	Saskatoon City (three members)	14	3rd of 12	Won
1964	Gladys Strum	Saskatoon City (five members)	7	7th of 15	Lost
1964	Marjorie Cooper	Regina West (two members)	20	2nd of 5	Won

TABLE 8.2. Election Results for CCF Women Who Were Candidates In Federal Elections, 1935 to 1965

ELECTION	CANDIDATE	CONSTITUENCY	% OF VOTE	POSITION	RESULT
1935	Louise Lucas	The Battlefords	11	3rd of 4	Lost
1935	Dorothy Pope	Melfort	15	4th of 4	Lost
1940	Louise Lucas	Melville	43	2nd of 3	Lost
1945	Louise Lucas	Melville			Withdrew
1945	Gladys Strum	Qu'Appelle	37	1st of 3	Won
1949	Gladys Strum	Qu'Appelle	33	2nd of 3	Lost
1958	Thora Wiggens	Prince Albert	17	2nd of 3	Lost
1965	Constance Kinzel	Rosthern	19	3rd of 4	Lost
1940	Dorise Nielson (Unity Party)	North Battleford	54	1st of 2	Won
1945	Dorise Nielson (Unity Party)	North Battleford	8	3rd of 6	Lost

> was a time when many of us thought the CCF was to be the answer to women's dream of justice and equality. Twenty-six years. and how many women will be candidates in the forthcoming election? Might[y] few. Perhaps only one. That's not good enough![4]

This essay will examine the validity of Telford's assertions by looking at the political careers of eight of the Saskatchewan CCF women who sought the party's nomination for MLA or MP,[5] considering first those women who actually managed to do so, and then those who were unsuccessful.

The first to be considered is Louise Lucas, who was nominated three times. A bookkeeper before she married, Lucas was active in the Homemakers' Clubs and served on the local school board. She joined the farm movement in 1926, and was Woman President of the UFC (SS) in the crucial years from 1931 to 1933. She was one of the members of the Board of Directors of the UFC (SS) who made an emergency tour of the province during the drought of 1931 to organize Saskatchewan farmers for a provincial Trek on Regina. The leaders of the Trek and members of the ILP then met with the cabinet to plead for more government relief. Lucas endeared herself to the farm people of that drought stricken province during this meeting. One cabinet minister had his feet on the table and another disdainfully told the farmers to stop asking for relief, to go home and plant a garden and milk a cow. Lucas, a farm woman who knew the fundamentals of agriculture, replied: "Will you kindly tell me how you are going to get milk out of one end when you cannot put hay and water in the other?"[6]

The growing spirit of co-operation between the UFC (SS) and the ILP culminated in the establishment of the Farmer Labour party, later to be the CCF. Lucas was present at the founding of the CCF in Calgary in 1932, and urged that the new party be called "The Socialist Party of Canada." She was also active at the 1933 convention, and was a long-time member of provincial and national Councils and Executives.[7]

Lucas travelled exhaustively speaking for the UFC (SS) and the CCF. She had a map of Saskatchewan on her wall with a pin in it for every place at which she had spoken. When she died in 1945 almost every town, village, and city in the province was marked with a pin. Many villages had several pins around them where she had spoken at rural school houses. In 1942, M.J. Coldwell said she had made more speeches than any other CCF speaker in Canada. She has been likened to a primary school teacher who taught the people of the province the ABCs of socialism.[8] Lucas ran as the CCF candidate in the Battlefords constituency in the 1935 federal election. She had little trouble getting the nomination, although there were local people who resented her coming in from outside the constituency. She was determined that the CCF platform should be presented, and wanted to be elected on the basis of this platform and not as a woman. This attitude was fairly typical of the Saskatchewan CCF women. They were socialists, not self-avowed feminists, although their actions were often independent and assertive.[9]

In 1940 Lucas ran again in Melville against Jimmy Gardiner, the former Liberal Premier, then the federal Minister of Agriculture, under whom the much heralded Prairie Farm Rehabilitation Act had been put into effect. The seat was far from safe but CCF fortunes were in the ascendancy. This fact, and Lucas's hard work, were not enough; she was defeated.[10] Nevertheless, Lucas was so gratified with the close result that she immediately started trying to get the nomination for the next election. She wrote very frank letters to George Williams, the provincial party leader, because she realized that to get the nomination she needed his approval. She worked tirelessly in the constituency building up CCF support, and won the nomination in 1943. She campaigned strenuously but cancer forced her to withdraw.[11] Helmer Benson was nominated in her place, just six weeks before the 1945 federal election, and finished only twenty-eight votes behind Gardiner. Many CCF people including Benson, who was a likeable party trooper but a stranger in the constituency, believed she could have won.[12]

Gladys Strum was a rural school teacher and a farm wife, and she too was active in the Homemakers' Clubs. She began to work for the CCF in 1935 at the urging of Louise Lucas who was her mentor from then until 1945 when Lucas died. From her first involvement Strum was a CCF dynamo motivated by the disaster of the Depression and family insecurity because of her husband Warner's recurring bouts of tuberculosis. He adamantly supported her province-wide work and did background research for her speeches, but because of his poor health he was forced to limit his political activity to the local level.[13] She became the organizer for the Cannington, Moosomin, and Souris-Estevan constituencies, but also spoke all over the province in support of the CCF. In 1938 and 1944 she ran in Cannington against William J. Patterson, the Liberal Premier. Beacause it appeared to be impossible to defeat Patterson, Strum had no problem getting the nomination. In 1938 Patterson and Strum were 1,696 votes apart but there was only a six vote difference in 1944. Much to her disappointment, however, she was one of the few CCF candidates not elected in 1944.[14]

At the next provincial convention she was elected President of the CCF, the first woman in Canada to hold such a post and the only Saskatchewan woman in the CCF era to have been elected to the position. In the 1945 and 1949 federal elections Strum ran in the Qu'Appelle constituency. Once again she had no problem getting the nomination because it was an extremely difficult seat. Her opponents were Ernest Perley, who had been the Conservative MP from 1930 to 1945, and Andrew McNaughton, the war hero who had served briefly as Minister of National Defence. McNaughton had been parachuted into the constituency but his family had run the large local McNaughton General Store. The Qu'Appelle constituency was held by either the Liberals or the Conservatives except for the term Strum sat as MP from 1945 to 1949. The fact that McNaughton was blamed by many for conscription and the fact that the CCF was at its electoral peak likely helped her. She became the only woman from Saskatchewan ever to sit for the CCF-NDP in the House of Commons. She won the nomination again in 1949 but the Liberals, who this time had a local candidate, were backed by many Conservatives. Strum was defeated even though she obtained 1,483 more votes than she had in 1945.[15]

By 1960 Strum was living in Saskatoon, and was nominated to run in the then three-member provincial constituency of Saskatoon. The seat, which had been held by the CCF since 1944, was a safe one and she won handily, but by 1964 when she ran again the picture had changed. The medicare crisis had created havoc for the socialists and Ross Thatcher's Liberals defeated the CCF. Saskatoon was no longer safe; she finished seventh out of a field of fifteen contenders in the constituency which had become a five-member seat. Strum apparently had little difficulty getting the nomination in any of these elections. In 1938, 1944, 1945, and 1949 she had run in very difficult seats. This, along with her obvious ability and devotion, her term as President in 1944, her victory in 1945, and her unfailing record as a determined CCF fighter gave her the nomination in a winnable constituency in 1960 and renomination in 1964 (in a seat that was now no longer so safe).[16]

Gertrude Telford was a teacher and one of the few women in the province with a master's degree. She had been active in the church and had been provincial president of the Homemakers. Telford had been the key organizer in the Pelly constituency since the CCF was formed, she was on the Provincial Council, and on the Provincial Executive. She was a long-time member of the Provincial Education Committee, speaking and writing numerous CCF pamphlets and booklets. In the 1934 provincial election the Pelly constituency had been won by the Liberal candidate, Reginald Parker, over the Farmer-Labour candidate by a very large margin. Parker went into the cabinet as Minister of Municipal Affairs, so that when Telford was nominated to run against him in 1938 she was running in a seemingly impossible seat. However, being Minister of Municipal Affairs was not the most enviable position in 1938, when most municipalities in Saskatchewan were bankrupt, and Telford came close to defeating Parker.[17]

Like Lucas, Strum and Telford, Beatrice Trew also was well qualified to represent the CCF as a candidate. She had been a rural school teacher, active in the church and in Homemakers. She and her husband Albert had been adamant CCF supporters from the time they heard J.S. Woodsworth speak at a picnic in 1933. They worked constantly as a team in both the UFC (SS) and the CCF. The Maple Creek provincial constituency was held by the Liberals from 1917 until 1971 except for the four years Trew sat as its MLA, from 1944 to 1948, so even in 1944 it was far from a safe seat. At the nominating convention, three candidates were proposed: Alex Schmatz, Beatrice Trew and her husband Albert. Trew's oldest son John proudly recalled that at the nomination convention his father had stood up and said that when he looked around the room at the people he saw present, he could see that there was "not much money in the room" and the CCF was going to need money. He was in a better position to earn money than "Bea" and "besides that she's smarter than I am." Therefore he withdrew his name from nomination and requested that they vote for her. Beatrice Trew several years later recalled the incident: "I am fortunate in having a husband who is equally interested in public affairs and one who insisted I was the one to accept the nomination. He could have had it but in reality gave it to me. He had no doubts as to my ability to handle it."[18] She won the nomination, Schmatz became her capable manager, and Trew won the election, defeating John Wildenberger, who had been the member for a decade, by 784 votes. The CCF fever which swept the province helped, and Trew herself put a great deal of work into her campaign, visiting every home in the constituency. The support of Schmatz was also vital, as he was a Catholic of Russian and German origin and many people in the area were Russian or German Catholics.[19]

The picture had changed by 1948. Trew was an able MLA and won the nomination again, but there was a province-wide drop in support for the CCF, from forty-nine CCF MLAs elected in 1944 to thirty-one in 1948. The CCF had passed legislation which imposed a school tax on ranch lands and the Maple Creek constituency had many ranchers. Moreover, Schmatz had moved to the Liberals and worked against her. Trew lost the election by 330 votes in an extremely difficult constituency, but continued to work tirelessly for the CCF until her death in 1976. She served as Provincial Vice President of the party, sat on numerous provincial committees and on the National Council, and was a member of the Thompson Commission on medical care.[20]

From 1948 until 1952 there were no women in the Legislative Assembly and many CCFers were unhappy with this situation, including Gertrude Telford. She was one of a group of people who urged Marjorie Cooper to seek the nomination in the Regina City constituency. Cooper herself had not been active in the CCF, because it had been wise to be low key in her non-partisan community work, but her husband Ed had been an active party worker since the CCF's inception. In 1935 the Coopers were on the way to Market Square when they heard shots ring out at the outset of the Regina Riot, and took four of the fleeing trekkers to their home for the night. These experiences, combined with the strong social gospel message she learned through the United Church (where she was active in young people's groups and the church choir) and her experiences as a rural school teacher, influenced her to join the CCF in spite of her Liberal upbringing.[21]

Cooper had been involved in volunteer work--the Regina YWCA, the John Howard Society, the Saskatchewan Mental Health Association, the Council of Social Agencies, and the Regina and then the Provincial Council of Women--and became well known throughout Regina as a capable woman. While on the Council of Women she became aware of how much less women were paid than men. She came to realize, too, that groups of women lobbying governments were listened to politely, but when they left the issues they raised seemed to be forgotten. This convinced her that there needed to be more women elected and she began to voice this conviction. She was appointed by the CCF government to the Provincial Labour Relations Board as a representative of the general public in 1945, served on the board for several years, and was for a time the Vice Chairman.[22]

In these years she also became involved in CCF women's groups. She was President of the Davin CCF Club and joined the Regina CCF Women's Group. When she was approached and urged to seek the CCF nomination she knew that many would prefer her husband as the candidate because of his involvement in constituency work. (He had been for several years the President of the Regina CCF Constituency Association.) Cooper recalled that she and her husband had decided that for financial reasons he could not resign his job and that she should run. She and her supporters had to fight to win the nomination against Henry Baker, a strong contender who had been very active in the CCF for years and later was mayor of Regina. Although she won, on the third ballot, one man complained bitterly about a woman being nominated. She went on to win the election in 1952, and in 1956, 1960, and 1964 but did not seek the nomination again in 1967.[23] She was the last Saskatchewan CCF-NDP woman to win a provincial or federal seat. Cooper's success in gaining the CCF nomination was likely affected by the fact that she and her husband lived in Regina; therefore she could be a legislator without living away from home.

Thora Wiggens was active in the farm movement, the co-operative movement, and numerous community organizations. As well, she worked as an organizer in the Cumberland provincial constituency, sat on the Provincial Council, and served as campaign manager for William Berezowsky in the 1950, 1956, and 1964 provincial elections and for Roger Carter in the Prince Albert federal constituency in 1962. She is the most renowned of the Saskatchewan women who won CCF nominations in impossible seats because she ran against the Conservative Prime Minister, John Diefenbaker, in 1958, the year of the largest landslide in Canadian history. She knew she could not defeat Diefenbaker, but was determined that the party's platform be kept before the electorate and felt strongly that if the CCF expected people to run in hopeless seats across Canada then in Saskatchewan, where seats could be won, no seat should go uncontested. No one else was anxious to do battle with Diefenbaker in 1958. Needless to say she lost the election.[24]

Taken as a group, these women who won CCF nominations generally were qualified in several ways. They had leadership and organizational skills gained through formal education, their participation in the workforce, and their involvement in community work. They were political educators for the party, teaching organizational skills, ideology, and the importance of women's participation in politics, and had done years of grass-roots constituency support work. They had also performed other tasks such as acting as campaign managers and raising funds, and held key elected positions in the party. They had been able to articulate local concerns, whether the constituency was rural or urban. The last essential ingredient was domestic support from their husbands and families. All eight had dedicated socialist husbands who were willing to risk community censure as a result of their wives' political involvement.

These women were successful in winning CCF nominations mainly because the chances of victory were remote. Marjorie Cooper's experience in Regina was an exception--she was repeatedly nominated in a winnable seat--and the same can be said of Gladys Strum's nomination in Saskatoon in 1960. Both Strum and Cooper were elected as MLAs in dual or multi-member constituencies where CCF supporters could vote for them and for a male CCF candidate also. This did not always guarantee that one of the nominees would be a woman, as will be seen.

There were, then, twelve instances where women sought and obtained nominations in difficult, if not impossible, constituencies. How did their experience compare with those of women who sought, but did not gain, the party's endorsation in ridings where the prospects of victory were better? Sophia Dixon's experience can be considered first. A rural school teacher, she wrote frequently about rural life and agrarian socialism. In the 1920s she was involved with the farm movement and the Progressives, and was encouraged by Agnes Macphail and William Irvine to be more active politically.[25] She was on the provincial Board of Directors of the UFC (SS) from 1931 to 1933, crucial years when the farmers were going into politics, and participated in the 1931 Trek on Regina. Dixon also played a part in the formation of the CCF; at the 1933 convention she suggested changes to the Regina Manifesto. In 1934 along with George Williams and M.J. Coldwell she represented Saskatchewan on the National Council. She was Woman President of the UFC (SS) from 1933 to 1934 and was on the Provincial Council and Executive of the Farmer-Labour party.[26]

Dixon debated about seeking the nomination for the 1934 provincial election but changed her mind. Her children were young, there was no money for household help, and she could no longer be away from home for any length of time. She withdrew from the provincial and national scene but continued to organize locally and to write. With her children grown and a new home established in Saskatoon she resumed a more active role in 1941.[27]

As the 1944 provincial election approached a CCF victory was in sight, and all over the province people were enthusiastic about running for the CCF. Dixon sought the nomination in Saskatoon, but John Sturdy, who had been the president of the powerful Saskatchewan Teachers' Federation, and Arthur Stone, a labour man, won the nominations. Many in the CCF were anxious to see some representatives of organized labour nominated as party candidates, and this appears to have been a factor in the selection of Arthur Stone. Dixon believes she might have won instead of Stone, if there had not been confusion over a complicated balloting system. It was agreed that the ballots would be recounted the next day but they mysteriously disappeared overnight.[28] Women seeking nominations in all political parties in Canada are reported to be the victims of trickery more frequently than men seeking nomination,[29] and Dixon may well have been just such a woman. Nevertheless, she went on to be the campaign manager, and was later joined by Helmer Benson; together they worked to elect both CCF candidates in Saskatoon.[30]

Dixon continued to be active in the provincial party, serving on numerous committees, including a term as a chairman of the Committee on the Election Reform Act in 1950. Dixon was the first woman Returning Officer in Saskatoon in 1952, and served again in the same capacity in 1960. She continued to be politically active until the late 1950s. In 1979 she was one of seven Canadian women to be given a Governor General's Award on the fiftieth anniversary of the Persons Case "in recognition for outstanding work in support of the cooperative movement and of rural women's organizations," the only woman from the prairies to be so honoured.[31]

Elsie Gorius was a passionate grass-roots socialist who above all else valued constituency control. She had not thought of running for the nomination in the Wood Mountain federal constituency for the 1945 election, even though she had laboured hard in the CCF for many years, and was persuaded to run only at the last moment. So great were the prospects of victory that sixteen people ran for the nomination and the balloting went on until 2:00 A.M. Gorius lost the nomination to Hazen Argue, a local farmer. He had not been involved in the CCF previously, but he was a fairly good orator and won by persuading the meeting that he would be the best candidate. Many CCF people later regretted this choice when Argue crossed the floor of the House of Commons to become a Liberal.[32] Gorius went on to be Argue's campaign manager in the four successive elections in which he was elected as a CCF MP. She was also the key organizer and the campaign manager in the Bengough provincial constituency. She organized all over the province in by-elections and in provincial elections in British Columbia and Manitoba.[33] She is regarded by many CCF people to have been the best organizer in Saskatchewan during those years. The campaigns she organized were "efficient," "smooth," and "grassroots all the way."[34]

The problem of getting a nomination in a winnable constituency is well illustrated by the experiences of Gertrude Telford and Thora Wiggens. Telford had been the CCF candidate in Pelly when the prospects had not been good in 1938. By the time of the 1944 provincial election, it appeared that Pelly would very likely be won by the CCF. Telford was confident that she would get the nomination on the basis of her near defeat of Reginald Parker, the long-time Liberal MLA, her years of dedicated work, and the fact that she had been the official CCF organizer in the constituency where her support was apparently strong. As it turned out, there was a terrible rainstorm the day of the nominating convention and several of her supporters telephoned to say that the roads were impassable. They asked if they should make a superhuman effort to get to the meeting. She replied that she did not think so, as Daniel Daniels, whom she believed was her friend, had assured her he would not run against her and she thought he was the only person who could possibly defeat her. These supporters, therefore, did not come. Telford appears to have been too confident, and apparently over-rated Daniels' friendship and under-rated his ambition; Daniels ran and won the nomination by eight votes. He told her he had run against her because he thought a woman could not win the constituency. Whether this would have been the case or not, Daniels went on to win by a wide margin.[35]

Telford wrote a confidential letter to Clarence Fines, the party's provincial secretary, shortly after the nominating convention. Her letter shows her tremendous disappointment at being defeated. She suspected that some of the Daniels supporters who had bought new CCF memberships were also members of the LPP, which would nullify their votes, and asked Fines to investigate. Possibly she thought she could still get the nomination, but nothing came of it. She also thought that Daniels, a Ukrainian, had won because of a "nationalistic" drive to have a Ukrainian nominated and because an attack had been "made on the WOMAN." She blamed herself for being naive about new memberships. Nonetheless, Telford continued to work for the CCF and was for a time an organizer at the provincial head office.[36]

The only other women to be nominated by the Saskatchewan CCF-NDP during the period under review were Gladys Salisbury in 1934, Dorothy Pope in 1935, and Constance Kinzel in 1965, but none had any chance of winning. Many other well-qualified women, such as Betsy Naylor, Olive Wells, and Pemrose Whelan, worked tirelessly for the CCF but realistically they did not seek a provincial or federal party nomination.[37] Dorise Nielson, who was very active in the Saskatchewan CCF in the 1930s, sat as the MP for North Battleford from 1940 to 1945 and was regarded as intelligent and capable. Nevertheless, she was expelled from the party because it was believed she was a communist.[38] She had run in 1940 as a candidate for the Unity Party, and had received the support of communists, Social Crediters, and many CCFers. During her term as MP she was the leading spokesperson in Canada for the Labour Progressives and she openly joined the communists. In 1945 she was defeated by the CCF candidate who had been nominated well ahead of the election and who had more time for campaigning.[39]

The political careers of these Saskatchewan CCF women show that a woman had to have exceptional qualifications in order to be considered for nomination; even then it was very difficult to get a nomination in a seat where the prospects of victory were good. It would appear that Gertrude Telford's 1959 assessment of the situation was accurate. She was correct in saying that many women had thought that "the CCF was to be the answer to women's dream of justice and equality." Most men had been "subconsciously unwilling to give up their age old prerogatives of dominance," but many women were "willing to let them maintain that dominance." It did take "years of study and forceful activity for a woman to gain recognition." Most of the individual women who challenged these sexist attitudes were defeated in their bids for nominations in winnable seats, thereby losing their "hard earned place of leadership." Telford's assessment was proven incorrect in only one small respect; there were two, rather than one, CCF women candidates in the 1960 election, the only election in which the CCF elected two women MLAs.

In the 1960s the picture began to change. With the CCF out of power in 1964, for the first time in twenty years, the party began a reassessment and it began to rebuild. Part of this re-examination was a careful look at the role women played in the party. It began to consider constitutional changes which would guarantee the participation of more women as equal partners with men in the party and it began to look more carefully at legislation which directly affected women. This work was spearheaded by the women who formed the Provincial Women's Committee (PWC) in 1965, including Ann Blakeney, Marjorie Cooper, Pemrose Whelan, and Thora Wiggens. Many women worked for the PWC but Whelan, who was the provincial Vice-President of the CCF, spearheaded it.[40] Encouraged by the modern women's movement, the PWC worked to get the party back into power and educate the CCF membership about the role of women in society and politics and about the need for more women legislators. It deliberately began to train more women to take an active role in the NDP as equal partners with men.[41]

Margaret Thomas, in recalling her mother Gertrude Telford's attempt to get the CCF nomination and to gain a seat in the Saskatchewan legislature, said that the failure of the party to elect women was a "continuing source of sorrow" for Telford. Many of the women who were active in the party shared Telford's sense of sorrow that their beloved CCF was not able to make its dream of equality for all people a reality for women. This failure was most obvious when Saskatchewan CCF women sought their party's nomination. Women were regarded as acceptable in other important areas of political activity--as political educators and organizers, and as elected officers within the internal party structure--but not as candidates. Nevertheless, these women did not seem to have regretted their years of work for the CCF. They rejoiced in its success and looked forward to a brighter future. They often expressed sentiments similar to those of Thora Wiggens:

> In the past...[women] were the workers in the Party organization, getting the men elected, keeping

> the political home fires burning. I hope that the role in the future will change...I hope women will recognize their potential as leaders and take action in becoming candidates, that they will be able to stand side by side equally with the men in our struggle to bring about a just society for everyone. In other words a true socialism which places humanity first.[42]

NOTES

1 S.M. Lipset, *Agrarian Socialism* (Berkeley: University of California, rev. ed., 1971), p. 163. The author wishes to thank the following people who read earlier drafts of this paper and made helpful suggestions: Sophia Dixon, Dr. T.D. Regehr of the University of Saskatchewan, Dr. Susan Mann Trofimenkoff of the University of Ottawa, and Pemrose Whelan.

2 *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 13 June 1934.

3 These statistics are calculated from the election results in the *Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory, 1905-1970 (Regina and Saskatoon: Saskatchewan Archives Board, 1971)*, the *Saskatchewan Executive and Legislative Directory - Supplement, 1964-1977 (Regina and Saskatoon: Saskatchewan Archives Board, 1978)*, and the *Directory of Members of Parliament and Federal Elections for the North-West Territories and Saskatchewan, 1887-1966* (Regina and Saskatoon: Saskatchewan Archives Board, 1967). All election results in this paper are taken from these sources unless otherwise noted.

4 SAB, Gertrude Telford Papers, XXXII, 2, "Women in Politics," article written for the Saskatchewan *Commonwealth*, October 1959.

5 Further information on Saskatchewan CCF women can be found in Georgina M. Taylor, "Equals and Partners? An Examination of How Saskatchewan Women Reconciled Their Activities for the Cooperative Commonwealth Federation with Traditional Roles for Women" (M.A. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1983). The Saskatchewan Archives Board holds a collection of taped interviews done by the author with numerous CCF people (Interviews R-5827 to R-5874, R-8130 to R-3166). Because women are often not adequately represented in documentary sources these interviews were necessary to fill in numerous gaps.

6 J.F.C. Wright, *The Louise Lucas Story* (Montreal: Harvest House, 1965), p. 95. Wright's biography is the only book published on any Saskatchewan woman in the CCF, but it is not reliable and should not be used as an historical source unless it is combined with the documentary sources available and the insightful thoughts of her daughter, Eloise Metheral, in the taped interview in the Saskatchewan Archives.

On Lucas's role in the UFC (SS) see *Western Producer*, 5 June 1930, 3 July 1930, 26 May 1932, 23 February 1933, 10 May 1934; SAB, UFC (SS) Papers, President's Reports,

1933. Lucas's role in the 1931 Trek is described more fully in *Western Producer*, 25 October 1945; SAB, Interviews with Helmer Benson and Eloise Metheral; Wright, pp. 84-96.

7 Dean E. McHenry, *The Third Force in Canada* (Berkeley: University of California, 1950), p. 25; *In Memoriam - Mrs. Louise Lucas* (Regina: NDP Provincial Office, n.d. n.p.).

8 *Leader-Post*, 18 October 1945; SAB, Interviews with Gladys Strum and Eloise Metheral; PAC, CCF Records, volume 308, newspaper clipping, *Toronto Star*, 28 July 1942.

9 SAB, Violet McNaughton Papers, file D41, Louise Lucas to McNaughton, 18 November 1935; PAC, Louise Lucas Papers, Volume 3, "Sixteen Sound Reasons Why You Should Vote for Mrs. Louise Lucas," pamphlet; Sophia Dixon to Georgina Taylor, 31 August 1983, in the possession of the author.

The CCF women were for the most part of a generation between the turn-of-the century women's movement and the modern women's movement. There were some feminists in Saskatchewan in the CCF period such as Violet McNaughton, but they were of an older generation, the generation of women who had fought the suffrage battle. Some of the younger CCF women, such as Pemrose Whelan, Thora Wiggens and Marjorie Cooper, were affected by the modern women's movement and some of them declared themselves as feminists in the NDP period. (Sheilagh L. Steer, "The Beliefs of Violet McNaughton: Adult Educator 1909-1929" [M.C. Ed. Thesis, University of Saskatchewan, 1979]; Rudolf George Marchildon, "The Women's Section of the Saskatchewan Grain Growers' Association: A Study in Agrarian Activism" [M.A. Thesis, University of Victoria, 1981]; SAB, Interviews with Anne Blakeney, Marjorie Cooper, Gladys Strum, Pemrose Whelan, and Thora Wiggens.)

10 PAC, Lucas Papers, volume 3, Georgina Mathers to Florence Barker, 20 July 1939; SAB, CCF Records, IV, 68, Florence Barker to Poll Secretaries, Zone Managers, Executive and Action Committee, 5 October 1939; *Western Producer*, 21 March 1940.

11 SAB, CCF Records, II, 1963, Louise Lucas to George H. Williams, 9 May 1940; PAC, Lucas Papers, volume 3, Rudolf J. Paidel to CCF Central Office, 14 October 1940; Lucas to Melville Provincial CCF Executive, 5 December 1940; *Leader-Post*, 28 October 1943.

12 PAC, Lucas Papers, volume 3, Lucas to Melville CCF Members, n.d.; E. Illingworth to Lucas, 8 November 1944; SAB, Interviews with Helmer Benson, Eloise Metheral, I.S. Nollet, Gladys Strum, Olive Wells, and Marjery Williams.

13 Saskatoon Women's Calendar Collective Papers (SWCC Papers), Robert McKeown, "Lady of the House," *Montreal Standard*, 15 March 1947; PAC, CCF Records, volume 448, "Gladys Strum," c. 1945-1949; SAB, Interview with Gladys Strum; *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1949, p. 246.

14 SAB, CCF Records, II, 263, Gladys Strum to the CCF Executive, 31 October 1941; Strum to F.C. Williams, 21 October 1941, 19 December 1941; Clarence Fines to Strum, November 1941; Strum to T.C. Douglas, 1 December 1941; Strum to Clarence Fines and F.C. Williams, 16 December 1941; Fines to Strum, 15 December 1941; SAB, Interviews with Gladys Strum and Olive Wells; Interview with T.C. Douglas, 15 June 1982, in the possession of the author.

15 SAB, CCF Records, I, 311-565, minutes of the CCF Annual Provincial Convention, 1944; SWCC Papers, McKeown, "Lady of the House"; *Leader-Post*, 12 June 1945; *Star-Phoenix*, 13 June 1960; *Commonwealth*, 5 February 1964; Walter D. Young, *The Anatomy of a Party* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969), p. 111.

16 SAB, Interviews with Alice Caplin, Frank Coburn, and Gladys Strum; PAC, CCF Records, volume 448, "Gladys Strum"; Edwin A. Tollefson, "The Medicare Dispute" in Norman Ward and Duff Spafford, eds., *Politics in Saskatchewan* (Don Mills: Longmans, 1968), pp. 238-79; David Smith, *Prairie Liberalism: The Liberal Party in Saskatchewan, 1905-71* (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1975), pp. 297-302.

17 SAB, Telford Papers, XXXII, 2, "Organizers Report, 1941"; Gertrude Telford, *Memories* (Edmonton, 1976), pp. 23, 25, 40-41, 52-53; SAB, Interview with Margaret Thomas; *Notable Saskatchewan Women* (Regina: Saskatchewan Labour Women's Division, 1980), p. 3.

On Telford's role as a party publicist see SAB, CCF Records, II, 37, Carlyle King, "Publicity and Education Committee Report"; *Commonwealth*, 26 April 1944, 31 May 1944; SAB, Telford Papers, XXXII, 5, scrapbook of a series of lessons in the *Commonwealth*; Interview with Carlyle King, 3 June 1980, in the possession of the author.

18 *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1947, p. 640; *Commonwealth*, 2 June 1976; *Western Producer*, 17 June 1976; Interview with John Trew, 16 December 1981, in the possession of the author; Saskatchewan Legislative Library, MLA Data, Beatrice Trew to Mrs. Wolfe, 23 March 1975.

19 Interview with John Trew, 16 December 1981, in the possession of the author.

20 SAB, Interview with Elsie Gorius; *Commonwealth*, 2 June 1976; *Western Producer*, 17 June 1976; Interview with John Trew, 16 December 1981, in the possession of the author.

21 *Leader-Post*, 14 June 1952; *Commonwealth*, 13 August 1952; SAB, Interviews with Marjorie Cooper and Margaret Thomas.

22 *Commonwealth*, 4 March 1964; Marjorie Cooper Papers, newspaper clipping, "Hard Shoes to Fill," c. November 1966; SAB, Interview with Marjorie Cooper.

23 Cooper Papers, *Regina CCF News Bulletin*, April 1952; SAB, Interview with Marjorie Cooper; *Canadian Parliamentary Guide*, 1967, p. 813.

24 SAB, Interviews with Pearl Buchanan, Frank Coburn, Mary MacIsaac, Barry Richards, Helen Wheaton, Penrose Whelan, and Thora Wiggens; Thora Wiggens, "Work Experience Contributing to my Social Work Competence - 1940 to 1978," resume in the possession of the author; SAB, Thora Wiggens, II, file 14, Wiggens to "Friend", 20 March 1958.

25 SAB, Interview with Sophia Dixon; *Western Producer*, 19 March 1931; *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 13 July 1934; Sophia Dixon, "How the Experience of Women in Literature May Help Saskatchewan Women," *Adult Learning*, II, 3 (December, 1937) pp. 15-18; PAC, Agnes Macphail Papers, volume 2, Sophia Dixon to Macphail, 14 May 1938; Macphail's secretary "B" to Dixon, 18 May 1938; Georgina Taylor, "Sophia Dixon: Progressive Always -- Indifferent Never," *Saskatoon History*, I (1980), pp. 25-31.

26 SAB, Interview with Sophia Dixon; Sophia Dixon Papers, "Saskatchewan CCF Research Bureau -- Convention Number," August 1933; *Western Producer*, 13 July 1933; *Manitoba Commonwealth*, 13 July 1934.

27 PAC, Macphail Papers, Sophia Dixon to Macphail, 14 May 1938; Macphail's secretary "B" to Dixon, 18 May 1938; Dixon Papers, Dixon to Mr. Ford, 10 April 1944.

28 Dixon Papers, Dixon to J.H. Sturdy, 26 February 1944; list of the results of the nomination convention recorded by Dixon's son, William Dixon; Commonwealth, 7 June 1944; Sophia Dixon to Georgina Taylor, 31 August 1983, in the possession of the author.

29 Jill McCalla Vickers and M. Janine Brodie, "Canada" in J. Loverduski and J. Hills, eds., The Politics of the Second Electorate (London: Routledge and Keegan Paul, 1981), p. 69.

30 Dixon Papers, notes for a speech introducing Sturdy and Stone, pamphlet and advertisement revised for reprinting; SAB, interview with Helmer Benson; Sophia Dixon to Georgina Taylor, 31 August 1983, in the possession of the author.

31 SAB, CCF Records, I, minutes of the CCF Annual Provincial Conventions, 1944-1958; Star-Phoenix, 17 June 1952; Dixon Papers, programme of the awards ceremony of "The Persons Case 50th Anniversary Commemoration and Presentation of the Governor General's Awards," 17 October 1979, p. 7.

32 SAB, interviews with Frank Coburn, Elsie Gorius, and Betsy Naylor; John Archer, Saskatchewan: A History (Saskatoon: Wester Producer Prairie Books, 1980), pp. 306-313; C.H. Higginbotham, Off the Record: The CCF in Saskatchewan (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1968), pp. 103-108; Desmond Morton, Social Democracy in Canada (Toronto: Samuel Stevens, Hakkert & Company, 1977), pp. 25-32.

33 SAB, interviews with Anne Blakeney, John Burton, Frank Coburn, Elsie Gorius, Eloise Metheral, Betsy Naylor, I.S. Nollet, Gladys Strum, Pemrose Whalen, and Thora Wiggens. Most of the information on Gorius is taken from the interview with her for two reasons. Her personal papers and many of the papers from the Bengough and the Wood Mountain constituencies were inadvertently destroyed. Furthermore, the work of organizers such as Gorius is not recorded in the written sources as fully as is the case with women who were educators or elected MLAs or MPs.

34 Lloyd Stinson, a Manitoba MLA for fourteen years, regarded his visit in 1944 to the Kelvington and Bengough constituencies, where Gorius was the organizer, as "one of the best learning experiences I ever had....I had never seen such an efficient, smooth operation before except in the North Centre by-election in 1942....It was grass-roots all the way--no bluff, no trickery, everything above board, without a slick advertising firm from Ontario running the show." Lloyd Stinson, Political Warriors (Winnipeg: Queenston House, 1975), pp. 26-27.

35 SAB, Telford Papers, XXXII, 2, Telford to Miss Mathers, 14 June 1941; "Organizers Report - 1941"; Telford, Memories, pp. 53-54; Interviews with John Burton and Margaret Thomas.

36 SAB, Telford Papers, XXXII, 2, Telford to Clarence Fines, 12 June 1941; Telford, Memories, p. 53; PAC, Lucas Papers, Gertrude Telford to Mrs. V. Metheral, 22 December 1945, 29 December 1945, 2 January 1946, 4 January 1946, 9 January 1946; SAB, Interview with Margaret Thomas.

37 SAB, Interviews with Betsy Naylor, Olive Wells, and Pemrose Whelan.

38 SAB, Interviews with Sophia Dixon, Elsie Gorius, Edna Meekes, Mary MacIsaac, Eloise Metheral, I.S. Nollet, Gladys Strum, and Helen Wheaton; Peter R. Sinclair, "The Saskatchewan C.C.F. and the Communist Party in the 1930's," Saskatchewan History XXVI, 1 (Winter, 1973), pp. 1-10.

39 The question of when Nielson first joined the communists is difficult to determine because many of the papers which might provide the answer are closed. Her letters signed with the pen name "Judy O'Grady" indicate that she was very much in sympathy with them and was likely a member in 1938. (Western Producer, July 1938 and September 1938).

40 PAC, CCF Records, volume 459, Pemrose Whelan to Eva Latham, 16 June 1964; SAB, Pemrose Whelan Papers, "Organization of a Provincial Women's Committee in Saskatchewan," p. 5.

41 SAB, CCF Records, PWC Papers, "Saskatchewan Women's Committee Report, October 1965 - October 1966," p. 30; "Draft to Commission on Organization"; SAB, Whelan Papers, "Organization of a Provincial Women's Committee in Saskatchewan," July 1967; Wiggens Papers, II, file 14, "Provincial Women's Committee Report," 18 November 1972; Thora Wiggens, "SNDW Report," 8 August 1974.

42 SAB, Interviews with Margaret Thomas and Thora Wiggens.

The Douglas Government's Changing Emphasis on Public, Private, and Co-operative Development in Saskatchewan, 1944-1961

Jean Larmour

I

The CCF adopted the Regina Manifesto in 1933 in the midst of economic chaos and the apparent inability of government or business to remedy the nation's problems or even to provide adequate assistance to those in dire need. Thus, it placed great emphasis on action by the new party to change an unacceptable status quo; it called in fact for the overthrow of capitalism. In this document transportation, communication, and power had the highest priority for social ownership. Other industries listed for socialization were those in which exploitation, waste, or financial manipulation were prominent. At the same time, co-operative institutions were to be assisted. Ten years later T.C. Douglas confirmed the CCF's dedication to social ownership during a debate in the House of Commons. Four different methods of social ownership were advocated by his party--ownership by the federal government, the provincial governments, municipal governments, and co-operatives. He went on to declare: "This group has never advocated government ownership of any industry in which there is sufficient competition but advocates government ownership only of those industries which have become monopolistic in character."[1] The stress on varied forms of social ownership, and on socialization only of those industries which were monopolistic in nature, appeared to de-emphasize public ownership.

In preparation for the 1944 election a committee within the Saskatchewan CCF studied the problem of resource development. A paper entitled "A Plan for the Development of the Natural Resources of Northern Saskatchewan under Social Ownership" was prepared by C.A.L. Hogg, a geologist and later Deputy Minister of Natural Resources and Industrial Development.[2] This was discussed at a CCF Inter-Provincial Conference which ran from 30 December 1943 to 2 January 1944, and became the basis of many of the policy initiatives of the Department of Natural Resources and Industrial Development after the party took office.

The paper suggested socialization of the forest industry, the need for scientific control over fisheries, and a state owned and operated fur processing industry. The government should undertake geological mapping and train prospectors in order to facilitate mineral development, but the actual development of new mines might better be left to experienced firms. A CCF government might develop hydro-electric power and undertake a rural electrification programme, although the latter might be done under co-operative ownership. Development under social ownership was the theme of the paper, but development for the benefit of all was the mood, not blind opposition to private enterprise.

In a radio broadcast early in 1944 T.C. Douglas clarified his position:

> We do not want the government to own everything ....There are industries and economic functions which are so monopolistic in character that they must be reserved to the state since they carry with them a power of exploitation....Banking... railways, packing plants, milling concerns, the tobacco and farm implement industries....Such monopolies should be owned by the people through the federal government.
>
> Hydro-electric power...other forms of power such as natural gas, coal and oil wells should belong to the people of the province rather than a privileged few.
>
> Co-operative ownership is another form of social ownership. This leaves a wide field for private enterprise. There are many thousands of small businesses...which...are of real value to the community....But when he [the businessman] owns a monopoly...which enables him to control the lives of his fellow citizens...only then do we hold that the time has come for the community as a whole to own the monopoly and operate it...."[3]

He was reiterating the requirement for public, private, and co-operative enterprise. All three were necessary in the life of the state. The same theme was echoed in the provincial legislature. J.L. Phelps, a CCF MLA, announced in March 1944 that a CCF government would not socialize the Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting Company, but would raise royalties instead.[4] O. Valleau, also a CCF MLA, stated that "small companies and concerns would be left to ensure a continuing of employment." Drawing closer to the election, in the short comparative election platform published in the Leader-Post on 20 May 1944 public ownership was not stressed, whether because of brevity or policy. However, in the Saskatchewan Commonwealth of 24 May 1944, the public aspect received more emphasis with the pledge to "proceed to develop these resources under public ownership."

The CCF party prior to the election in June 1944 was pledged to public ownership and to the strengthening of co-operative ownership. Public ownership was a philosophical stand but was also considered necessary in order to have industrial development, to prevent the exploitation of the public, and to avoid the wasteful use of resources. However, there seemed to be some ambivalence with regard to private enterprise. Although T.C. Douglas himself seemed consistent in advocating the need for all three types of development, there were those in the party who looked to the complete overthrow of the capitalist system and its replacement by social ownership as the Regina Manifesto had pledged.

The CCF provincial conventions were more doctrinaire, or at least they considered larger areas for public development. In 1945 the convention recommended that the government establish marketing boards for lumber and fish and a coal briquetting plant, and undertake logging operations. It endorsed "the principle of social dividends in the public development of our natural resources and industries." More emphatically it asked "that our Government give consideration to early development under public ownership of our gas, minerals and mineral oil resources." In 1946 the convention considered socialization of the meat packing industry, endorsed the marketing boards and the crown corporations operating and developing industrial projects, and asked for the development and distribution of natural gas and oil under public ownership and control.[5]

When the new CCF government was elected, much work and study had already been done in ascertaining the goals of the party and what legislation was needed to achieve these objectives. The 1944 fall session amended the Department of Natural Resources Act to allow the minister to take over land and/or works by any means including expropriation, and to operate these. He could develop and utilize resources; industrial development was also made part of this department.[6] Thus, J.L. Phelps, the Minister of the Department of Natural Resources and Industrial Development, was given the legislative authority for the development of any and all natural resources in the province. Other legislation approved during this fall session allowed the government to enter the general insurance field.

The Crown Corporations Act of 1945 provided the structure for government initiatives in industry. During that year Saskatchewan Clay Products, Leather Products, Wool Products and Fish Products, a Timber Board and a Fur Marketing Service, as well as the unplanned box factory were established as crown corporations under the auspices of J.L. Phelps. These seven crown corporations were concerned with the development or use of natural resources. In addition three other primarily service industries, Saskatchewan Government Printing, the Reconstruction Corporation, and the Reconstruction Housing Corporation, made their debut in 1945. These, with the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office, made eleven crown corporations established by the CCF government during little more than a year and a half in office. In 1946 and 1947 the new government established a bus system and an airline while a projected radio station was scuttled by the federal government. The government was carrying out its mandate to develop resources, diversify the economy, and provide social ownership. This was a period of intense activity in the establishment of government services and industries, and it was marked as well by a new approach to economic planning.

II

Economic planning had been part of the CCF programme from the outset, and there was an attempt to set up a planning agency in 1944. However, it became largely preoccupied with providing advice on problems of federal-provincial relations. It was not until 25 January 1946 that the Economic Advisory and Planning Board (EAPB) was established under the chairmanship of George W. Cadbury, an economist knowledgeable in the business world, with a socialist philosophy and outlook. As chairman of the EAPB, Cadbury was to advise the Executive Council through Premier Douglas on all economic, industrial, and commercial matters, and to formulate long range plans for economic development. He was also appointed Chief Industrial Executive and Co-ordinating Officer. In this capacity he was to co-ordinate, control, and rationalize the operations of the crown corporations. He would also be responsible for studying and recommending any further ventures of the government into business.[7] The EAPB would provide not only economic and industrial, but also sociological, administrative, and technical advice to Cabinet.

Already there were problems in some of the newly established industries. The woollen mill in Moose Jaw had problems with untrained employees, old machinery, and a poor factory layout. The boot and shoe factory lacked a good market and the manager held conflicting interests. The lack of appropriate written or financial records and of co-ordinated labour policies were difficulties in most of the crown corporations.

The preparatory meeting of the EAPB proposed a number of working groups to study specific problems: methods of organizing government agencies, capital available for investment, the relationships between the government and co-operative enterprise, and between the government and private enterprise.

Professional advice and long-range planning for development would be the rule. Great importance was attached to government assistance to encourage co-operatives in the field of industrial development. Cadbury suggested asking the co-operatives for a ten year plan for their industrial development. R.L. Stutt, Director of Education for the Wheat Pool, became a member of a working group studying economic policy, and Les Bright, Executive Secretary of the Co-operative Union, joined the group studying the relationship between government and co-operatives. Later, a joint Co-operative-Government Consultative Committee was set up.[8]

The relationship between government and private enterprise was also reappraised. Cadbury and T.H. McLeod (an economist, Secretary of the EAPB, and former economic adviser to the Executive Council) prepared a memorandum on this topic in March 1946. One of the first considerations which they mentioned was that the CCF government had to function within a capitalist economy. Development of the economy depended to a large degree on the volume of investment, much of which came from the private sector. The paper went on to state some of the economic facts of life: "Private enterprise will (if not must) continue to operate in a wide field of investment....The problem is...determining its field of operations as well as the role, if any, the government is to play in facilitating or regulating its operations....The Government would seem to be justified in encouraging private enterprise to extend its operations in spheres unsuitable for government activity if by so doing it can achieve certain desired...ends...high levels of employment...development of provincial resources...."[9] In fact the EAPB was suggesting that the government consider active encouragement to private enterprise.

This was not official government policy, but rather advice from the EAPB. The economists were taking a practical approach rather than an ideological one. However, not all CCF party members agreed with this reasoning. The Saskatchewan CCF party conventions in 1945 and 1946 urged the government to extend industrial projects and to develop mineral resources, particularly gas and oil, under public ownership and control. CCF party president Dr. Carlyle King took exception to a greater emphasis on private enterprise, and suggested that, before any action was taken, discussions should be held with the Legislative Advisory Committee and with Provincial Council on the spheres for government, co-operative and private enterprise.[10]

The EAPB's examination and reconsideration of the government-private enterprise relationship resulted in a report for the Cabinet-Planning Board meeting in September entitled "Government, Co-operatives and Private Enterprise in Industry." The report noted that the government and the co-operatives could do much but that there was still a large field for private enterprise:

> We cannot contemplate either the investment or the organizational job required to take this over in any short space of time....If we allow the standards of living in Manitoba and Alberta to outstrip ours in Saskatchewan we will be accused of failure....There are highly competitive and speculative fields into which Government Enterprise should not enter, and others that require a degree of technical skill that we could not acquire...in the near future.
>
> Private Enterprise...must not...be allowed to exploit our natural resources or our people nor must it compete with our own industries. But it still has a place...so logically we should encourage certain types of Private Enterprise...until such time as we can do these things for ourselves.[11]

This advice from the EAPB was in fact what the government had already begun to do in 1946. It had acknowledged its inability to finance or to manage the development of all resources. Although the party's position prior to the election had been that natural resources would be developed by the government itself, Phelps had pledged to exempt the Hudson's Bay Mining and Smelting Company from socialization. The alternative of increased royalties was made effective on 1 January 1945. Phelps went beyond this in 1946 to state: "it is not necessary that the mining industry be socialized.... The Government's interest can be adequately safeguarded if we have proper royalty schedules."[12]

In 1946 the government took two different and opposite approaches to the development of natural resources. In the case of sodium sulphate, it examined the methods of extraction and potential markets. The EAPB sought expert advice and, based on its investigation, Cadbury recommended that the government proceed with development. "Major reorganization is now due in any case," he reported, and "Saskatchewan has a virtual monopoly of the deposits." However, the government followed a different course with respect to the sodium chloride deposits which had been discovered while drilling the Vera oil well, near Unity, in 1946. The EAPB suggested engaging a consulting firm for advice on the possibilities of this resource. In this instance the government decided upon private development and reached an agreement with the Prairie Salt Company late in 1946.[13] A large capital investment and extensive technical knowledge, both in production and in marketing, were required for the mining and marketing of sodium chloride, but the government lacked all of these. There was competition in the market and thus no prospect of a monopoly. The choice was whether the resource would be developed by private enterprise or would not be developed at all, and the government chose private enterprise.

Government financial resources were limited and had to be husbanded. The federal government's demand for the repayment of seed grain loans imposed a drain on provincial income. The hospitalization scheme and new social assistance programmes imposed a further restriction on available funds. However, the development of Saskatchewan's natural resources would lead to a more diversified economy, one of the stated aims of the party, and would provide more capital for further development and for social programmes. Thus, social goals might be achieved more rapidly with private investment in resource development. Could private development be reconciled to a socialist philosophy? There were those who wanted immediate development and those who wished to wait until the government itself was able to undertake resource development. These two views were reconciled as the need for development and the scarcity of government funds became obvious.

In trying to husband the capital resources available, the Douglas government considered more efficient use of the capital already invested in crown corporations. The EAPB set to work to devise "a more effective pooling of the financial operations of various crown corporations." It suggested a central financial organization for government enterprises and an industrial development fund to encourage new business. The result of these ideas was a new Crown Corporations Act, approved in 1947, which provided for a Government Finance Office to act as holding company, financial comptroller, and co-ordinator of the crown corporations. Continuity, co-ordination and expert accounting, legal, and secretarial services would be provided by the Government Finance Office. The new Crown Corporations Act also established an Industrial Development Fund. Loans could be made to any co-operative association or any "person, firm, corporation or municipality carrying on...any... business or undertaking of any nature whatsoever."[14] This new Crown Corporations Act indicated some alterations in attitudes and in direction on the part of the CCF. C.M.

Fines, the Provincial Treasurer, had signalled this change in his budget speech of 1947. "This Government recognizes that private enterprise has a place in our economy," he said, provided that it "carries with it no threat of monopolistic exploitation of our people." He went on to declare that "private capital and enterprise need have no concern over the policies of this Government."[15] This, then, was the official policy: private enterprise was welcome, would receive fair treatment and would even be assisted in its enterprise, always provided that it was not monopolistic. None of the previous CCF budget speeches had contained any such reference to private development.

In September 1946 the Douglas government had requested from the EAPB a four year projection of economic development in the province and of the possibility for government influence on development. No new industrial ventures were to be undertaken until this study was received. This "Four Year Plan" was presented to a joint Cabinet-Planning Board session on 1 December 1947.[16] It noted the limitations on government influence at the provincial level and the need for assistance from the federal government. While recognizing the value of co-operatives it also suggested the necessity for selective support of them, as some co-operatives had the sole objective of increased bargaining power. The report recommended that the government invest in exploration, research, and mapping of mineral deposits but leave prospecting in private hands. Drilling for oil and gas was too risky for the government and should be left to private enterprise, although incentives should be offered to private industry. Federal investment in potash was preferred but no immediate development of this resource was foreseen.

The Planning Board was able to view the whole economic situation and to point out the limitations on the provincial government's ability, both financially and legally, to undertake public ownership and development. Although the Cabinet had to face these realities, it took the party and its members a little longer to accept the fact that a lack of financial resources deterred the government from greater developmental activity and that unless some encouragement were given to private enterprise, little development would occur. If this happened the CCF government would be judged a failure when the Saskatchewan economy lagged far behind that of its sister provinces.

The EAPB recognized the need for assistance to co-operative development, but also pointed out the limitations to such development. Private enterprise would if not *must* continue to operate in a wide field of investment. The Board recommended encouragement to private enterprise, while noting that care would have to be taken to prevent exploitation of resources and of people. Although all three methods of development were considered, public development, which formerly had received the highest emphasis, was reconsidered and rejected for a number of natural resources. Other methods of public control assumed a higher profile as a means to prevent exploitation of the people, and the government moved towards greater emphasis on private enterprise.

III

The Douglas government accepted many of the recommendations of the "Four Year Plan" with alacrity. The Minister of Natural Resources and Industrial Development, J.L. Phelps, announced at the end of 1947 "'a vigourous program' to assess Saskatchewan's mineral resources and to encourage their development." Reductions in royalty rates would be given for developing mines and the government would deal with private industry on an "accepted business basis." He pledged that a "continuity of activities started by private industry can be assured."[17]

In his budget speech in 1948 C.M. Fines stated: "The great bulk of our economic life is dependent upon enterprise of thousands of private individuals, partnerships, co-operative organizations and private corporations. Nor has this Government any thought that this can or should be otherwise."[18] Assistance would be given to co-operatives and to private enterprise under both the Co-operative Guarantee Act and the Industrial Development Fund.

Economic development was the theme of the 1948 election. In a series of radio broadcasts C.M. Fines announced the government's willingness to encourage private enterprise. "We propose to encourage private capital to come into Saskatchewan and to co-operate with us in the development of industries based on our natural resources," he said in one broadcast. In another, he explained that although the government had always stressed the three-pronged approach, greater progress had been made "in government ownership and co-operative ownership. That the emphasis should now be laid on the third--the role of private capital-- is the logical sequel." But this was "no divergence from our party policy or from the program originally enunciated."[19] For his part, Premier Douglas gave "a firm undertaking that no steps will be taken to expropriate or socialize the mining or petroleum industry in the province." Nevertheless, his government would "take all necessary steps to protect the public interest and to that end the mineral rights in certain areas will be defined and reserved in advance for the use of the crown, and royalties will be fixed guaranteeing to the people of the province a fair return."[20] Thus in 1948 the need for economic development in Saskatchewan took centre stage. J.L. Phelps, Minister of Natural Resources and Industrial Development, C.M. Fines, Provincial Treasurer, and Premier T.C. Douglas all pledged fair play, assistance, and the assurance of no expropriation to private enterprise, as long as there was not gross abuse of power.

Public and co-operative development had been the emphasis of party policy, but public, co-operative, and private enterprise had been recognized as having a legitimate place in society. In the first eighteen months of office the government had ventured into a number of enterprises for social reasons as well as for reasons of economic growth and diversification. The problems associated with controlling such diverse organizations and a lack of technical expertise, as well as the limitation on available funds, had necessitated a reconsideration of the role of the three forms of development. Reality called for a recognition of the importance of private enterprise in fostering economic growth, and the government adopted a policy of encouragement to private development. Nevertheless, it continued to monitor that growth to prevent the gross abuses which monopoly control, in the hands of a few who might be unresponsive to the welfare of the population, could produce. The changing attitude of the Douglas government to public, private, and co-operative development can best be illustrated by reference to some specific examples.

Potash

Potash development was not anticipated until 1946 when traces of the mineral appeared in the core of a well drilled near Unity, Saskatchewan. A federal-provincial partnership was projected for the development of this resource; however, by 1948 it had become clear that the federal government was not interested. The EAPB recommended that negotiations be undertaken with private enterprise. In July 1948 the government announced that potash deposits in the west-central area of the province were open for private development. Twenty months later it advertised land that was available for leasing, but received no bids. It was not until 1951 that it reached an agreement with private industry to develop the potash deposits.[21] Nevertheless the provincial government continued to look, unsuccessfully, for a partner to co-operate in joint development. By 1960 there were fifteen private companies representing Canadian, American, British, German, and French interests involved in potash development, and J.H. Brocklebank, Minister of Mineral Resources, could assert that there was no need for public investment as there was plenty of competition in the field.[22]

Recognizing the large capital requirements for the development of Saskatchewan's potash the Douglas government had worked for federal-provincial co-operation, but had been unable to elicit any interest. The choice, again, was private development or none at all. The government chose private development, although it did not exclude some public development at some later date.

Petroleum

Oil was not discovered in Saskatchewan until 1945, near Lloydminster, but soon after taking office J.L. Phelps, the Minister of Natural Resources, considered the possibility of adding to all agreements, permits, or leases a clause giving the government the right to take over and operate any land or plant. A protest to the Premier led to a statement by Phelps that the government had no intention of entering the oil business at present. F.R. Scott, a law professor at McGill University and a prominent member of the national CCF, advised the government in 1945 to make use of private companies in oil exploration. By 1946 even backbenchers reluctantly agreed to the need for private development, providing that there was no monopoly and that the government discussed it with caucus before taking any action.[23]

During 1947 and 1948 the government discussed the possibility of oil development with Saskatchewan Federated Co-operatives Limited. It also considered a joint co-operative-private-government venture and a government-private venture. The working group which studied mineral resources recommended that the government provide encouragement to private development; the oil business was too risky and the costs too great for either government or joint government-co-operative development. It advised against a partnership with private enterprise if government funds were involved, but advocated assistance to co-operatives in any oil play. In an effort to consider all possible methods of oil exploration the Department of Natural Resources also suggested a scheme for a government-directed Petroleum Exploration Pool for private investment, but the cabinet rejected it.[24]

Having rejected government development of Saskatchewan's oil resources, the committee then considered means to retain some government control. It recommended a system whereby private oil companies would be assured that they would benefit from their discoveries, but the government would control half of any potential field on crown land. This was the system adopted. After 1948 the CCF government encouraged private oil exploration and development, and assisted the co-operatives. While the philosophical position was that public ownership and development was best, it had been necessary to give concessions to private enterprise in order to have any development. These concessions led to intensive exploration. In 1951 and 1952 the Cabinet deliberately made its oil policy "as nebulous as possible" so as not to tie the government's hands or slow the pace of oil development. In 1954 the government negotiated a "farm out" agreement with Saskatchewan Federated Co-operatives, without going to tender, in an attempt to retain some social control of petroleum. By 1961 there were four "farm out" agreements, but the government had not entered the oil business directly.[25]

Precambrian Mining

Although the CCF policy in 1944 had favoured public development of natural resources, mining was to be left as it was except that the government imposed higher royalties. In 1946 J.L. Phelps stated that there was no need for socialization of mines with a proper royalty schedule. The "Four Year Plan" presented for study to the Cabinet in December 1947 recommended encouragement to private enterprise and a declared policy of "non-participation in mining in the precambrian shield." This was the acknowledged working policy of the Department of Natural Resources and Industrial Development, although the Cabinet did not officially endorse this policy until April 1948.[26] In the case of uranium development, for example, the Cabinet rejected the policy committee's advice in May 1948 and decided to rescind the wartime ban and allow prospecting for uranium, with the understanding that federal control of the sale of the product would remain.[27] Thus, the Douglas government adopted the practice of using royalty schedules to control mineral development. This would allow social benefits to accrue from development without the necessity of government involvement, particularly financial involvement.

Natural Gas

Private enterprise was already engaged in the business of producing and distributing natural gas on a limited scale in Saskatchewan when the CCF government took office in 1944. The problem was a scarcity of natural gas, and the government offered encouragement to private exploration. The construction of private gas pipelines was approved in 1945 and 1946,[28] but the next year this was reconsidered. In 1949 the policy of a government owned and operated grid transmission system was approved, and confirmed in 1951 when the Brock field was discovered.[29] The privately owned (and federally controlled) Trans Canada Pipeline was completed in 1957, offering a ready market for private gas producers. To protect Saskatchewan's supply the Saskatchewan Power Corporation was designated the sole purchaser from the southeastern area of the province. J.H. Brockelbank protested, but Premier Douglas upheld the general policy although agreeing that the price should be negotiated. In 1959 the

Cabinet deemed it necessary to give approval for exports of natural gas, despite the objections of the Power Corporation Chairman that adequate reserves were not yet certain.[30]

The government, while not owning the natural gas, wished to ensure adequate supplies for provincial customers and attempted to control exports. Federal responsibility for interprovincial lines made this difficult, but the CCF could, by establishing a publicly owned distribution system, at least control the transmission of gas within Saskatchewan. This was the decision the Cabinet reached as soon as it became apparent that adequate supplies would be available. Although it offered the option of municipal or provincial local distribution to Saskatoon, that city chose provincial distribution and this became the rule. The privately owned Unity system was purchased in 1959.[31] Thus, the government retained a great deal of control over natural gas through its ownership of the distribution system, although it never enjoyed complete control of supply.

Like electric power, natural gas distribution was a natural monopoly suitable for government enterprise. It was also one of the basic requirements for industrial development and, as such, control over this resource was vital to government policy. However, exploration for natural gas, like that for oil, was too expensive and too risky for the provincial government alone. Concessions had to be made to private enterprise to encourage exploration, while at the same time safeguards were needed to prevent exploitation. Public ownership of the provincial distribution system was the solution, with some assistance to the co-operatives' exploration activities and also government purchase of some known fields.

Industrial Development

Industrial development was sorely lacking in Saskatchewan when the Douglas government took office and the need for such development was acknowledged by all parties. In 1944 the emphasis was placed on co-operative and government initiative in undertaking development. However, in 1946 the EAPB advised the government to offer encouragement and assistance to the private ector. The Saskatchewan Research Council, established in 1947, was to identify potential uses for Saskatchewan resources and make them known to investors. The Industrial Development Fund, also set up in that year, was to offer assistance in production. In addition, the government gave assistance to a private company manufacturing children's clothing to establish a plant in Saskatoon.[32]

In 1950 the CCF established an Industrial Development Office to attract private investment and gave that office a high profile; its Director, D.H.F. Black, reported directly to the Premier. The EAPB gave further assistance to potential investors by preparing marketing studies for the Industrial Development Office and for the Saskatchewan Research Council. In addition the EAPB began to publish its *Economic Review* in November 1951, to provide information on Saskatchewan and its economic prospects. The Douglas government also raised the capital available for loans from the Industrial Development Fund to $5 million in 1955. Two large industries, a cement pipe plant and a steel plant, received substantial loans and other assistance to set up in Saskatchewan.

At the outset, then, the CCF had placed great emphasis upon public and co-operative development of diversified industries but the experience with some of the newly established industries and the broader perspective provided by the EAPB after 1946 had changed that emphasis. In 1948, when the government publicly announced its intention to focus on industrial development, it began to provide more and more assistance (both money and information) to private firms to encourage them to establish plants in Saskatchewan. The government worked with the private sector to diversify the economy although, recognizing the dangers of monopoly control, it also sought to encourage competition.

Transportation, Communication and Electric Power

The new CCF government took office in 1944 with a mandate to socialize transportation, communication, and power. The Saskatchewan Transportation Company and the Saskatchewan Government Airways, established in 1946 and 1947 respectively, provided Saskatchewan residents with low cost transportation into many areas which had previously lacked service of any kind. In the north air transportation was essential for the location and development of natural resources and the government rapidly expanded this facility, offering free transportation to prospectors from 1948 onward.

In 1944 the basic telephone system was already provincially owned; only the small rural systems were privately owned and operated. The government offered assistance to the small companies to upgrade their facilities. There was no compulsion but the demands for better facilities gradually led to government ownership, although in 1961 there were still 958 privately owned rural companies.[33] The province also owned a portion of the electric power system when the CCF government took office, and it extended that system after 1944. A problem emerged in some urban centres, however, where municipal plants were regarded as sources of revenue and the cities refused to sell. The government proceeded by negotiation rather than compulsion, although legislation limited the expansion of city owned plants. Not until 1965 did the Saskatchewan Power Corporation acquire the Regina plant.

It was the CCF government's policy for lower cost urban areas to subsidize the more expensive (and sparsely populated) rural areas in order that the whole population should share in a better standard of living. This same policy was adopted for natural gas, although the government was unable to maintain complete control of this field for financial and legal reasons.

Government Insurance, introduced in 1944 and later strengthened with the introduction of compulsory automobile insurance, gave competition to private enterprise. It offered lower cost car insurance, as well as protection to all of those involved in an accident. (In deference to the co-operatives, the government agreed not to enter the life insurance field.) Not only was the government able to lower rates, but capital funds were retained in the province for investment.

Thus, in the areas of transportation, communication, and power (including natural gas distribution) as well as insurance, the government carried out its mandate to provide social ownership. The potential for expropriation existed in the statutes and in some of the early rhetoric (and perhaps exerted a subtle form of pressure in negotiations with private interests), but negotiation and purchase was the accepted method of socialization. The celebrated "box factory" in Prince Albert was an exception, but in this case expropriation resulted from a labour dispute in which the company refused to comply with a Labour Relations Board order.

Economic Diversification

To a province plagued by a one-crop economy and lagging economic growth, the Douglas government had also promised industrial expansion and the development of natural resources for the benefit of the people. J.L. Phelps, chairman of the pre-election natural resources sub-committee, was well aware of the CCF party stand and of these pledges. When he became Minister of Natural Resources he was in a position to carry out the mandate and, being a man of action, he did so.

The fur marketing service, the fish board, and the timber board had all been recommended prior to 1944. The objective in each case was to stabilize the industry and the northern economy, and thus conserve the resource and prevent the exploitation of the northern population. Social as well as economic objectives were important in these ventures. Perhaps too rapid implementation of these schemes and too little educational work caused concerns and objections, but prices did improve and markets were stabilized. Government trading stores provided competition to the Hudson's Bay Company which had held a monopoly in the north for over one hundred years.

Similarly, the woollen mill, the leather tannery, and the boot and shoe factory were to utilize agricultural resources and create industry. The brick plant was also to create industry, diversify the economy, and utilize natural resources. These proved to be problem children, however, and were eventually sold. However, the government's involvement in the mining of sodium sulphate, undertaken after careful study of all aspects, proved to be an unqualified success.

Diversification of the economy could not be achieved by government action alone, nor by both government and co-operative efforts. A recognition of the need for private enterprise, while present prior to 1944, became more evident as the government gained experience. The logical conclusion, as the EAPB pointed out, was that government action to encourage private enterprise would contribute more to diversification than public and co-operative investment could achieve. Public ownership was not rejected, in fact it had proven its worth in many areas, particularly where a monopoly situation existed or where social goals were dominant, but at the same time the limitations of public ownership were acknowledged.

IV

The Douglas government had been elected in Saskatchewan on the platform of governmental development of natural resources and diversification of the economy, since private enterprise had not taken the initiative there. In the first heady days of power, the new CCF government placed its emphasis on government action and government ownership. Perhaps it moved with too much alacrity to redeem its election promises, but if it had not been seen to be carrying out those promises the government would have lost credibility with many of its supporters. When the means for longer range social planning and for more technical evaluation of alternatives became available in 1946, the financial and legal constraints limiting the government's power, and its lack of technical competency, were brought into sharper focus. Funds were not available for all of the desired ends and priorities had to be established. The goals of economic and social development and of social ownership could be contradictory; compromises had to be reached. A closer look had to be taken at the types of industries suitable for government operation.

With a more discriminating view of the potential for social ownership, the Douglas government did venture into sodium sulphate production and into natural gas distribution, and it made electric power a provincial monopoly. However, recognizing the problems and limitations of public ownership and the necessity to develop the economy, it also offered greater encouragement to private enterprise. The co-operatives also received encouragement and assistance from the government, but they too were hampered by limited financial and technical resources. Indeed, they were a little wary of possible government domination. Their role in the development of the Saskatchewan economy, while important, remained a limited one. Although the CCF's basic philosophical preference for social ownership (either through the government or through the co-operatives) remained, the fact was that private enterprise would have to be relied upon if Saskatchewan's rate of economic development was to be comparable to the other prairie provinces. The private sector had the funds to invest in resource development and industry. If it could be attracted to the province to undertake development, this would make money available for other social goals such as hospitalization, free medical care, and improvements to education.

In 1944 the CCF recognized that all three types of ownership--public, private, and co-operative--had a place in its development strategy for the province, but the stress was on public and co-operative ownership. Two years later, with the facility for long range planning in place, a change began to take place, and by 1948 the importance of private enterprise was conceded. When T.C. Douglas retired as Premier in 1961 all three types of enterprise were still accepted, but a much larger role was recognized for the private sector. Competition and governmental controls, along with public enterprise in limited areas, were to safeguard the public from undue exploitation, while royalties would enable residents of the province to share in the fruits of resource development. For the Douglas government, social objectives, such as hospitalization, medical care, better educational facilities, and a higher standard of living for all residents, assumed the highest priority after 1944, higher even than that attached to the philosophical belief in social ownership. These social objectives were costly, and could only be obtained through more rapid development of the economy than was possible by the government itself. Thus, private enterprise held a higher profile in Saskatchewan in the Douglas era than many had anticipated with the election of the first socialist government in North America.

NOTES

1 Hansard, 1943, p. 1442.

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3 Ibid., Premier's Files, file 975, T.C. Douglas, "Co-operative Commonwealth or Chaos," Radio Broadcast no. 2, 1944.

4 Leader-Post, 2 March 1944; A.W. Johnson, "Biography of a Government: Policy Formulation in Saskatchewan, 1944-1961" (Ph.D. Dissertation, Harvard University, 1963), p. 136.

5 SAB, CCF Records, I, 2(4), resolutions of Tenth Annual CCF Provincial Convention, pp. 934, 937; resolutions of Eleventh Annual CCF Provincial Convention, pp. 980, 982.

6 It had been suggested originally that industrial development would be placed under the Department of Co-operation, but in fact co-operative development was added to the Department of Co-operation while industrial development was added to the Department of Natural Resources. (SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 395a, T.H. McLeod to Douglas, 28 June 1944.)

7 Saskatchewan Gazette, 15 February 1946, p. 3.

8 SAB, T.C. Douglas Project, George Cadbury Papers, "Agenda for first Meeting of the Economic Advisory and Planning Board," c. 21 January 1946; "Working Groups," 21 April 1946; Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 413a, "Minutes of Special Cabinet Meeting," 19 September 1946.

9 SAB, Douglas Papers, EAPB, file III, "Relationship Between Government and Private Enterprise," 27 March 1946 (emphasis in original).

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15 Saskatchewan, Budget Speech, 1947, pp. 8-9.

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17 Commonwealth, 31 December 1947.

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19 Commonwealth, 20 October 1948, 3 November 1948.

20 Quoted in B. Sufrin, "Report on Fuel Policy," November 1949. (SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 413b.)

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22 SAB, Kuziak Papers, file 24, "Potash in Saskatchewan," 21 October 1960; J.H. Brockelbank to R. Davis, 28 November 1961.

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25 Ibid., Premier's Files, file 413c, resumé of Cabinet-Planning Board conference, 10-13 October; Ibid., file 383, statement dated 5 March 1954; memo concerning "Farm Out Agreements," 12 June 1961.

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27 Ibid., EAPB Files, file 2, minutes of Committee on Mineral Resources Policy, 11 March 1948.

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The CCF and the Co-operative Movement in the Douglas Years: An Uneasy Alliance

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In the summer of 1933 there were two important congresses in Regina. Between 19 July and 21 July, approximately 130 representatives from the groups which had formed the CCF a year earlier gathered in the City Hall. Between 25 July and 27 July sixty delegates from member organizations also met in the City Hall to attend the Annual Congress of the Co-operative Union of Canada.[1] The differences could hardly have been more startling. The CCF gathering was marked by enthusiasm, earnest debate, conflicting opinions, and unbounded optimism. The co-operative gathering was subdued, earnest, and businesslike. These characteristics suggest some of the basic differences between two different movements, although in the minds of many people the two movements were closely intertwined.

The close relationship between the social democratic and co-operative movements was based in part on strong ideological considerations. As the co-operative movement emerged as a reaction to industrialism during the late nineteenth century, it was widely embraced by social democrats. In Scandinavia, Great Britain, France, and Canada, many social democrats believed that three kinds of institutions were essential for the advancement of working people. Trades unions would protect workers in the work place; labour parties would advance their cause in politics; and co-operatives would protect their interests in the market place. The Fabian tradition, so basic to the rise of the CCF, particularly endorsed this three-pronged support for the working classes. So, too, did the Scandinavian, especially Danish, social democratic traditions which also more systematically embraced farmer marketing co-operatives.[2]

It is not surprising, therefore, that the Regina Manifesto strongly endorsed co-operatives. Even the name of the new political party, the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation, was partly an attempt to build on the widespread support gained by the Canadian co-operative movement since the turn of the century, particularly on the prairies. The Manifesto emphasized the need for strong producer and consumer co-operatives to help resolve the basic problems confronting Canadian farmers. The Manifesto also called for the development of co-operatives to assist in the sale of staple commodities, particularly milk, to consumer groups, and it advocated government financial assistance for co-operative development.[3]

It is perhaps surprising, however, that the Manifesto did not dwell at great length on co-operatives. The sections devoted to them were brief and truncated. There was no indication of the role co-operatives could play in housing, credit, or health services. There was no apparent appreciation of the social dimensions of the co-operative movement, and, throughout the document, the emphasis was inevitably on centralized government direction of the economy. As a result, many within the co-operative movement regarded the Manifesto suspiciously, even fearfully. W.C. Good, the president of the Co-operative Union of Canada and a former Progressive MP, articulated the misgivings of many co-operators at both the Regina congresses. In fact, he was one of the few and perhaps the only person present at the CCF convention to vote against the Manifesto. Subsequently he prepared his own manifesto to summarize essentially the response of co-operative idealists to the social maladies intensified by the Depression. In addition to reiterating his long-standing commitment to electoral reform, Good asserted his, and the co-operative movement's, faith in the efficacy of voluntary co-operative organizations.[4] The co-operative movement in its most distinct form had always argued for a social revolution through community activism. It called for emancipation of the individual through direct involvement in the vital organizations which controlled economic and social life. These were fundamental differences that would profoundly affect relations between the social democratic and co-operative movements in subsequent years.

There was another major difficulty that clouded social democratic views of the co-operative movement. The driving intellectual force behind the Regina Manifesto and the national CCF party in the early years was a group of eastern intellectuals well steeped in the traditions of the British Labour party and Fabianism. Most of them were mystified by the farmers' movements that had developed on the prairies since the 1870s. They did not comprehend sufficiently that the western farm movement represented an indigenous, pragmatic reform tradition based on the harsh realities of the settlement process, the vagaries of the grain economy, and a Canadian reformism with roots back to the early nineteenth century.

In its essence, the western farm movement stood for control over the economy by local groups of producers and consumers, an approach which it believed would lead to production for use and not for profit. It protested most vigorously against the concentration of finance capital and economic power represented by the emergence of the modern corporation, and it searched for ways to control economic life democratically. In that sense the western farm movement was similar to the American Progressive movement, an historical phenomenon recently reinterpreted by Lawrence Goodwyn.[5] These concerns among western farmers led them to embrace the co-operative movement, particularly the wheat pools, but ultimately the other kinds of co-operatives as well.

It is fashionable today to lump this approach into the general category of left populism.[6] To do so is convenient but somewhat misleading. The western Canadian Progressive tradition was harsh on its leaders, suspicious of experts, and at least as concerned about the society it was seeking to build as it was about the villains it identified. The approach, in fact, was in sharp contrast to the emphasis in populist theory on the cult of the leader, the reliance on experts, and the compulsive need for external villains.[7] It was also in sharp contrast to the implied view of analysts of prairie populism that the petty bourgeois western farmers were easily led and essentially confused.[8] Only those who have never tried to lead farm groups could hold that view. The essence of the prairie Progressive and co-operative movements was the emancipation of individuals from the economic, social, and intellectual blinkers that obscured reality and restricted human growth. That theme runs through the press of the agrarian revolt, the speeches of its leaders, and the early educational programmes of its institutions. It was vague in defining ultimate goals, however, largely because it believed in the capability of the human soul and mind to rise above material circumstance. Above all, it believed that significant social and economic change could arise only from the grass-roots; it could not be imposed from above by even the worthiest and best intentioned elite.

In the crucible of the Dirty Thirties, co-operatives thrived in Saskatchewan--"Our Co-operative Province" as it came to be named. Marketing pools for grain, dairy products, and livestock, though rocked by near failure in the early 1930s, regrouped and emerged from the Depression leaner and more determined. Most of the stores survived, and Saskatchewan Co-operative Wholesale gained the practical experience to become a better advisor for co-operatives in difficulty. Credit unions, deceptively important responses to the economic crisis, appeared in Saskatchewan Wheat Pool offices, church basements or private homes. Cash poor farmers in the Dust Bowl west of Regina somehow collected $32,000 to start an oil refinery; other farmers started to mass their social, economic, and political capital to construct a co-operative implement business.[9] And, throughout the province, there were numerous co-operative innovations to meet specific needs: providing recreation facilities and health services, purchasing breeding stock, selling handicrafts, marketing fish. Indeed it may well be, as some have claimed, that by 1945 Saskatchewan possessed the most diversified co-operative movement in the world.

In the same decade the Farmer-Labour party cum CCF in Saskatchewan went through an agonizing period of self-definition and leadership uncertainties. It only surfaced as a major contender for political power in the early 1940s when Tommy Douglas returned from Ottawa, and popular opinion shifted markedly to the left. When it came to office in 1944 it was a true if troubled coalition--labour, farmer, socialist--with a wide ranging programme and limited funds.

One area, however, in which the CCF had a definite programme in the beginning--and a willingness to spend some funds--was the co-operative movement. One of the new government's first acts was to create a new Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, the first in Canada. In one sense, this development was not as significant a departure from the past as one might assume. The Department of Agriculture had organized a Co-operative Organization Branch in 1914, and it had played a vital role in encouraging and supervising co-operative organizations.[10] In fact, it was one of the main reasons why the Saskatchewan movement was so strong and so concerned about developing a unified movement on sound co-operative principles. The new Department continued the Branch's programme and key personnel, particularly B.N. Arnason, who became Deputy Minister, remained in place.

In other respects, however, the step was significant. The name of the department was important in itself. As a department of co-operation as well as co-operative development, it had a mandate to encourage the study and practice of co-operation in a general way throughout the province. The department was also empowered to become more aggressive in creating co-operatives for marketing or service functions. In order to assume this aggressive role more successfully, the department was given an expanded mandate to undertake research activities. Research was considered to be a high priority for the Department because a report of the Co-operative Branch in 1940 had established that, between 1914 and 1938, nearly half of all new co-operatives had failed or not survived the organizational phase.[11] All of these activities, plus the more traditional task of maintaining a thorough statistical record of co-ops in accordance with the requirements of the Co-operative and Credit Union Acts, indicated that the Douglas government was assigning the Department a proactive, important role in its economic and social programmes.

This emphasis is thoroughly understandable when one considers the CCF members elected to the legislature in 1944. Some of them, notably "Lackey" McIntosh and Warden Burgess, had very close ties with co-operatives, and a majority of the CCF MLAs had served as officers in various co-operatives. The commitment was further indicated in late 1944 when the Saskatchewan government joined with its Manitoba and Alberta counterparts to help guarantee the financial position of Co-operative Implements.

This favourable view from Regina coincided with a series of positive developments within the Saskatchewan movement. In October 1944, Saskatchewan Co-operative Wholesale and Co-operative Refineries united, amid considerable euphoria, to form Saskatchewan Federated Co-operatives. Reserves built up in co-operatives during the war were released by the lifting in 1945 of government restrictions on the construction of new buildings. Consumer and producer co-operatives undertook new construction, purchased plants, and laid plans for further expansion. Early in 1945, thanks largely to the efforts of Saskatchewan co-operatives, the co-operative movement generally succeeded in arguing its case before the McDougall Royal Commission on the Taxation of Co-operatives. Co-operative Life Insurance Company was formed in the same year, primarily through the efforts of the Saskatchewan Wheat Pool.[12] Along with the Co-op Credit Society, Co-op Life represented the beginnings of an effort by Saskatchewan co-operators to establish a central financial system. All told, in the middle of the widespread concern over reconstruction following the war, it appeared as if the Saskatchewan co-operatives would, with the aid of the government, play a crucial role in restructuring provincial economic life.

Defining the appropriate roles for co-operatives, however, proved to be more difficult than might have been expected. When the CCF achieved office, one of its most cherished goals was to develop an effective central planning process. A remarkable group of public servants, representing the most modern approaches to central planning, migrated to the province.[13] Although hampered by the severe limitations imposed by a depleted provincial treasury, they were keen to experiment with numerous projects. Their favoured model for development was the crown corporation, and their long term goal was to create a diversified, industrialized provincial economy. None had a strong association with co-operatives and, as young, ambitious enthusiasts, they showed only spasmodic interest in working closely with the co-operatives. Certainly by the later 1940s many co-operative leaders had come to believe that, aside from a very small number of CCF members with long-standing ties to the government, initiative in the government was passing to those who favoured an aggressive and interventionist state. Indeed, according to Warden Burgess, some believed that it was only the Premier who defended, and the government's slender financial resources that sustained, the case for a broad and growing sphere for co-operative enterprise.[14]

As uncertainties over the appropriate role for co-operatives gathered in the late 1940s, both government and co-operatives sought to rationalize their relationship. The Co-operative Union of Saskatchewan submitted a brief that endorsed government control over resources and medical care but affirmed that the co-operatives should be given the key roles in agriculture, wholesaling, retailing, and savings or credit institutions.[15] It also called for joint co-operative-government initiatives in health care, insurance, power, petroleum, and marketing. This approach was obviously a blueprint for an economic programme in which co-operatives would be the main economic force in the province, although government and capitalist enterprises would certainly also be important. The brief received a lukewarm reception in government circles although it did serve as the basis of the activities of a joint government-co-operative committee on planning.

The co-operative movement in the late 1940s was suspect to government officials for three main reasons. Its level of managerial competence was strong for the organizations as they then existed and the central co-operatives in particular were run efficiently by managers and imaginatively by their boards of directors. Their capacity to develop into larger organizations controlling complicated programmes, however, was insufficiently tested and uncertain because of obvious weaknesses at what a later age would call the middle management level. Secondly, there were uncertainties about how effectively the co-operatives were maintaining strong membership relations programmes. These programmes were the essence of co-operative distinctiveness. The Wheat Pool's programme remained strong, but those in stores and credit unions seemed lacklustre and ineffective. For that reason, the Co-operative Union of Saskatchewan, the Department of Co-operatives, the central co-operatives, and provincial educational institutions launched a series of membership involvement programmes in the late 1940s and 1950s.[16] Until they were successful and this distinctive feature of co-operatives was healthy, there was no particular reason for the Douglas government to select co-operative initiatives over more directly-controlled forms of economic activity. Thirdly, while co-operatives had served the average, medium sized, and larger farmers well, they had been less effective in assisting the smaller farmer. Thus, for government officials concerned about meeting the needs of the poorest rural dwellers, co-ops provided few attractions.

TABLE 10.1. Memberships and Number: Saskatchewan Co-operatives, 1944-1961



Source: Dept. of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Reports

TABLE 10.2. Assets and Sales: Saskatchewan Co-operatives, 1944-1961



Source: Dept. of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Reports

Undertaking many initiatives through co-operative channels was further restricted by the growing problems confronting the province in the early 1950s. Many sons and daughters had not returned to the farm after the war, and the exodus of their younger siblings to urban communities left the countryside bereft of youth and social organizations.[17] And, to make matters worse, selling grain became steadily more difficult on a glutted international market. Piles of grain grew on the province's farms, not to be reduced until the big grain sales of the later 1950s. Amid these difficulties it was not easy to see how co-operatives, so much creatures of gradualism, could react rapidly enough to ease the immediate situation. Moreover, the co-operatives themselves did not quickly develop an effective integrated programme for rural development. The internal demands of the different co-operative sectors and the difficulties some co-operative leaders had in transcending institutional loyalties usually made the development of new extensive, large scale projects a slow, complicated process.

Instead, the years between 1944 and 1961 were characterized by substantial growth in several different, mostly traditional, areas of co-operative activity. When viewed over all, the provincial movement nearly doubled in number of associations, tripled in number of members, grew tenfold in assets and over fourfold in sales (see Tables 10.1 and 10.2). Undoubtedly, the Department of Co-operation deserves considerable credit for this development. Its advisory services, particularly for credit unions, grew increasingly sophisticated, and its research branch provided a series of valuable studies on practical issues affecting all kinds of co-operatives. The Department gained further respect because of the work of B.N. Arnason, the Deputy Minister, who was widely admired within the co-op movement because of his sincerity, his dedication to the co-operative cause, and his diplomatic skills.

One area where the Department also gained recognition was in the field of education among co-operators. In 1955 it helped spark the formation of the Co-operative Institute (afterwards called the Co-operative College). This initiative was part of a growing concern over the lack of training procedures for co-operative employees and the weakness of educational programmes for members within co-operatives.[18] Within the Department, this concern also led to the expansion of Extension Services during the 1950s. Working together with marketing, consumer, and credit co-operatives as well as educational institutions, this branch, sparked by L.L. "Lewie" Lloyd, one of its employees, held co-operative schools throughout the province. These schools, which ran usually for a week during the summer, emphasized the philosophy of co-operation, the role of women and young people in co-operatives, an introduction to the various types of co-operative organizations, and the possibilities of trade unionists and farmers working together. The schools were particularly intended to explain to young people why the previous generations in Saskatchewan had found co-operative organizations essential to protect their interests.

The main thrusts for extension services, however, lay in the development of production co-operatives and the encouragement of co-operatives in northern Saskatchewan. Production co-operatives included co-operative farms, machinery co-operatives, co-operative pastures, and livestock co-ops. Of these, co-operative farms attracted the most attention. The first modern efforts at co-operative farming emerged in 1943 at Round Hill, followed by two others at Sturgis and Hepburn in 1944. These were formed by groups of farmers on relatively small farms voluntarily merging their holdings to form collectively-owned farms large enough to compete efficiently. When veterans returned home in significant numbers in the following year, many of them wished to enter farming but, even with the assistance extended by the Veterans' Land Act, were unable to do so because of the costs involved. Some, too, wished to pioneer in new collective styles of living. Following a series of conferences on co-operative farming sponsored by the Department and other organizations in 1946, a group of veterans was encouraged to join together to establish the Matador Co-operative Farm Association near Swift Current. In the next fifteen years another thirty-five co-operative farms were organized with Department assistance throughout the province.[19] Generally, the pattern was one of euphoria during the postwar period and growing disillusionment in the 1950s. Developing co-operative farming among people from a highly individualistic background proved difficult, regardless of their idealistic intentions. Deciding on work and equipment allocations was not easy, and learning how to live together in a close-knit community required considerable commitment. Some of the farms proved to be successful, although co-operative farming did not become the great movement its enthusiasts had anticipated. It may well be best viewed as a modestly successful experiment in social engineering and one that was perhaps somewhat in advance of its time.

Extension Services' interest in northern Saskatchewan also began to emerge in the late 1940s, and the first fieldman for northern co-operatives was hired in 1949. During the Depression people from southern Saskatchewan began to press northward looking for suitable land for settlement. In the war period there was a drive to search for new minerals in the north, and in the postwar period new transportation arteries radiated northward. Inevitably, this expansion raised the question of how the original peoples in

TABLE 10.3. Northern Co-ops: 1957-1961



Source: Dept. of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Reports

the north would be affected by modernization. The government and the Department decided that one of the best ways northerners, especially native people, could be organized in their own best interests was through co-operatives. The Department, therefore, helped organize a series of emerging co-operatives and fully independent co-operatives for fishing, consumption, and service functions (see Table 10.3). This proved to be an extremely difficult kind of work. Establishing where a co-operative should be located was not always easy; distance was a barrier; many of the native people did not speak English and few organizers an Indian language; management skills were in short supply; and training for boards of directors required more time and money than in the south.[20] The Department made an effort to ensure that native employees were hired whenever possible (with some success), and there can be no doubt that the programme did help introduce large numbers of native people to modern business methods. However, on balance, the programme was only a small step--although requiring considerable effort and capital--in coping with the vast problem of modernizing the north.

These two initiatives, in fact, must be seen as attempts to find co-operative solutions to two of the most perplexing social questions confronting Saskatchewan in the Douglas years: building and reforming rural society and assisting native people in coping with social and economic change. They both suffered from the disadvantage of requiring long periods of time, perhaps generations, to bring into effect. It is little wonder, then, that people outside the co-operative movement began to search elsewhere for more immediate solutions to those problems. And, even within the movement, there seemed to be little interest in assisting with these two initiatives. The established co-operative system contributed little money and almost no personnel to them and indeed, if publications are a measure of interest, paid scant attention to them.[21] From a statistical viewpoint, therefore, the most significant and easily apparent developments lay not in the areas of expansion favoured by the government but rather within the more traditional forms of co-operative activity--consumer, credit, and marketing co-operatives.

Consumer Co-operatives

The consumer movement underwent dramatic changes between 1944 and 1961. More than any other aspect of the provincial movement, it was buffeted by the transportation revolution transforming rural society and small towns. Somewhat belatedly, the rural road system of the province was modernized, and in the 1950s the retail businesses began to concentrate in the larger communities. Shopping centres began to appear, and the shopping patterns of decades suddenly started to change. The pressures on co-operatives to adjust to these developments was intense, and it is a measure of the business acumen of managers and directors that they were able to adjust. The Research Bureau of the Department assisted in this process, analysing trends, assisting in mergers, and co-operating with the advisory personnel at Federated Co-operatives.[22]

At the same time, the consumer co-operative system reached beyond the province for support and expansion. In 1955 Saskatchewan Federated Co-operatives amalgamated with Manitoba Co-operative Wholesale to form Federated Co-operatives; six years later, it merged with Alberta Co-operative Wholesale Association. These amalgamations were part of a general programme to maximize purchasing power at the wholesale level in order to compete in the modern retail world. They also helped to accumulate the capital needed to develop sources of supply and to improve competitive efficiency. Lumber mills were purchased in British Columbia, the oil refinery was expanded, the improvement of stores was financed, feed plants were built, and new warehouses were constructed. The government did not play a role in any of these activities; nor did it help finance the expansion of Federated's manufacturing capacity, although it did help to finance some co-op loans.[23] Rather, the government used its funds for the expansion of industry to develop crown corporations over which it would have more direct control. One wonders what might have happened if the government had chosen to support co-operative manufacturing more directly.[24] The only major exception to this general trend was the decision in 1954 (made despite strong opposition from the petroleum companies) to assign sections of crown oil reserves to Saskatchewan Federated Co-operatives on very generous terms.

The Financial System

The basis of the co-operative financial system was the credit union. These unexpected products of the Depression had banded together in 1941 to form the Saskatchewan Co-operative Credit Society to move funds among credit unions, to advise credit union managers or directors, and to provide cheque clearing services. This was the beginning of what was, in retrospect, the most important development in the provincial co-operative movement during the late 1940s and 1950s: the creation of a superstructure for an integrated, strong financial co-operative system (see Tables 10.4 and 10.5). Thoughtful co-operative leaders after World War II realized that the fundamental problem restricting the development of their organizations was the shortage of capital. Wherever they looked--at the emerging implement factory in Winnipeg, the expansion needs of the retail system, the

TABLE 10.4. Credit Unions: Number Reporting to Dept. and Membership



Source: Dept. of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Reports

TABLE 10.5. Credit Unions: Assets, 1944-1961



Source: Dept. of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Reports

escalating debt requirements of farmers, the capital demands of co-operatives--they saw an insatiable need for funds. Ultimately, there were only three possible sources: pooling investments among the major co-operatives, a practice developed to a fine art and with remarkable generosity; securing direct or indirect assistance from government, a dubious possibility given the province's limited financial resources; or developing a multi-faceted financial system to accumulate the resources of members to provide the funds for future development. Ultimately, the most effective way to meet the needs was the last alternative. In the late 1940s Saskatchewan co-operators established a life insurance company and, in the early 1950s, a casualty and fire company. They also established a trust company and played a major role in developing a national credit society.[25]

These developments created uncertainties in the relationship between co-operatives and government. For example, Co-operative Fire and Casualty, the national fire and casualty company started by the co-operatives in 1952, had a particularly difficult role to play. During the early and mid-1950s it was hard pressed to survive and badly needed a stable base in Saskatchewan. This base was difficult to achieve because of competition from the Saskatchewan Government Insurance Office. In the late 1950s, too, relations deteriorated because of long standing debates over property insurance and extended coverage for automobile owners. At odds were two contrasting views of how insurance and the large amounts of money involved in it might best be used in the interests of the people. The government argued that insurance was a service which could be administered and delivered most effectively through government offices. The co-operatives believed that insurance was best developed as a part of a cohesive co-operative financial sector.

The Douglas government, however, did contribute directly to the development of Co-operative Trust, another important element in the network of co-operative financial institutions developed during the 1950s. Co-op Trust was organized to meet the trust requirements of ordinary people, to provide long term credit to co-operatives and members of co-operatives, and to work closely with credit union centrals as part of an integrated financial system. Its main problem in the early years lay in finding sufficient income to allow it to survive, and probably it would not have done so if the Saskatchewan government had not chosen to use the company as the delivery vehicle for its family farm credit plan. This plan loaned money to young farmers at low rates to allow them to buy their farms from their parents, so that one generation could retire with dignity while another started its work without being strangled by impossible debts. This need was one of the most difficult burdens confronting new farmers, and it had led in many instances to either bankruptcy or insufficient capitalization for many of them. Administration of the plan was of great importance to Co-op Trust because of the revenues it generated, but it is important to note that it was given to the company only because of the insistence of Tommy Douglas. Some members of his cabinet believed that the plan should be administered by the government; others argued that Co-op Trust did not have the training or personnel to administer it effectively.[26] These attitudes were understandable, but they were also indicative of a general attitude towards co-operatives found within the government.

Thus, when one examines the emergence of the co-operative financial system in Saskatchewan in the 1940s and 1950s the role of the Douglas government was traditional rather than aggressive. Through the Department of Co-operation, it provided important inspection services to credit unions and assisted in improving the business practices followed by local credit unions. It facilitated the development of Co-operative Trust, but it did not deposit substantial sums of money in the credit union system. Its policies in the insurance field indicated a different set of priorities and some disagreement with the co-operative leadership of the province. In general, the government supported the movement, but it did not enter into the kind of close relationship which might have created rapid growth and a significant new centre of economic power.

The Marketing Co-operatives

The main strength of the co-operative movement in Saskatchewan since the early years of the century had been the marketing co-operatives. The giant among the province's co-operatives was the Wheat Pool with its immense assets, marketing capabilities, membership involvement, and important connections. The Pool was a major source of funds for many co-operative ventures, and many of its fieldmen were evangelists for the co-operative cause. In the years between 1944 and 1961, however, several problems restricted even its involvement in sustaining and expanding the surge within the co-operative movement. Early in the period it still had to pay some of the debts accumulated during the Depression. In the 1950s, the same transportation revolution that altered the consumer movement began to transform the grain collecting system. Built to meet the transportation requirements of the 1920s, the Pool had to adjust quickly. New facilities had to be constructed, locals had to be reorganized, the organization's bureaucracy reformed, and younger farmers attracted to the Pool. To these problems were added the difficulties created by uncertain markets and fluctuating prices, at least up until the late 1950s.[27] In confronting these challenges, the Pool worked essentially on its own or, in the case of marketing, with the federal government. The provincial government provided the Pool with some statistical and research information, but it did not--and was not asked to--provide much more.

The livestock marketing co-operatives faced even more dramatic changes. The government greatly assisted one small segment of this market by helping establish the Horse Co-operative Marketing Association in 1944.[28] It lasted for eleven years and sold large quantities of horse meat to Europe, thereby helping farmers sell the large number of horses made redundant by the advent of the self-propelled combine and the modern tractor. The other kinds of livestock co-operatives had longer term, structural problems with which to contend. The livestock industry was in the process of rationalization and rapid transformation in the postwar years. Transportation changes, freight rate changes, amalgamations in the meat packing industry, and provincial rivalries placed great pressures on livestock producers and their organizations. By the late 1940s, the co-operative marketing of cattle had evolved to the point where only two organizations were left, one of them being the livestock marketing programme administered by the Wheat Pool. The poultry and dairy industries witnessed the same type of rationalization. Despite these changes, however, livestock, poultry and dairy producers were poorly protected from the vagaries of the market. The government therefore launched campaigns to bring these commodities under marketing boards, but without success. The fiercely independent Saskatchewan farmers--and their co-operatives--were not willing to accept the degree of government regulation suggested by the marketing board approach.

What conclusions can be drawn from this history of co-operatives in Saskatchewan during this dynamic period? When the CCF came to power in 1944, there were many who believed there would be a joyous, enthusiastic mingling between the government and the co-operative movement. It did not happen, and in understanding why this was so it is vital to remember that co-operatives do march to a different drummer. The tradition of political neutrality runs deep; the belief that independent social and economic activism was more important than government direction was fundamental; the desire to maintain and increase power in co-operative institutions never wavered--all of these factors were important. So too was the fact that co-operators and leaders of co-operatives were not all social democrats; a significant number were Liberals and some were Conservatives. In a province where partisanship appears sometimes to be as important as religion and sex, that factor, as difficult to trace as it is, cannot be overestimated.

On the other side, the initiative in the Douglas government tended to flow towards crown corporations and social welfare programmes and not as much to the semi-anarchistic, locally-controlled solutions endemic to co-operative thought. For politicians and civil servants caught in the maelstrom of public controversies and immediate needs, the sober, stolid methods of the organized co-operative movement must have seemed to be a strange mixture of glacial speed and arcane debate.

Thus, the most successful involvement of the CCF government in the development of co-operatives in the province lay in perfecting the traditional roles of providing good co-operative legislation, reliable statistics, effective advisory services, and useful research reports. Less successful, but nevertheless important, the government served as a prod to the movement, encouraging joint projects among co-operatives and broadening the scope of co-operative activities, particularly in northern Saskatchewan. Beyond that, mostly by mutual agreement, the government did not go; the independent domains of the co-operative sector and government were respected and maintained even in the time of greatest sympathy during the Douglas years.

When viewed in broader terms, the relationship between co-ops and the Saskatchewan government between 1944 and 1961 is not unusual. Until the 1970s on the national level, co-operatives remained essentially aloof from the federal government and neither asked for nor expected significant assistance.[29] When ministries of co-operation were developed in Manitoba and Quebec during that decade, co-operatives were suspicious of government intentions and loathe to use the department fully; indeed, they were probably more wary than their Saskatchewan counterparts had been in the 1950s. This split suggests the autonomous tendency of "co-operative culture"--the fierce independence that characterizes the relationship between local co-ops and their centrals, and the associations between all co-operatives and their regulating government agencies.

Finally, the situation in Saskatchewan also typifies the relationship between co-operatives and social democrats. Quite understandably in the 1950s the bureaucrats and aggressive politicians in the Douglas regime (like Joe Phelps) grew impatient with the co-operative movement although that movement had, more than any other factor, made the CCF possible in Saskatchewan. From the point of view of its critics, the movement was not reaching out effectively beyond its already developed constituency; the established co-operatives were not showing much interest in helping the poorest people in the province; the major co-operatives were not working together as effectively as they might; and the communications and managerial revolutions of the day were imposing immense challenges on the co-operative system. From the bureaucrat's point of view, too, the co-operative movement did not show the unity or the sophistication to organize relations with government effectively and to state clearly and systematically how governments and co-operatives could work closely together to build the co-operative commonwealth. These criticisms were to some extent valid but they were not peculiar to the Saskatchewan situation; they are endemic in the gradualism of the co-operative movement and help explain why social democrats and marxists will always find co-operatives frustrating allies in the political process.

NOTES

1 For a description of the C.U.C. Annual Congress see The Canadian Co-operator, September 1933, pp. 8-28.

2 A. Bonner, British Co-operation (Manchester: Co-operative Union, 1970), pp. 135-37; M. Digby, The World Co-operative Movement (London: Hutchinson's University Library, 1944); C.R. Fay, Co-operation at Home and Abroad (London: Staples Press, 1925); W.P. Watkins, The International Co-operative Alliance, 1895-1970 (London: International Co-operative Alliance, 1970); B. Webb, The Co-operative Movement in Great Britain (London: Longman's Green and Company, 1891).

3 Interview with Frank Underhill, May 1968. Clause six of the Regina Manifesto deals with co-operatives.

4 W.C. Good, Farmer Citizen: My Fifty Years in the Canadian Farmers' Movement (Toronto: Ryerson, 1958), pp. 200-206.

5 L. Goodwyn, Democratic Promise: The Populist Moment in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1976).

6 For example, see J. Richards and L. Pratt, Prairie Capitalism (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart, 1979), pp. 21-38.

7 These characteristics of populism are discussed by many writers. See, for example, P.R. Sinclair, "Class Structure and Populist Protest: The Case of Western Canada" in Carlo Caldarola, ed., Society and Politics in Alberta (Toronto: Methuen, 1979), pp. 73-76.

8 This general view of the prairie farmer is perhaps best developed in C.B. MacPherson, Democracy in Alberta (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1953), especially pp. 225-26.

9 J.F.C. Wright, Prairie Progress: Consumer Co-operation in Saskatchewan (Saskatoon: Modern Press, 1956), pp. 122-49. An historical account of Co-op Implements has not yet been written. See The Co-operative Consumer, Western Producer and The Canadian Co-operator for 1946 for reports on the organization drive.

10 I. MacPherson, Each For All: A History of the Co-operative Movement in English Canada, 1900-1945 (Toronto: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 92, 127, 160, 198.

11 Saskatchewan, Department of Agriculture, Annual Report, 1940, pp. 209-210; J. Trevena, Prairie Co-operation--A

Diary (Saskatoon: Co-operative College of Canada, 1976), pp. 176-77.

12 Wright, pp. 150-55, 158; I. MacPherson, *The Story of CIS Ltd.: Co-operative Insurance Services* (Co-operative Insurance Services, 1974), pp. 1-5. On the taxation issue see Co-operative Union of Canada Archives, *Canadian Co-operative Digest*, Winter, 1959.

13 See Richards and Pratt, pp. 111-21, and the essay by Jean Larmour in this book.

14 Interview with Warden Burgess, 14 August 1976.

15 SAB, T.C. Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 106, "The Place and Functions of Co-operative and Government Enterprise in a Democratic Economy."

16 Interview with Warden Burgess; Interview with L.L. Lloyd, 12 August 1974. There is extensive correspondence between L.L. Lloyd and T.C. Douglas in SAB, Douglas Papers, various files.

17 See Saskatchewan, Report of the *Royal Commission on Agriculture and Rural Life*.

18 Wright, pp. 188-98.

19 Ibid., pp. 164-77. This number is based upon tabulations from Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, *Annual Reports*, 1947-1962.

20 See, for example, Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, *Annual Report*, 1958, pp. 77-78.

21 There are few reports on the northern co-operatives in either *The Co-operative Consumer* or the *Western Producer* during the 1950s.

22 Numerous reports were prepared by the Research and Statistical Services Branch of the Department on such issues as financing co-operatives, vertical integration of co-operatives, legislative needs, managerial training, the functions of boards of directors, and marketing changes.

23 Trevena, pp. 216-30. The loans were guaranteed under the Co-operative Guarantee Act, 1944. The most interesting aspect of this act, however, was that relatively few loans were actually protected by it over the years.

24 See Richards and Pratt, pp. 111-21, for an account of how the government attempted to stimulate manufacturing through crown corporations.

25 C. Purden, Agents for Change: Credit Unions in Saskatchewan (Regina: Credit Union Central, 1980), pp. 67-93.

26 Interview with Warden Burgess; interview with H.A. Wagner, 5 November 1976.

27 G.L. Fairbairn, From Prairie Roots: The Remarkable Story of Saskatchewan Wheat Pool (Saskatoon: Western Producer Prairie Books, 1984), pp. 165-96.

28 Saskatchewan, Department of Co-operation and Co-operative Development, Annual Report, 1945, pp. 13-14.

29 I. MacPherson, To Build and To Defend: A Brief History of the Co-operative Union of Canada, 1909-1984 (Ottawa: Co-operative Union of Canada, 1984).

The CCF Government in Saskatchewan and Social Aid, 1944-1964

Jim Pitsula

The newly elected CCF government established Saskatchewan's first Department of Social Welfare in November 1944. Over the next twenty years the Department developed a variety of programmes in such fields as child welfare, assistance for the aged, housing, corrections, and social aid. This essay focusses on the evolution of the social aid programme from 1944 to 1964. It seeks to answer the question of whether the CCF government effected significant improvements or whether the campaign promises of "humanity first" and social justice were only so much political bombast.

First, it is necessary to examine the social aid system inherited by the CCF when it came to power. Before 1944 social aid was referred to as direct relief and came under the jurisdiction of the Department of Municipal Affairs. Though financed jointly by the province and the municipalities, it was administered by the latter. Needy persons applied to the municipality in which they resided for aid in the form of food, clothing, fuel, shelter, and incidentals. The municipalities were reimbursed by the province for 50 percent of the expenses incurred for these items, but they had to bear the full cost of medical care provided to social aid recipients. The municipalities had no obligation to those who were not legal residents, that is, those who had not lived in the municipality for at least one year. Such persons were 100 percent provincial charges.

The province also had full responsibility for indigents living in parts of Saskatchewan where municipalities had not been organized (Local Improvement Districts and the Northern Administration Area). Extra provincial assistance was given to municipalities burdened with a high concentration of indigents. As a result of these provisions, the province paid 71 percent and the municipalities 29 percent of the total cost of social aid in 1944-45.[1]

The social aid programme had numerous deficiencies. Many municipalities were hampered in their ability to deliver adequate aid by their weak financial position. It also happened that the municipalities least able to afford social aid tended to be burdened with the largest number of needy persons. Various means were used to discourage applications; for example, the postponement of action until the next council meeting or the publication of the names of recipients and their private circumstances.[2] Premier T.C. Douglas and O.W. Valleau, who was appointed Minister of Social Welfare in 1944, received many letters from individuals who complained of the humiliation they had to endure in order to obtain social aid. The following was typical: "I was left with seven small children under 12 years and I received a mother's allowance of $30 which was cut down as each child reached 16 years of age until the last miserable $8 was cut off so that I was left destitute and had to go on relief to the town which was handed out in a way that made you feel as if you were a real and honest-to-goodness thief." Another woman explained that she was ashamed to go to the village for aid, but, having been advised there was no other alternative, she would talk it over with her children. If they thought it was all right, she would make an application.[3]

Saskatoon had a reputation for treating social aid recipients harshly. In 1947, Douglas interceded on behalf of a Saskatoon family of his acquaintance: "I don't think people like this man and his wife should have to be humiliated by making him go to [the relief officer] to be browbeaten in order to get something to eat for themselves and their family." Valleau shared the low opinion of the quality of relief administration in Saskatoon: "Our Mr. Forster [Director of Social Aid] is visiting Saskatoon this week to interview [the relief officer] in regard to this and a number of other cases, in all of which [the relief officer] has refused to grant any assistance whatever. We cannot go over his head without blowing the lid entirely off in Saskatoon which I am reluctant to do without consulting the sitting members."[4] There is no evidence of the "lid having blown off" in Saskatoon.

Another problem was that the municipal officers commonly took the view that no social aid should be granted to recipients of Mothers' Allowances or old age pensions. Mothers' Allowances had been introduced by the provincial government in 1918 to support dependent mothers who qualified under a means test.[5] Old age pensions, also based on a means test, began in 1927 as a joint federal-provincial programme. Neither the Mothers' Allowance nor the old age pension was sufficient in itself to sustain an adequate standard of living. Nonetheless, many municipalities maintained that they should not have to support people who qualified for the other programmes. Some municipalities recognized the need to supplement the allowances with social aid. In these instances, an undesirable duplication of administration resulted.

The residence requirement impaired smooth and efficient administration. The complications involved in establishing whether or not the applicant had legal residence delayed urgently needed assistance. Individuals were shunted from one government office to another. The collection and processing of information on residence consumed a great deal of staff time. It sometimes happened that a person lived in one municipality but had legal residence in another. The province then reimbursed the granting municipality 100 percent and billed the municipality of legal residence for its share. The procedure was cumbersome, especially when the responsible municipality refused to pay. As the population of the province became more mobile, the difficulties increased.[6]

One of the worst features of the relief system prior to 1944 was its intimate connection with the Liberal political machine. Voters who failed to support the government were in danger of losing their relief. T.C. Douglas made the following comment about the 1938 election in which the Liberals were victorious: "In my area and in the rural areas, ninety per cent of the people were on relief, and people were told very frankly that if this poll doesn't carry, their relief would be cut off, and as an added inducement, those who were willing to go out and campaign got an extra relief order. Everyone who lived through that time knew it."[7]

Upon achieving power, the CCF quickly took some initiatives designed to raise the standard of relief or, as it was now called, social aid. Effective 1 January 1945, free medical, hospital, dental, and nursing services were provided for recipients of Mothers' Allowances and their dependents and old age pensioners and their dependents. These benefits were not available in any other province in Canada at the time. Fewer people now had to turn to social aid to pay for medical care.

In December 1944 the Minister of Social Welfare sent to the councils of urban and rural municipalities a guide for a minimum social aid schedule. It was hoped that the municipalities would voluntarily adopt the schedule and guarantee adequate levels of aid to recipients. The Department of Social Welfare relied upon its field staff to advise and instruct municipalities as to how they might improve their administration of social aid. Under the Liberal government, relief inspectors had been mainly engaged in the auditing of municipal claims, in reconciling disputes, and in investigating claims of abuse and neglect. The Department of Social Welfare renamed the relief inspectors "social welfare officers" and enlarged their role. Besides continuing the auditing function, the social welfare officers were expected to consult with municipal officials and help them adopt good welfare practices.[8]

The social welfare officer investigated cases of potential needs and interceded with municipal councils on behalf of applicants who had been turned down or who had received insufficient aid. The following illustrates the kind of work a social welfare officer did.

> Re: Mr. and Mrs. X
>
> This old couple are living in a one-roomed house on a quarter section of land belonging to a son who is presently living in Winnipeg. They have not a member of their family in Saskatchewan. Their income for 1949 was practically nothing and their assets consist of two yearling calves.
>
> I drove, by snowmobile, to the farm homes of Councillor Y and Reeve Z and impressed on them the need of this old couple. The Reeve was reluctant to grant assistance but I insisted that the need was there and he agreed to grant $35 a month for the winter months. Mr. X had mentioned to me that they could get along on $20 a month and fuel.[9]

The officials of the Department, influenced by new social work concepts, hoped that the social welfare officer would not confine himself to merely financial problems but would try to counsel and work with families in order to help them become self-sustaining members of the community. As much as possible, social welfare officers were supposed to supply casework services to public assistance cases.[10]

The impact of these initiatives, namely the publication of a minimum aid schedule and the expansion of the role of the social welfare officer, was limited. K. Forster, Director of the Social Aid Branch, admitted as much in a speech to the Western Regional Conference on Social Work in April 1947:

> We do have obstacles in the path of an adequate public assistance program such as discrimination, national or other prejudices, ignorance, unconcern, and in certain cases the inability of the municipality to properly finance an adequate program. We find that, in spite of continuing our contribution towards social aid costs, our establishment of minimum standards, together with policy formation and supervision, there are still too many people not being adequately provided for.

In the last analysis, the municipality was able to grant assistance but was not required to do so. The Department of Social Welfare had no real authority except under sections 14 and 16 of the Social Aid Act, passed in 1947, which provided that the Department could furnish aid to any indigent person and recover the amounts so expended from the municipality of legal residence. In practice, the authority was little exercised because of the damage that would be done to provincial-municipal relations. When the municipality was not amenable to suggestions from the social welfare officer, the Department often assumed 100 percent responsibility for the case.[11]

The effectiveness of the social welfare officers was sharply reduced by chronic under-staffing. In 1944-45, the social welfare officer's average caseload was one thousand. By 1949, the number of social welfare officers had increased from twenty-four to forty, but this was still not enough. The Department's Annual Report for 1948-49 asked for a "substantial increase in the strength of our field staff." Reports in subsequent years continued the same theme.[12]

The most severe indictment of the efforts of the CCF government with respect to social aid came in the form of a Budget Bureau survey report completed in 1952. It stated flatly that the existing programmes were failing to meet two primary objectives of the government, namely to ensure that all persons in real need received assistance and to ensure that the assistance provided was adequate. The report went on to say that the government had failed to give positive leadership by asserting control over standards of assistance. The Budget Bureau called for a complete redrafting of public assistance policies, plans, and programmes. The respective responsibilities of the province and the municipalities had to be clearly set forth in statutes or regulations. The residence requirement ought to be abolished, and an appeal procedure set up for persons who believed they had been unfairly treated.

The report also recommended that all forms of public assistance be co-ordinated in one programme. The existence of separate programmes for old age pensions, pensions for the blind, mother's allowances, and social aid created administrative confusion. The needs of families had to be made to fit the terms and requirements of the various programmes. Arguing that the family was the only appropriate working unit upon which to base the administration of public assistance, the report favoured "a single integrated organization for receiving, evaluating, and dealing with all applications for assistance within a given area."[13]

The Budget Bureau recommendations did not receive serious attention until 1959. What was the reason for the protracted delay? It seems that the limiting factor was money. D.E. Chalmers, Director of Public Assistance, pointed out in 1950 the connection between increased provincial funding and adequate social aid:

> It would appear that if a proper standard of even minimum needs is to be achieved, the Provincial Government will have to seriously consider increasing their share of Social Aid either by acceptance of a larger portion than 50% or by limiting the responsibility of the local area to a given mill rate on total assessment. The latter could be achieved by the Provincial Government acceptance of 100% of the cost of Social Aid after the local area has expended one or two mills of their assessment for this purpose and are obliged to look after indigent persons beyond that amount of revenue.

The government decided that it lacked the financial resources necessary for major social aid reforms. A four year plan prepared in December 1947 by the research staff of the EAPB maintained that while a primary aim of the social services programme was to redistribute wealth in order to ensure a decent standard of living for all, the province did not have sufficient income to achieve this objective. A redistribution of wealth among the provinces was the only solution. "Until a redistribution is achieved along such lines as the equalization grants suggested by the Rowell-Sirois Commission, the province cannot hope to provide adequate social services."[14]

Expenditures on social services, including education, health, social welfare, labour, cultural amenities, and community planning, accounted for 50 percent of the 1947-1948 budget of $45 million. This was out of line with the practice in the other provinces and, according to the EAPB report, a cause of "serious alarm." Social service expenditures tended to become binding moral commitments that were difficult to cut back when revenues declined. Furthermore, social service expenditures would automatically increase owing to the steady rise in the number of old age pensioners and the not unlikely event of a downturn in the economy. These considerations led the cabinet to adopt a "hold the line" policy with respect to social services until federal aid could be secured.

A planning document which appears to have emanated from the Department of Social Welfare in May 1949 reiterated the same cautious theme. Various proposals were advanced; for example, larger contributions to municipalities, sharing the cost of medical, dental, and hospital services for indigents, and the merging of Mothers' Allowances into the social aid programme. However, action in any of these areas seemed unlikely because "with approximately the same measure of funds for public assistance purposes, our expansion in this field must necessarily be limited."[15]

A major breakthrough in the financing of social aid occurred in 1956. Under the terms of the Unemployment Assistance Agreement signed by the province and the federal government, the federal government agreed to pay 50 percent of the cost of social aid for the caseloads in excess of .45 percent of the province's population.[16] This enabled the province to inform the municipalities that the province would cover 75 percent rather than 50 percent of municipal expenditures for social aid.

The impact of the change upon the allocation of fiscal responsibility among the various levels of government is evident from Table 11.1. In 1955-56, the province bore 73 percent of the total cost of social aid and the municipalities bore 27 percent. It must be remembered that while the province reimbursed the municipalities for half of their costs, a great many cases were 100 percent provincial charges. In 1956-57, under the new cost-sharing formula, the municipal share fell from 27 percent to 13 percent, the provincial share declined from 73 percent to 63 percent, and the federal government covered the remaining 24 percent. Amendment of the Unemployment Assistance Agreement in 1958 resulted in the federal government's assuming an even larger portion of the cost. Between 1957-58 and 1958-59, the federal share increased from 22 percent to 35 percent, the provincial share fell from 63 percent to 50 percent, and the municipal share stayed the same at 15 percent.

The altered fiscal arrangements were bound to affect the workings of the social aid programme. In May 1955 J.S. White, the Deputy Minister of the Department of Social Welfare, composed a memorandum reflecting on the anticipated consequences of the Unemployment Assistance Agreement. He predicted that as a result of the increased availability of funds "local government bodies will be subject to a great deal of pressure from individuals and from community groups to pay assistance to groups not now helped."[17] The expansion of social aid would bring to light deficiencies and inconsistencies in the programme and put pressure on the provincial government to enforce uniform standards. Moreover, in J.S. White's estimation, the administration of aid by some municipalities was so poor that they would be unable to fulfil the requirements of the Unemployment Assistance Agreement for the proper reporting of expenditures.

TABLE 11.1 Expenditures on Social Aid in the Province of Saskatchewan, 1944-1964

YEAR	MUNICIPAL	PROVINCIAL	FEDERAL	TOTAL
1944-45	196,606 (29%)	474,648 (71%)		671,254
1945-46	224,478 (29%)	558,404 (71%)		782,882
1946-47	253,243 (29%)	628,599 (71%)		881,842
1947-48	319,810 (29%)	802,118 (71%)		1,121,928
1948-49	366,986 (29%)	914,322 (71%)		1,281,308
1949-50	434,962 (30%)	1,013,708 (70%)		1,448,670
1950-51	421,321 (30%)	975,041 (70%)		1,396,362
1951-52	507,874 (31%)	1,155,167 (69%)		1,663,041
1952-53	336,557 (27%)	914,399 (73%)		1,250,956
1953-54	352,628 (26%)	989,743 (74%)		1,342,371
1954-55	307,087 (21%)	1,142,532 (79%)		1,449,619
1955-56	497,403 (27%)	1,371,174 (73%)		1,868,577
1956-57	298,647 (13%)	1,463,498 (63%)	556,814 (24%)	2,318,959
1957-58	387,463 (15%)	1,578,983 (63%)	558,394 (22%)	2,524,840
1958-59	469,020 (15%)	1,543,152 (50%)	1,096,441 (35%)	3,108,613
1959-60	311,839 (8%)	2,049,779 (50%)	1,740,709 (42%)	4,102,327
1960-61	264,533 (5%)	3,325,459 (57%)	2,208,054 (38%)	5,798,046
1961-62	389,655 (4%)	4,710,146* (52%)	3,906,836* (44%)	9,006,637
1962-63	582,877 (5%)	6,352,909* (53%)	5,049,447* (42%)	11,985,233
1963-64	520,034 (4%)	7,335,878* (59%)	4,641,398* (37%)	12,497,310

Source: Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, Annual Reports, 1944-1964.

* Includes expenditures for Aid to Dependent Families (formerly Mothers' Allowances) and Supplemental Allowances on a needs test basis.

Over the years, the situation had developed whereby many municipalities depended upon the provincially appointed social welfare officers to do more and more of their administrative work. For example, certain municipalities would not grant aid until the social welfare officer had investigated the applicant and established his eligibility.[18] The Department had come to a crossroads. It had to either assume full responsibility for social aid or restore full responsibility to the municipalities.

These considerations formed the backdrop to the most significant piece of social aid legislation passed by the CCF government, the Social Aid Act of 1959. In the spring of 1958, T.J. Bentley, Minister of Social Welfare, invited the Saskatchewan Urban Municipalities Association (SUMA) and the Saskatchewan Association of Rural Municipalities (SARM) to appoint representatives to a committee to advise the Department on changes to social aid. The proposals of the committee were embodied in the Social Aid Act the following year.[19]

Two guiding principles underlay the legislation. First, it was intended that the municipalities accept full responsibility for administering social aid. Secondly, all persons in genuine need were to receive adequate assistance.

With respect to the first principle, J.S. White, the Deputy Minister, stated privately that the province was capable of administering the Act more competently than were the local authorities, "but this better administration would have been achieved at the price of removing from local government one of its historical responsibilities." T.J. Bentley, in a memo to Cabinet in which he argued for strengthening municipal responsibility, drew attention to the large expense involved if the province attempted to do the job.[20] Under the 1959 Act, municipal councils were no longer allowed to deal with applications in an irregular, haphazard way. Each municipality was required to appoint a municipal welfare official and authorize him to make decisions in accordance with the Act.

The second principle, pertaining to the rights of social aid recipients, was enlarged upon by the Minister of Social Welfare in a speech to the legislature:

1. Every individual should have a right to Social Aid when his need can be demonstrated, regardless of his race, creed, residence, or citizenship.

2. No individual should have to meet a test of moral worthiness in order to receive Social Aid.

3. Every individual receiving Social Aid should have a right to plan his life as he chooses even though he has lost his financial independence. This means he should have the right to decide such things as how he should use his Social Aid except if he fails to use it to provide the necessities of life for himself and his dependents, where he shall live, what services he wishes to accept. A corollary of this is that every individual should receive his Social Aid in the form of cash so that he may be free to make these decisions.

4. The privacy of the circumstances of every individual receiving or applying for Social Aid must be respected.

5. Every individual seeking or receiving Social Aid should have the right to appeal any decisions concerning his application which he thinks unjust.

6. Every individual should have the right and obligation to take as much responsibility as he can in seeking a solution to his financial problem. This includes both the finding and holding of employment and the establishing of his need for Social Aid.[21]

The provisions of the 1959 Social Aid Act and the regulations made under its authority raised the dignity of applicants for social aid.[22] Whereas in the past the applicant had been to a large extent at the mercy of whims of the municipal council, there was now a fixed and regular procedure for handling applications. Applications were to be made in writing on a form prescribed by the Director of Public Assistance in the Department of Social Welfare. To be eligible for aid, the applicant had to produce evidence that he had explored, within the limits of his ability, every possibility of self-support. The municipal welfare official was expected to personally interview the applicant and record the contents of the interview on another form supplied by the Department. The "budget deficit" method, the balancing of available resources against the estimate of regularly recurring need, was used to determine whether aid would be granted.

The council of any municipality could pass a by-law, approved by the Director of Public Assistance, to adopt a schedule specifying the amount of aid to which recipients were entitled. In each municipality where such a by-law was not in force, the amount of aid was determined by the schedule drawn up by the Department. All calculations involved in establishing the "budget deficit" were to be recorded on a Departmental form which was filed in the municipal office. When an application was approved, the applicant was to be advised in writing of the decision, the basis on which the amount was determined, and the method of payment. If the application was rejected, the applicant was to be informed in writing of the reason for the refusal and of his right to appeal. Aid was to be paid by cheque or cash in advance each month. However, when the recipient was judged to be incapable of managing his own affairs, aid could be provided in the form of goods or services or by payment to a trustee. Aid was to be administered in such a way as to protect the confidentiality of the recipient's circumstances.

The Departmental schedule set rates for allowances for food, shelter, clothing, fuel, utilities, and personal and household incidentals. They were set "at a minimum level that will maintain health and decency."[23] Under certain circumstances, items additional to those needed for basic maintenance were provided. The schedule authorized the initial purchase, repair, or replacement of equipment and supplies for the home such as bedding, towels, dishes, utensils, and essential articles of household furniture and furnishings. Instalment payments on essential household equipment could be covered only if the item had been purchased before the application for aid was made and if the municipality was satisfied that the cost of replacing the item would exceed the cost of the remaining payments.

Other special allowances were granted for transportation expenses to enable recipients to obtain health care that was unavailable in their own locality or to enable recipients to move to areas where jobs could be found. Social aid covered the expenses of children attending school such as transportation, school supplies, school activity fees, text books, locker fees, and gymnasium clothing. Housekeeping services were allowed if required by a recipient who was unable to look after himself or his family. Expenses necessary to commence employment, such as special clothing, mandatory licenses, fees or permits, and minor essential tools were also paid.

The total aid granted to any applicant family could not exceed $200 per month or an amount equal to 95 percent of the normal earnings of the recipient, whichever was the lesser. However, in cases of "extreme hardship" the Director of Public Assistance had the authority to waive this provision.

Before aid was granted, satisfactory proof had to be obtained that the applicant lacked the means and resources to support himself. Not included in the calculation of the applicant's means were family allowances, casual gifts of small value, savings for burial expenses (not exceeding $250 for a single person), earnings from part-time employment (not exceeding $5 per month for a single person, $10 a month for a family of two persons, and $15 for a family of three or more persons), the home in which the applicant resided, the basic stock herd on a farm, seed for next year's crop, and essential equipment to carry on farming or business operations. The municipal welfare officer could direct the applicant to sell certain items of personal property not required for maintaining a basic standard of health and welfare.

One feature of the Social Aid Act of 1959 especially underlined the concern for the self-esteem of the recipient. Each municipality was obliged to establish a committee to hear appeals from decisions of the welfare official. If the appellant was dissatisfied with the ruling of the local committee, he could take his complaint one step further. Final authority rested with the provincial Social Welfare Board, composed of representatives from SUMA, SARM, the community at large, and the Department of Social Welfare.

The Social Aid Act abolished the residence requirement which had been the source of so much inconvenience for administrators and applicants alike. The municipality would now issue aid to any indigent person within its boundaries, regardless of how long the person had lived there. The cost-sharing formula whereby the province reimbursed the municipality for 75 percent of its social aid was no longer acceptable or just. Without the residence requirement, the municipalities to which the poor gravitated would have to bear the heaviest financial burden. Consequently, the Act established a new funding formula based on a per capita levy.

One side effect of the change was the disappearance of 100 percent provincial cases (those who had been unable to establish legal municipal residence). Under the old system, the province paid the medical expenses for these cases, while the municipality looked after the rest. Under the new Act, the municipalities were responsible for health care for all social aid recipients. An adjustment was made to the per capita levy to compensate the municipalities for the additional expense.

The implementation of the Social Aid Act was not free from controversy. J.S. White, in a memo dated 18 March 1960, noted

> statements being made in various places throughout the Province about inadequate administration of social aid and in fact to statements respecting

> social aid being an easy type of hand-out. While these statements are certainly not in accordance with the facts and this was admitted by these representatives, we ourselves know that there is some criticism throughout the Province that it is too easy now to obtain social aid. This is undoubtedly partly created through insufficient staff in some municipalities to properly administer the program.[24]

Criticism of the social aid programme reached the floor of the legislature. On 6 March 1961, Dave Boldt, the Liberal member for Rosthern, denounced the ease with which people received assistance. He implied that the recipients should be required to sign a document pledging to repay the amount of the allowance.[25] The strongest attack on the government's policy came from Ross Thatcher, leader of the Liberal party:

> But I would also this afternoon say flatly to the Premier, I would say flatly to the Minister of Social Welfare, I would say flatly to this government, that there is increasing evidence that hundreds of people are drawing social aid today who are simply not entitled to it. Social aid in Saskatchewan is becoming a provincial scandal. There is evidence that social aid on an ever-increasing scale is being given to chiselers, to dead beats, to drunks, to people who are too lazy to work, to people who are frequently not even citizens of Saskatchewan.

Premier W.S. Lloyd replied that the increase in the number of people on social aid was due to the province's acceptance of a larger share of the financial responsibility. Municipalities were now more willing to give aid to those who really needed it because the burden of expense for local government had been lightened. Lloyd told the Assembly a story about the "bad old days" of the 1930s when the Liberals had been in charge of relief:

> ...It is the story of an old couple who were visited by an old age inspector under the Liberal government. They happened to have cooking on the stove some chicken brought in by a relative from the farm. The comment of the old age inspector was "You people don't really need a pension, you can have chicken for dinner." This was the standard of treatment by the Liberal party, some of them at least, in their application of this kind of thing. And if the honorable members want to deny it, let me tell them this, let me tell them

> this. The people I speak of were my own mother and father, and I know it.[26]

Liberal members of the legislature suggested modifications to the administration of social aid. Dave Boldt believed in the need for a work test; that is, employable recipients should give service for cash received. J.W. Gardiner, the MLA for Melville, advised the Social Welfare Department to cut down on the advertising of its programmes. When people became aware of the programmes, they took advantage of them.[27]

Because of the criticism raised in the legislature and by the CCF caucus, the cabinet appointed a special committee in the spring of 1962 to review the social aid programme. Department officials prepared a report for the consideration of the committee. With respect to the complaint that employable persons obtained aid too easily, the report pointed out that municipal councils were responsible for deciding what proofs were necessary to establish eligibility. The city of Regina, for example, required a slip from the National Employment Service signed and recently dated confirming that the recipient had registered, letters from major employers stating that the recipient had requested work but none was available, and an interview with the applicant concerning other employment possibilities. The report condemned the concept of "work for relief": "In all fairness, a person should be hired to do a job, not just be 'put to work' to demonstrate to the public that he does not get something for nothing."[28] Furthermore, the Unemployment Assistance Act expressly prohibited work for social aid. If the province implemented such a scheme, it would lose federal funding.

The report examined the allegation that social aid benefits were so generous that people had no incentive to work. It pointed out that municipalities were not bound to the provincial schedule. They had the option of drawing up their own and submitting it for the approval of the Director of Public Assistance. Only the larger cities had actually done so, and their schedules were, for the most part, higher than the provincial schedule. The regulations under the Act ensured that no social aid recipient could receive more than 95 percent of his normal earnings. In some instances, that amount was higher than the minimum wage. The report maintained, however, that the problem lay with the minimum wage being too low and not with social aid being too high.

As Table 11.2 makes clear, the amount of the social aid allowance in Saskatchewan was comparable to the amounts paid in Alberta and Manitoba in 1961. British Columbia paid out rather less.

TABLE 11.2. Maximum Social Aid Allowances for Four Sizes of Families* in the Four Western Provinces, October 1961

	FAMILY OF TWO	FAMILY OF THREE	FAMILY OF FOUR	FAMILY OF FIVE
British Columbia	$ 103.80	$ 125.40	$ 147.00	$ 168.80
Alberta	117.85	146.75	170.85	193.65
Saskatchewan	110.24	141.48	172.57	195.21
Manitoba	128.00	151.00	172.00	197.00

* Family of two is considered two adults;
Family of three--two adults and one child 6-11 years;
Family of four--two adults, one child age 5 years, and one child age 9 years;
Family of five--two adults, one child age 2 years, one child age 9 years and one child age 14 years.

Source: Saskatchewan Archives Board, A.M. Nicholson Papers, Public Assistance-General, 15-7-1.

The report firmly rejected the notion that municipalities should be allowed to relate the amount of aid to the "person's behaviour or status merits." Need should be the sole criterion. If a recipient misused his allowance, the regulations provided for aid being paid through a trustee or issued in the form of requisitions to merchants.

The report noted that prior to 1959 the Department had been deluged with criticism that people's needs were not being met and that applicants were being humiliated. The 1959 legislation was intended to ensure fair treatment and uniform administration throughout the province. Now the criticism appeared to be coming from the opposite direction. To counteract the dissatisfaction, the report advised that municipalities be made more fully aware of the degree of autonomy they enjoyed under the Act; for example, the right to determine their own assistance schedules. Moreover, as the standard of municipal administration improved, controls should be relaxed and more discretion allowed to municipal welfare officials.

Here the report touched upon a significant issue. The Social Aid Act of 1959 had two fundamental aims, to guarantee the basic rights of the social aid recipient and to strengthen municipal administration. The initiatives taken to achieve the former were not universally popular. What was less obvious from the public controversy were the difficulties obstructing the attainment of the second goal. The report acknowledged that development of local policies required "more competence and time on the part of municipal officials." A provincial contribution towards paying administrative costs would make it possible for the municipalities to hire appropriate staff and allow a municipal official to allot a set proportion of his time to social aid matters. The competence of local officers also depended upon the quality of the consultative service provided by the Department. The report regretted that "our present social aid representatives are junior staff who are not competent to provide professional advice to municipalities on either the development of social policies or promotion of resources required for rehabilitation measures."

An active rehabilitation programme would reduce social aid costs and perhaps neutralize some of the adverse publicity about the alleged "chisellers, deadbeats, and drunks" receiving welfare cheques. Rehabilitation involved classifying recipients, enrolling them in education and job-training programmes, providing sheltered work experience for those who needed preparation for competitive employment, and eventually reinstating them in the work force.

Government policy reflected the main conclusions of the report. There was no intention of backing down from the main principle of the Social Aid Act with respect to the right of the needy to receive adequate assistance. There would be no "work test," no publicity designed to shame the recipient, no opportunity for municipal councils to make arbitrary judgments about the moral credentials of individuals. A.W. Sihvon, Director of Public Assistance, had the confidence to assert in the Department's annual report for 1962-63 that a "revolution" had occurred in the administration of social aid: "The right of persons in need to receive assistance has been gaining general acceptance and much of the stigma attached to the receipt of assistance has disappeared."[29] Regardless of whether or not this was an accurate appraisal of public opinion, the Department was upholding the principle that social aid should not carry a stigma.

Some preliminary steps were taken to promote rehabilitation. A "rehabilitation allowance" was added to the other special allowances permitted under the social aid regulations. The 1963-64 budget designated $30,000 to cover the cost. Special projects were commenced at Prince Albert and in the Moose Jaw region to test the effectiveness of rehabilitation methods in helping recipients become self-supporting.[30]

Despite the minor initiatives in the area of rehabilitation, neither the Department nor the municipalities were providing much in the way of casework services. It was still beyond the capacity of the social aid programme to offer all clients counselling or other assistance with budgeting, household management, employment, and family problems. The Provincial-Municipal Advisory Committee on Social Aid (composed of representatives from SUMA, SARM, and the Department) discussed the question of services in the social aid programme at their conference in September 1963. They agreed that caseloads were too large for counselling to be feasible, and advised municipalities to continue utilizing all available community facilities. In Regina, for example, a private agency like the Family Service Bureau provided casework services.[31]

Although the government remained loyal to the principle of fair treatment for social aid recipients, it had less success implementing the principle of municipal responsibility for administration. The report prepared for the Cabinet Committee on Social Aid in 1962 urged the Department to "increase the tempo of its educational program with councils and municipal officials." The Minister and his officials accordingly held a series of meetings throughout Saskatchewan to discuss all aspects of social aid. In order to upgrade the quality of municipal administration, the Provincial-Municipal Advisory Committee on Social Aid approved a plan for a training programme for municipal welfare officials.[32]

These efforts notwithstanding, the future of social aid administration did not lie with the municipalities. The municipality was too small a unit to support a full-time, professional social welfare officer. Larger units of local administration were ruled out because of the political opposition to tampering with the existing municipalities. The only solution was the one that had been proposed as far back as July 1946 by Oakland Valleau, the first Minister of Social Welfare--provincial administration of social aid. Officials in the Department of Social Welfare had begun planning the change even before the election in 1964, but the plans were not actually legislated until 1966.[33]

When the CCF was elected to power in Saskatchewan in 1944 on the slogan "humanity first," they inherited a social aid system which did not put humanity first. Aid was dispensed by municipalities in a grudging manner calculated to shame the needy person into asking for very little or not asking at all. During the initial years of its administration, the CCF government made marginal improvements in the social aid programme. However, a major breakthrough did not occur until the federal government made funds available. Relieved of financial pressure, the government introduced a Social Aid Act in 1959. The Act was a turning point in the evolution of public assistance in the province. It established procedures and set standards that made social aid a right, not a privilege. The government persisted in upholding the Act despite the attacks of political opponents who were scandalized by the apparent ease with which people received financial assistance. Eventually, the administration of aid had to be transferred from the municipalities to the province, but the substance of the Act stood. In comparison with the public relief available in Saskatchewan in 1944, the social aid programme in 1964 did put humanity first.

NOTES

1 See Table 11.1.

2 SAB, J.H. Sturdy Papers, Economic Advisory and Planning Board file, D.E. Chalmers to J.S. White, 13 November 1950; Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, *Annual Report*, 1947-1948.

3 SAB, T.C. Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 633g, O.W. Valleau to Douglas, 3 July 1946; file 633j, Mrs. A. to T.C. Douglas, 1 June 1948 (the real names of social aid recipients have not been used in this paper); file 633l, O.W. Valleau to Douglas, 24 February 1948.

4 Ibid., file 633g, Douglas to A.K. Cassidy, 17 June 1947; file 633a, O.W. Valleau to Douglas, 14 June 1945.

5 Mothers' Allowances were distinct from the family allowances granted to all families by the federal government beginning in 1945.

6 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 641, speech by T.J. Bentley on the new Social Aid Act, 1959.

7 Lewis H. Thomas, ed., *The Making of a Socialist* (Edmonton: University of Alberta, 1982), p. 147.

8 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 633a, Instructions and Guide for Administration of Social Aid; Treasury Department, Budget Bureau Reports, collection R-201, volume VI, 1952, Report on a Survey of the Organization of the Department of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation, 30 June 1952 (hereafter cited as Budget Bureau Report on Department of Social Welfare, 30 June 1952), Appendix A.

9 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 633l, W.C. Davis to K. Forster, 14 February 1949.

10 SAB, Budget Bureau Report on Department of Social Welfare, 30 June 1952.

11 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 642, Proceedings of the First Biennial Western Regional Conference on Social Work, 21-23 April 1947; Budget Bureau Report on Department of Social Welfare, 30 June 1952.

12 Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, *Annual Reports*, 1944-1945, 1948-1949, 1951-1952.

13 SAB, Budget Bureau Report on Department of Social Welfare, 30 June 1952. The first step towards a closer in-

tegration of public assistance programmes occurred in 1961 when "Mothers' Allowances" were renamed "Aid to Dependent Families" and shifted from a "means test" to a "needs test" basis. In 1962, the supplemental allowances for Old Age Security recipients and Blind Persons Allowance recipients were also placed on a needs test. These changes led to the amalgamation of mothers' allowances and supplemental allowances with social aid. The financial implications are evident from Table 11.1.

14 SAB, Sturdy Papers, Economic Advisory and Planning Board file, D.E. Chalmers to J.S. White, 13 November 1950 (emphasis in original); Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 413, four year plan prepared by the research staff of the EAPB, 1 December 1947.

15 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 413, minutes of a Joint Meeting of Cabinet and Planning Board, 1-4 December and 8-10 December 1947; file 652, report on the Department of Social Welfare, received in the Premier's office 31 May 1949.

16 Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, Annual Report, 1955-1956.

17 SAB, A.M. Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-9, J.S. White to A.W. Johnson, 19 May 1955.

18 Ibid., file 15-7-1, Work Programme for Fiscal Year 1957-1958, Department of Social Welfare and Rehabilitation.

19 Ibid., file 15-7-14, J.S. White to Nicholson, 13 September 1960.

20 Ibid., file 15-7-9, J.S. White to A.W. Johnson, 19 May 1955; file 15-7-1, T.J. Bentley to members of Cabinet, 13 May 1957.

21 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 641, speech by T.J. Bentley on the new Social Aid Act, 1959.

22 Statutes of Saskatchewan, 1959, Chapter 59; Saskatchewan Gazette, Orders-in-Council under the Social Aid Act, 17 April 1959.

23 Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates and Proceedings, 15 March 1962.

24 SAB, Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-14, J.S. White to T.J. Bentley, 18 March 1960.

25 Legislative Assembly of Saskatchewan, Debates and Proceedings, 6 March 1961.

26 Ibid., 19 February 1963, 20 February 1963.

27 Ibid., 21 February 1963, 22 February 1963.

28 SAB, Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-7-A, Policy and Administration of Social Aid Program, 15 November 1962.

29 Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, Annual Report, 1963-1964.

30 SAB, Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-14, J.S. White to Nicholson, 10 May 1963; Saskatchewan, Department of Social Welfare, Annual Report, 1963-1964.

31 SAB, Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-7-A, minutes of annual conference of Provincial-Municipal Advisory Committee on Social Aid, 25-26 September 1963. On the Regina experience see James M. Pitsula, Let the Family Flourish: A History of the Family Service Bureau of Regina, 1913-1982 (Regina: Family Service Bureau, 1982).

32 SAB, Nicholson Papers, file 15-7-7-A, minutes of annual conference of Provincial-Municipal Advisory Committee on Social Aid, 25-26 September 1963.

33 SAB, Douglas Papers, Premier's Files, file 633g, O.W. Valleau to Douglas, 3 July 1946; Interview with Otto Driedger, Dean, School of Social Work, University of Regina, 11 March 1983.

"Empty Harbours, Empty Dreams": The Democratic Socialist Tradition in Atlantic Canada

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Patrick J. Smith and Marshall W. Conley

When the first national convention of the CCF met in Regina in July 1933, the vision of a Co-operative Commonwealth certainly included Atlantic Canada. Yet fifty years later, no other region in Canada appears to have resisted its implantation so completely. The focus of this essay is on the impact of the democratic socialist tradition in Atlantic Canada. Numerous studies of the Atlantic region have characterized it as having a backward political culture out of step with political development in the rest of the country. This view was best expressed by Frank Underhill: "As for the Maritimes, nothing, of course, ever happens down there."[1] This essay will examine whether this conception of a conservative region resistant to the democratic socialist tradition (or other radical political solutions) has been entirely accurate, and what relationships exist between the political patterns of the past half-century and present politics in Atlantic Canada.

What follows is divided into four parts. The first is simply a description of and comment on the electoral politics of Atlantic Canada. The emphasis here is on those instances when democratic socialist or left-wing parties have sought to challenge the historical two-party system in the region. The essay then goes on to consider the adequacy of explanations of the Atlantic "conundrum." The third section examines recent survey data on party organizations within the region; the intention here is to assess the distinctiveness of Atlantic Canadian party involvement when compared with broader Canadian patterns, particularly with regard to the New Democratic Party. The final section considers the implications of all this for Atlantic Canada's political development and offers some concluding comments on the impact of democratic socialism on the region.

I

No study examining the apparent lack of electoral impact of democratic socialism in the provinces of Atlantic Canada can ignore those instances when such forces have made breakthroughs in the political systems of the region. Few have achieved significant electoral success, if such is measured solely in terms of legislative seats won or governments formed. However, such a standard may not be the most illuminating basis for examining social democracy in the region.

The present authors also acknowledge the suggestions of Richard Apostle and Paul Pross, James Sacouman, and others, that other forms of political activity than conventional party involvement exist, have tended to be overlooked, and appear fruitful in an examination of political culture and political development in Atlantic Canada.[2] This essay's preoccupation, however, is on the political parties, an emphasis which seems entirely appropriate in examining the "failure" of democratic socialist politics to disturb the stability of the traditional party systems in Atlantic Canada.

Joe Wearing has suggested that "the three Maritime provinces are the only part of the country where Gilbert's lines in *Iolanthe* are as valid today as they were when they were written one hundred years ago:

"That every boy and every gal
That's born into the world alive
Is either a little Liberal
Or else a little Conservative"

His description of Newfoundland party politics would not alter Gilbert's imagery.[3]

The political mythology of--perhaps better "on"--Atlantic Canada has abounded with such conceptions. Yet while it is true that politics in these provinces clearly have been dominated by the two major parties, and the political systems have been described as "traditional, bipartisan, pure two-party,"[4] a more specific examination of electoral results illustrates those instances where democratic socialism has had some impact upon regional electoral struggles.

At the federal level, third parties in the region have enjoyed very limited electoral success; since 1878 (including Newfoundland since 1949), only eleven non-Liberals/Conservatives have been elected in federal general elections in Atlantic Canada, compared to 492 Liberals and 502 Conservative MPs. Third parties have won a mere 1.13 percent of all parliamentary seats in general elections in the region in the past 107 years.[5] When these figures are examined closely, particularly when the vote totals are compared with the number of MPs elected, Liberals and Conservatives have continued to dominate, though less conclusively in more recent general elections.

In terms of popular vote, three parties/movements have made "breakthroughs" in the past thirty general elections. In 1921, the Progressives captured 12 percent of the federal vote in Prince Edward Island, 15 percent in Nova Scotia and 11 percent in New Brunswick. Because of the vagaries of "first past the post" voting, this support translated into only one parliamentary victory--in New Brunswick (Victoria-Carleton) where the Progressive won 55 percent of the vote in a straight contest with the Conservative candidate.[6]

The Progressives suffered from weak party organization --an outcome of philosophical differences among the various elements of the movement. Walter Young has described the two main components in this growing rift as those, led by T.A. Crerar, who preferred to see the Progressive movement as a vehicle to reform the Liberal party, and those, led by Henry Wise Wood, who objected to the traditional two-party system "as a tool by which the big interests had corrupted the electorate and had run the country to serve their own selfish ends."

The result of this division was the demise of the movement, as described by W.L. Morton: "It was a brave experiment, inspired by political naiveté, and marked by a curious over-emphasis on the importance of legislation and an ill-advised indifference to the importance of administration."[7] It is a view shared by E.C. Drury, the United Farmers Premier of Ontario (1919-1923) and by Walter Young. According to Young, "the Progressives did not want power, they merely wanted representation....The voters were not asked to elect a Progressive Government, they were simply asked to elect a Progressive to represent them in Ottawa--an important distinction." Drury noted the indifference--even opposition--to party organization in the United Farmers of Ontario in 1919 and amongst Progressives in the 1921 federal general election. In the former instance, Drury was only asked to lead the group and become Premier after the farmers found that they had won the 1919 provincial election. Their defeat, and that of the Progressives, stemmed largely from this "indifference to the importance of party organization."

With only one MP east of the Ottawa River, internal political dissention and the lack of any ongoing organization, no Progressives even ran in Atlantic Canada in 1925. Indeed, only two non-Liberals/Conservatives sought election in the region, and neither was elected. The Progressive interlude was quickly over.[8]

The second electoral intrusion occurred in the 1935 general election with the Reconstructionists, "an offshoot of the Conservatives...polling 384,000 votes and electing but one member."[9] In the Maritimes, the Reconstructionists received 3 percent of the popular vote in Prince Edward Island, 10.5 percent in New Brunswick and 14 percent in Nova Scotia. Like the Progressives, the Reconstructionists emerged in crisis, but with little parliamentary representation and with the start of World War II the movement faded quickly. Its impact in Atlantic Canada was negligible.

The only party/movement that has had any electoral impact on the two-party federal struggle in Atlantic Canada over the past half-century has been the CCF-NDP. During the almost thirty years from its foundation to the formation of the NDP in 1961, the CCF never achieved more than seventeen percent of the popular vote in Atlantic Canada during federal elections, except in Nova Scotia. In New Brunswick, only one CCF candidate ran in 1940, the first federal election the party contested there. The best showing came in 1945, when the CCF contested eight of ten constituencies and captured 6.2 percent of the New Brunswick federal vote. In subsequent federal elections in the province fewer CCF candidates were nominated, and those who were received less support from the electorate. None was ever elected to Parliament. In Prince Edward Island, the 1940 and 1945 elections represented the crest of CCF support (4 percent and 2 percent respectively of the federal vote in the province). In Newfoundland, the CCF achieved 4 percent in 1953, but in general was never a significant factor prior to the establishment of the NDP in 1961.

Only in Nova Scotia did the party achieve a breakthrough with any impact. Norman Penner and others have noted the significance of industrial development and concomitant unionization in enhancing the CCF's electoral fortunes. Influenced by American political developments such as the Socialist Presidential candidacy of Eugene Debs, and American unions such as the Industrial Workers of the World and the United Mine Workers (UMW), the roots of modern Canadian labour organization in the region were established: "These American unions greatly influenced the fledgling Canadian trade-union movement, because they already had a considerable experience in organization, and were radical and militant as a result of two decades of unrelieved and unparalleled violence on the part of U.S. authorities and employers." It was in Industrial Cape Breton that the impact of this American unionization experience was particularly felt.

> The American unions were considered by many Canadian workers to be more militant and aggressive than most of the indigenous ones. An example...of the way Canadian workers were attracted to the American unions in the early years involved the

> coal miners of Nova Scotia. Their union, the Provincial Workmen's Association, proved to be conservative and conciliatory to the employers and consequently failed to win any important gains for the miners or to lead any struggles for such gains....Consequently, in 1908, the miners voted by referendum to dissolve the Provincial Workmen's Association and to invite the American Miners' Union to represent them.[10]

Following years of often bitter struggle between the miners and the British Empire Steel Corporation (and its successors), it was the United Mine Workers who organized the steelworkers in Sydney, Cape Breton, in 1936 into the Steel Workers' Organization Committee (SWOC) under the direction of Silby Barrett, UMW director in Nova Scotia. The Local 1064 Sydney steelworkers' dues were instrumental in SWOC efforts to organize in other parts of Canada, a development which did not escape the interest of David Lewis, CCF secretary. At the same time (1938), the United Mine Workers, District 26 (Nova Scotia), became the first union to seek affiliation with the CCF under the 1937 National Convention rules adopted to encourage such affiliation.[11]

After an initial concern that the Nova Scotia affiliation application might represent "a communist trick," David Lewis and Angus MacInnis "went to Nova Scotia to set up local CCF organizations by the side of and independent of UMW locals and to work out the details of union affiliation to the CCF." Lewis's concern about communist infiltration was at least partially reinforced by the 1935 federal election returns from Nova Scotia; 37 percent of the voters in Cape Breton South voted for "other parties--19 percent supporting a Communist and 18 percent a Reconstructionist. Within two years of Lewis's visit and the UMW affiliation with the CCF, however, Clairie Gillis became the first CCF MP east of Manitoba, elected "by the mineworkers of Cape Breton South."[12] The CCF vote across the province in 1940 was 6 percent, and increased to a peak of 17 percent in 1945 (though with no more CCF members elected). Thence it shrunk to 10 percent and ultimately 5 percent before the party lost the Cape Breton seat in 1957 and allied with the Canadian Labour Congress to form the NDP after the 1958 election.

In the federal elections between 1933 and 1961, the CCF fielded thirty-seven parliamentary candidates in six federal elections in Nova Scotia, twenty-seven in New Brunswick, ten in Prince Edward Island and five in Newfoundland (between 1949 and 1961). In only four instances were they successful--all in Cape Breton South (1940, 1945, 1949, 1953). The figures are significant because they reflect a political and organizational continuity not found in the two previous examples of third party "breakthrough" in the region. This continuity and the efforts of the CCF in the region, particularly in Nova Scotia, were important in the formation of the successor New Democratic Party.[13] Nova Scotia/Cape Breton provided a social democratic foothold in the region for the federal CCF and, subsequently, the NDP.

Numerous commentators have discussed the establishment of the NDP and its subsequent development. Perhaps only a few points need reiteration here prior to an examination of federal election results in Atlantic Canada since 1961. As N.H. Chi and George Perlin argued more than a decade ago, "organizationally, the NDP is clearly more effective than the CCF. Union affiliation has given the national office a sustaining budget....In addition, the alliance with the unions has made available a cadre of professionals who can be drafted from time to time for party work, and it has helped to enlarge formal membership in the party...." Despite organizational problems noted by these authors and others, and the fact that the NDP has rarely achieved greater electoral success nationally than the CCF, there is evidence that the NDP has been successful in "attracting votes from growing social groups on which it may be able to build broader support in the future."[14]

This broadening of support has been evident in the provinces of Atlantic Canada. In Newfoundland, the NDP received 5 percent of the federal vote in its first election in 1962. While voter support hovered at that level for the next decade (and four general elections), by 1974 the party had managed to gain approval from almost one in ten of the voters. That increase translated into the party's first by-election victory and the candidate's subsequent re-election in 1979 when the NDP received 29.73 percent of the federal vote in the province, compared with 29.70 percent for the Tories and 40.59 percent for the Liberals. While this support declined to 17 percent in the 1980 general election, under Howard Scarrow's definition of "success" in federal politics (two elections with more than 15 percent of the vote), the NDP has qualified in Newfoundland. In the 1984 election, this support slipped to less than half that amount (approximately 7 percent).

In Prince Edward Island, the least industrialized and unionized province in the region, the NDP has fared considerably worse, though it was to triple its 2 percent support obtained in the 1962 and 1963 federal elections. With the two major parties continuing to share more than 93 percent of the vote, prospects for significant change here would appear to require the vision of a Woodsworth to see.

New Brunswick has presented a somewhat different picture. Early (1962 and 1963) support for third parties was divided between the NDP and Social Credit (the latter peaking in 1965 with 9 percent support). In 1965 just under 10 percent of the province voted NDP, with some fluctuation increasing to the 15 percent plus quota for success in two of the last three federal general elections in the province (15.3 percent, 16.2 percent, and 14.5 percent respectively). This has not yet translated into any victories on election night, but the base of appeal of the NDP in federal politics in New Brunswick has doubled since 1974, and almost quadrupled since 1962.

In Nova Scotia, the NDP started with the strongest social democratic base in the Atlantic region--10 percent in the 1962 general election--and has similarly doubled its electoral strength. It has elected MPs on three occasions, and in 1980 received over one-fifth of the federal votes cast in the province: 20.8 percent. (In September 1984 this slipped to 15 percent support.) As with New Brunswick and Prince Edward Island, this has resulted in few parliamentary victories, yet it has qualified the Nova Scotia NDP as a federal success. Increasingly, there has also been evidence that a support base has been established "on the mainland" outside of Cape Breton.[15]

Comparatively, and in the context of the NDP nationally, regional support in all but Prince Edward Island has come to reflect the overall appeal of the party across the country. And while support has lagged behind provinces such as British Columbia and Saskatchewan, the change in the Atlantic region has been all the more significant. Under a revised electoral system, the New Democrats might hold 75 seats in an expanded (382 seat) House of Commons, several of them from Atlantic Canada. In federal political terms, the past fifty years has demonstrated a growth from virtually no expression of radical politics to consistent 15 percent plus support for "the Woodsworth party" throughout most of Atlantic Canada.

In terms of provincial party systems, the traditional orthodoxy has been to describe the region's politics as "rather simple two-party relationships. The traditional Liberal-Conservative struggle in the Atlantic provinces has gone on without serious disruption by third party forces, protest movements and the like. Within the history of democratic politics, it is very rare to find such cases of party system persistence." Marsha and William Chandler examined four variables in their analysis of provincial party systems: (i) bipartisanship (the degree to which it is a true two-party system), (ii) fractionalization (the number of competing parties and their relative equality with respect to competitive positions), (iii) one-party dominance (calculated by the proportion of votes or seats won by the strongest party, and also including "endurance in power over time"), (iv) party system instability (based on the average amount of change in vote share or seat share of each party from one election to the next).[16]

Provincial electoral returns offer support for the dominance of the traditional two-party system in the region. They do not, however, offer categorical support for Wearing's description of a "traditional, fiercely competitive two-party system...[where] neither ideology nor major policy questions have much to do with party lines - the last issue to divide Liberals and Conservatives was that of entering Confederation over a hundred years ago."[17]

In Newfoundland, provincial party politics has consistently been dominated by a single party, initially the Smallwood Liberals (1949-1971); subsequently (1971-1985) the Conservatives. Until the Liberals lost in 1971, their share of the popular vote never fell below 58 percent; while the Conservative governments have been less successful, only once have they received less than half the votes. Despite the increase for the CCF-NDP in federal elections, provincially the record has been poor. No CCF candidates ran provincially prior to 1956, when the party contested seven of thirty-six seats and received 661 of the 114,438 votes polled. The labour-oriented Newfoundland Democratic Party nominated eighteen candidates in the 1959 provincial election and received 7.3 percent of the vote. In the seven elections fought by the NDP between 1962 and 1982, support has moved up and down--from 0.2 percent in 1972 (for only three candidates) to 7.8 percent in 1979, when the party ran in fifty-one out of fifty-two seats. Indeed, when the vote totals are examined, the fluctuations appear to have a good deal to do with the ability of the NDP to field candidates,[18] a reflection on its organizational viability. In autumn 1984, the NDP finally suceeded in electing its first MLA--in a Labrador by-election.

In Prince Edward Island, the two main parties have never received less than 94 percent of the popular vote in this century, and only one non-Liberal/Conservative has ever been elected to the legislature, an Independent Farmer in 1919. The CCF received its strongest support in 1947 (4.3 percent) and by the 1955 general election failed to run any candidates; this pattern continued with the NDP until 1974 when the party secured 5.9 percent of the vote in contesting twenty of thirty-two legislative seats. In subsequent provincial elections its popular vote support slipped as the NDP sought fewer than one-quarter of the seats.

New Brunswick has been described as politically volatile. Because of "the long standing ethnic and religious divisions in the province" there has been "vigorous competition" though this "has never led to distinctive issue positions or to ideological divisions between the two parties ....The strength of these traditions is certainly a basic reason why minor parties have enjoyed no appreciable success here." Despite these conditions, third parties have been more active in New Brunswick; in 1920 over one-quarter of the total vote went to non-Liberals/Conservatives, and nine United Farmers and two Labour MLAs were elected (with support from 19.6 percent and 5.2 percent of the electorate respectively). In 1939, the CCF ran its first candidate (who garnered 0.1 percent of the popular vote). By 1944 its share of the popular vote had grown to 13 percent, but thereafter declined as fewer CCF members sought election. In the 1956 and 1960 elections the CCF did not nominate any candidates. Nor were there any NDP candidates in 1963. The party gained 0.1 percent of the popular vote in 1967, but has made consistent (albeit small) gains until the 1982 general election, when, with assistance from organized labour, the first social democratic MLA since 1920 was elected to the New Brunswick legislature.[19] In a subsequent 1984 by-election, St. John voters returned a second NDP member.

In the province of Nova Scotia, the "pattern of two-party competition has been marred by limited, sporadic success of the CCF/NDP and by the ability of this third force to secure itself a regional stronghold in Cape Breton."[20] As has already been noted, the success of left-wing parties there has been rooted in the strength of the miners' and steelworkers' unions which early appeared in the Cape Breton region. This translated in 1920 to a front of Farmer and Labour groups which supported each other's candidates to secure 27.4 percent of the total vote (12.7 percent for Labour candidates and 14.7 percent for farmer candidates). Seven farmer and four Labour MLAs were elected, but only one of each group was returned in 1925 when their combined share of the popular vote fell to 6.4 percent. A small number of United Front or Labour candidates continued to run; however, it was not until 1941 that these democratic socialist efforts translated into legislature seats. In that election, three of the five Cape Breton County seats were won by the CCF, with the party receiving 8.8 percent of the vote province-wide. The vote total almot doubled in 1945 (to 15.1 percent) but one seat was lost. Until the formation of the NDP, the CCF vote fluctuated (from a low of 3.2 percent to a high of 9.6 percent), but at least one CCF member--from Cape Breton--sat in the legislature.

The NDP vote has consistently grown from an initial support of 4.4 percent of the electorate in 1963 to 18.1

percent in 1981 and 16 percent in 1984. In 1978 this translated into four Cape Breton MLAs. Following the 1978 election, the "McEwan Adventure" and the departure of party leader Jeremy Ackerman for a civil service job disrupted the NDP in Cape Breton. Former NDP MLA Paul McEwan formed his own Cape Breton Labour Party and took enough votes in the 1981 election to cost the NDP all of its other Cape Breton seats. Mr. McEwan was re-elected, his party receiving 1.2 percent of the vote. With 2 percent support in the November 1984 provincial general election, this Cape Breton pattern continued. Despite the loss of its four Cape Breton seats, the NDP achieved its first ever "mainland" victory, when party leader Alexa McDonough was elected in a Halifax constituency. Increasingly, this mainland shift has been reflected in the number of NDP candidates crossing the "deposit threshold" in constituencies throughout the province. In the 1984 election, three NDP MLAs were elected on the mainland. However, despite two decades of growth, the Nova Scotia NDP still remains "a party in transition." The party now regularly fields candidates for all legislative seats, and its support in the province approaches one in five voters, but at most the provincial party system there can be characterized as "two-party-plus."

None of this offers any explanation of why these patterns exist across the region and in separate Atlantic provinces. Numerous assessments of the impact (or lack of impact) of radical politics exist and it is to this that this essay now turns.

II

There are numerous explanations of political behaviour in Atlantic Canada, and despite Engelmann and Schwartz's caveat that "the failure of demonstrable strains leading to viable political parties has no single explanation...."[21] perhaps four such "types" stand out.

Traditionalism

Authors who favour this explanation of Atlantic Canada's political behaviour emphasize that its society was and is traditional and conservative in nature. Social traditionalism and political conservatism have been related phenomenon in this orthodox treatment of the region. For David Bellamy "the political cultures of Atlantic Canada comprise the attitudes, beliefs and values of those societies by the sea that have been to some extent left behind by the impulsive rush toward materialism of the rest of Canada," while for Murray Beck the region's rustic political culture is "of interest to those...who desire to see a fragment of Canadian life that has generally disappeared elsewhere."[22] It is a fragment which generally condones and tolerates political corruption, especially patronage.[23] In such a society, ideological parties find little fertile ground.

Alienation

Efforts to explain the persistence of this "traditionalism" have emphasized the region's political alienation, and there is little doubt that Atlantic Canada is politically alienated. Simeon and Elkins found more than half of their Atlantic survey with weak feelings of political efficacy and a low degree of political trust. John Wilson documented equally significant patterns of inefficacy and distrust, and George Perlin's Atlantic survey for the Task Force on Canadian Unity concluded that "a crisis of confidence may not be too far away because...it is among the young people of the Atlantic provinces that feelings of political alienation are most widespread."[24] The fact that the provinces of Atlantic Canada represent "disaffected societies" is significant. However, it leaves two questions unanswered. What were or are the origins of this regional disaffection, and why has this sense of alienation not translated into greater political success for "radical" parties? Answers to these questions have been suggested by the last two schools of thought.

Elites

Simeon and Elkins have hypothesized that politics in Atlantic Canada may be perceived as a game enjoyed by a small upper stratum, with the mass of the population observing the rules by ritualistic participation. George Rawlyk has argued that regional grievances have been manipulated by local elites to sterilize the issue as a force for reform. These elites have used such sentiments as a means of preserving the status quo. According to Rawlyk, a widespread and profound dislike of "Upper Canadians" and a distrust of Confederation have combined in Nova Scotia to produce a "paranoid style" of politics. Periods of stable and quiet politics are succeeded by "...those periods of extreme economic crises where the embers of...discontent and suspicion were fanned into the flames of regional protest by the propagandists of the 'paranoid style'." Rawlyk has applied this contention to all of the Atlantic provinces: by blaming Ottawa and Central Canada for all that ails their province, provincial politicians/elites have deflected criticism, and without such criticism the status quo has been maintained.

Together these three explanatory types represent the "Orthodox" School of Atlantic Interpretation; for Rawlyk "the rhetoric of alienation not only serves to preserve the status quo but it is also an important means whereby a traditional and basically conservative people keeps in touch with a past which is regarded as far more important in many respects than the future."[25]

Economic underdevelopment

The adequacy of these orthodox explanations of the Atlantic "conundrum" has in recent years been challenged by a revisionist school which has argued that the quintessential element in understanding the Atlantic region is economic underdevelopment. Chi and Perlin, for example, have contended that it has been the economic backwardness of all parts of the region (except industrial Cape Breton) which has explained the failure of radical working class politics to make any real impact in Atlantic Canada. Certainly "whether it is called 'underdevelopment', 'slow growth' or 'uneven development', 'regional disparity' is a feature that pervades the Canadian reality," as Michael Clow has noted. In Atlantic Canada, E.R. Forbes has suggested, the crisis caused by disparate economic growth has been *the* paramount political issue for at least three generations. Kealey, McKay and Reilly have referred to it, simply, as "Canada's 'Eastern Question'," and the National Film Board has portrayed it visually as *Empty Harbours, Empty Dreams*.[26]

These authors have challenged "the conventional wisdom that the geographically remote and 'backward' Maritimes slid from an anomalous 'Golden Age' into a stable state of chronic stagnation, depopulation and conservative quiescence ....The basic theme or 'message' of this procentralist orthodoxy is that the current situation of the Maritime provinces is the outcome of their uncompetitiveness, the product of internal flaws and weaknesses and that it reflects no unfavourable light upon the nature of the Canadian Confederation or on Canadian economic development as a whole." On the challenge to such orthodoxy there is general agreement. What is at issue *within* the revisionist challenge are interpretations emphasizing "the importance of politics and state action versus the somewhat mechanical unfolding of the 'laws of capitalist development'."[27] The debate here has been essentially between Marxist and non-Marxist political economists.

Among the latter, the contributions of E.R. Forbes and T.W. Acheson stand out as representative of an essentially liberal perspective. In Forbes's view the responsibility for Maritime decline rests with political domination by central Canada and the centrally-dominated policies of the national government, such as the decision to abandon subsidized freight rates on the Intercolonial railway. Acheson reflected on the role of the National Policy and the eventual economic annexation of the region by "the centre."[28]

Marxist political economists find representation in the work of Robert Brym, James Sacouman, and Henry Veltmeyer. Brym and Sacouman have rejected the "conservative region" image: "Atlantic Canadians *have* engaged in a wide variety of both formally political and non-political movements to improve their lot; and if formally political attempts at improvement have not been as successful as in, say, the Canadian west, this is due less to any inherent conservatism than it is to the fact that the character of regional underdevelopment has, at least until recently, distributed political resources so unevenly as to militate against widespread success." According to Veltmeyer, "underdevelopment in Atlantic Canada can be best understood in terms of Marx's concept of an 'industrial reserve army' - as a lever of capital accumulation."[29] Some of the same concerns, albeit from a different perspective, can be found in the Marginal Work World Study. In the marginal work world "members cannot influence the environment; seek to distance themselves ideologically from government but are frequently dependent on government to survive; this relationship is not symbiotic and revolves around patronage rather than policy, and there is a high dependence on political party communication."[30] Such a "world" may explain the linkage between economics and politics in the Atlantic region.

The significant link here is between economics and political party development. One of the Marxist political economists who has sought to address the "third party question" in the region has been Robert Brym. Brym has argued that the absence of significant radical party success in Atlantic Canada reflects certain features of underdevelopment whose combination inhibits such developments. Specifically, the high concentration in the region of petty primary producers who are affected by an "indirect/subsistence" form of capital exploitation is in large part responsible for the failure of radical politics. Subsistence producers are unlikely to become conscious of their common plight and interests, and third parties are unlikely to result.[31] Brym's concentration on (among other variables) petty producers may offer only a limited explanation, if the economy of the region is changing. There are indications of such change with implications for understanding Atlantic Canada. Before turning to this and its impact on democratic socialism in the region, however, the distinctiveness of party organizations must first be examined.

III

If, indeed, there is a consensus that the political culture and economy of Atlantic Canada is different, this should be reflected in patterns of political involvement, including involvement in the NDP. To determine if this is so, survey data on party officials of the Nova Scotia NDP were compared with equivalent information from other regions of the country. How and why local officers got involved in party work and what they actually did were important research concerns. Within this broader ongoing study three variables were suggested by current party organization literature: political recruitment, incentive patterns, and roles and attitudes.[32]

Political recruitment

Prewitt, Eulau, and Zisk have argued that "recruitment and induction experiences...serve as guidelines for the incumbent's present behaviour."[33] The first point of entry into party work has been termed the "trigger event." In a party system with little apparent ideological content, purposive triggers would appear less significant than social-material motives, and this should be reflected in the NDP.

In fact, two patterns emerged. Within Nova Scotia, the NDP clearly demonstrated its ideological basis--70.9 percent of the constituency officers indicated ideological reasons for joining the party. This compared with more than nine in ten (93.7 percent) of the Tory activists and almost ninety percent (89.9 percent) of the Liberals who expressed non-ideological "triggers" for initiating party work. (See Table 12.1.) When compared with similar data on party organizations in Hamilton and Toronto, Ontario, the regional factor emerged across several recruitment variables. Ontario NDP officials emphasized ideology more consistently as the initial reason for joining the party, an approximately eleven percent difference. (See Table 12.1.)

TABLE 12.1. Initial Trigger Event Mobilizing Activists

	IDEOLOGY	CANDIDATE-LEADER	FAMILY-FRIENDS	MATERIAL REASONS	TOTAL	
	%	%	%	%		N
ONTARIO						
New Democrat	82	14	11	0	100	(28)
Liberal	6	24	67	3	100	(31)
Prog. Conserv.	10	20	65	5	100	(20)
NOVA SCOTIA						
New Democrat	71	23	6	0	100	(58)
Liberal	11	42	29	9	100	(41)
Prog. Conserv.	6	27	31	27	100	(44)

With regard to voluntarism versus co-optation, it was hypothesized that the ideological party organizations would exhibit self-starting patterns, while non-purposive associations would tend to co-opt officers, but *within* Nova Scotia the anticipated pattern was not so accentuated. New Democrats were most likely to volunteer for party activity (71 percent) but more than half of the Liberals (62 percent) and Conservatives (58 percent) did also. (See Table 12.2.) While almost three quarters of the Nova Scotian NDP officers were volunteers, this was (again) less than their Ontario counterparts, where 93 percent of the NDP officials indicated that they were "self-starters." Thus regional variation persisted.[34]

TABLE 12.2. Recruitment Method

	VOLUNTEERED %	WAS CO-OPTED %	TOTAL	N
ONTARIO				
New Democrat	93	7	100	(28)
Liberal	9	91	100	(33)
Prog. Conserv.	5	95	100	(20)
NOVA SCOTIA				
New Democrat	71	29	100	(51)
Liberal	63	37	100	(52)
Prog. Conserv.	58	42	100	(49)

Incentive patterns

Several motivational variables were examined to assess the significance of purposive and non-purposive incentives. Amongst New Democrats (in Ontario and Nova Scotia) about four in five gave purposive reasons for involvement, with a slight additional significance (86 percent to 78 percent) for ideological reasons in the Ontario organizations.[35] (See Table 12.3.) This regional political disparity was further reflected when motivational change was examined; 96 percent of the Ontario NDP suggested that their initial motives were ideological, compared with 70 percent of the NDP in Nova Scotia. (See Table 12.4.) While present incentives had merged (78 percent of the Nova Scotia activists compared to 86 percent of Ontario officials) with ongoing ideological commitments, a continuing difference, perhaps explained by regional political development, remained.

TABLE 12.3. Incentives: Ontario, Nova Scotia

	UTILITARIAN %	SOLIDARY %	PURPOSIVE %	TOTAL	N
ONTARIO					
New Democrat	0	14	86	100	(38)
Liberal	21	73	6	100	(33)
Prog. Conserv.	15	80	5	100	(20)
NOVA SCOTIA					
New Democrat	0	22	78	100	(51)
Liberal	40	40	12	100	(53)
Prog. Conserv.	48	41	11	100	(49)

TABLE 12.4. Change from Initial to Present Expectations

	INITIAL EXPECTATIONS			PRESENT EXPECTATIONS			SHIFT IN MOTIVES
	M %	S %	I %	M %	S %	I %	Yes %
ONTARIO							
New Democrat	0	4	96	0	14	86	11
Liberal	21	46	33	21	73	6	49
Prog. Conserv.	0	70	30	15	80	5	35
NOVA SCOTIA							
New Democrat	2	28	70	0	22	78	20
Liberal	8	59	33	43	43	14	21
Prog. Conserv.	17	45	38	49	41	10	9

M = Material; S = Solidary; I = Ideological.

Roles and attitudes

Past research has suggested that the role orientations of party organizations would be affected by the motivational patterns predominant in particular party structures. If Clark and Wilson's typology has any applicability to understanding party organizational activity, the purposive-non-purposive distinction already established should continue to manifest itself. Specifically, "activists in purposive party organizations should emphasize party, policy, education and ideology, while non-purposive associations should contain officers who more often stress associational and utilitarian rewards."[36]

Throughout, New Democrats indeed emphasized party and policy considerations, and perceived influencing government policies as more important than their associational Liberal-Conservative counterparts. Consistently the Ontario NDP officials were found to be more prone to this "service orientation", whether in helping constituents with governmental problems (75 percent versus 56.3 percent), constituents' welfare (78.6 percent versus 59.4 percent), in emphasizing the importance of concern with public issues (92.9 percent versus 75 percent), seeking to influence government policies (85.7 percent versus 60.3 percent), helping the party (89.3 percent versus 69.8 percent), and involving people in issue discussions (75 percent versus 55.6 percent). Conversely, Nova Scotian New Democrats were more likely than their fellow Ontario NDP officials to emphasize social or utilitarian motives, such as fun, prestige and friendships (22.2 percent of the Nova Scotia NDP said this was very important compared to only 13.6 percent in Ontario), and the importance of a specific candidate (53.6 percent of Ontario New Democrats indicated this was very important; over two-thirds of the Nova Scotians did).[37] The consistency of these patterns would suggest the continuing influence of regional factors.

IV

The history of democratic socialism in Atlantic Canada is not one of political docility. This orthodox view of a politically backward region ignores an ongoing political presence of the CCF-NDP within the region, dating perhaps from Woodsworth's Easter 1922 tour of Cape Breton and certainly from the Lewis/MacInnis visit to establish CCF organizations in 1937. The relative weakness of its organization clearly affected the expression of popular support for the party from time to time, but when these organizational impediments were overcome, and candidates were fielded in most constituencies, the popular vote for the CCF-NDP rose substantially. More importantly the traditional orthodoxy has failed to recognize the political development of the NDP in the region over the past decade. Organizational concerns are less significant, party membership is more substantial and committed, articulate leadership is in place, and, with a reformed electoral system, the NDP would represent a persuasive influence in the politics of three of the four Atlantic provinces.

The patterns of party organizational development also demonstrate that even given a "regional remnant" of traditionalism, the NDP in Atlantic Canada is a party of activists who are motivated by ideological commitment and voluntarism, and whose political activities and attitudes reflect this "service orientation" to their communities. Very clear differences between "purposive" (ideological) NDP supporters and non-purposive Liberals and Conservatives have emerged. Importantly, these differences were more significant than those between New Democrats within the Atlantic region and elsewhere in Canada. This and other data[38] would appear to suggest that the national pattern of the NDP as an "ideological" party offers a more significant explanation of the NDP within the region than do regional factors. However, a "regional slippage factor" does remain and continues to manifest itself.

With regard to the existing attempts to explain the politics of the region, whether as a conundrum or otherwise, there has been a preoccupation with seeking a "one best solution" when in fact it does not exist. In seeking a better understanding of democratic socialism in Atlantic Canada, it is necessary to recognize that elements of traditionalism persist, regional alienation finds expression, and traditional elites and economic underdevelopment are factors. While intra-party differences have continued, these may lessen if a significant alteration in the regional economy materializes. While there remains some reason to be skeptical about such a change, off-shore development with concomitant industrialization and unionization may form a basis for this alteration. Apostle and Pross have concluded that "the political culture of any community is the product of many complex social and economic forces....Of these forces we consider the structure of the economy to be particularly important....We feel that...there are many signs that the region is about to experience a massive change in its economic structure....As these changes in economic structure occur we surmise that...centrality will be the dominant force here, just as it is elsewhere in Canada."

Perlin has demonstrated that this "change potential" has already been picked up by the general population in the Atlantic region, with implications for existing elite structures: "when, as we have seen, perceptions of governmental ineffectiveness are accompanied by the belief that political elites are preoccupied with issues that are perceived to be irrelevant to problems of popular concern, feelings of political alienation may be expected to intensify all the more quickly, hastening the arrival of a breakdown in diffuse (regime) support."[39]

Politics in Atlantic Canada is clearly changing. This is partly reflected in the growth of popular support for the NDP to the point where it has begun to approximate the national standing of the party (in all but Prince Edward Island). If the items on the political agenda in the individual provinces and in the region as a whole are shifting, a more fundamental change in the traditional party system may also occur. At the very least, this may undermine many of the existing single-factor explanations of "political docility" in Atlantic Canada.[40] Two responses to such change seem possible. The benefits of this change in the economic order may not be as great as propagandists have suggested, but even if they are, the existing political structures and patterns may adjust or muddle through; or these trends may not be accommodated within the traditional party systems of the Atlantic provinces. If that is the case, then the party of democratic socialism would appear best placed to give voice to these new regional forces. If the harbours are sometimes empty, the dreams of democratic socialism are not.

NOTES

1 F.H. Underhill, The Image of Confederation (Toronto, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, 1964), p. 63.

2 Richard Apostle and Paul Pross, "Marginality and Political Culture: A New Approach to Political Culture in Atlantic Canada," paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 1981, pp. 54, 58; R. James Sacouman, "Underdevelopment and the Structural Origins of Antigonish Movement Co-operatives in Eastern Nova Scotia," Acadiensis, VII, 1(Autumn, 1977), pp. 66-85; "The Centrality of the 'Peripheral' Maritimes to a Canada-Wide Marxian Political Economy," paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Saskatoon, Saskatchewan, May 1979; R. Brym and R.J. Sacouman, eds., Underdevelopment and Social Movements in Atlantic Canada (Toronto: New Hogtown, 1979). The relevance of this 'other-than-party" activity is addressed briefly in Part IV of this essay.

3 Joseph Wearing, The L-Shaped Party: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1958-1980 (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1981), pp. 87-89 (emphasis added).

4 Marsha Chandler and William Chandler, Public Policy and Provincial Politics (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1979), pp. 53-66, particularly pp. 64-66; Richard Johnston, "Federal and Provincial Voting: Contemporary Patterns and Historical Evolution" in David Elkins and Richard Simeon, eds., Small Worlds: Provinces and Parties in Canadian Political Life (Toronto: Methuen, 1980), pp. 131-78; Wearing, pp. 87-96.

5 Figures for Part I are taken from various Reports of the Chief Electoral Officer, Ottawa; H. Scarrow, Canada Votes (New Orleans: Hauser, 1962); P. Fox, Politics: Canada (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 5th ed., 1982); S. Hyson, "Conditions Which Prevent the Electoral Success of Third Parties in the Maritime Provinces" (M.A. Thesis, McGill University, 1971), Appendices; and Reports of Chief Electoral Officers of the Atlantic Provinces.

6 P.J. Smith, ed., The Electoral Reform Question in Canada (London: Electoral Reform Society of Great Britain and Ireland, 1979); Hyson, Appendix D, pp. 215-16.

7 Walter D. Young, Democracy and Discontent (Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 2nd ed., 1978), p. 30; W.L. Morton, The Progressive Party in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1950), p. 151.

8 Young, p. 31; R.M. Dawson, The Government of Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto, 3rd ed., 1973), pp. 420-22; Interview with Hon. E.C. Drury, October 1964.

An independent in New Brunswick Victoria-Carleton (won in 1921 by the Progressives) received 0.7 percent of the popular vote; in Cape Breton South a Labour candidate received 21 percent (versus 26 percent for the Liberal and 53 percent for the Conservative). [Hyson, pp. 215-16, and Appendix E, pp. 219-222.]

9 Dawson, p. 426.

10 Norman Penner, The Canadian Left (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1977), pp. 24-25.

11 Grace MacInnis, J.S. Woodsworth (Toronto: Macmillan, 1953), pp. 159-70; Irving Abella, Nationalism, Communism and Canadian Labour (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1973), pp. 54-65; G. Horowitz, Canadian Labour in Politics (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1968), pp. 58-84. David Lewis was particularly active during this period in opposing communists infiltrating the CCF directly through Canadian unions. (Abella, pp. 66-85 and passim.)

12 Horowitz, pp. 71-72. David Lewis sent UMW Nova Scotia director D.W. Morrison the following telegram: "Have read in morning press decision Truro Conference to affiliate CCF. Wish to greet your decision on behalf of National Council. Am anxious to have immediately as full report as possible of conference decision and background. Particularly interested in knowing whether decisions supported by rank and file and whether move sponsored by Communists." (PAC, CCF Records, Lewis to Morrison, 16 August 1938.)

13 Walter Young, The Anatomy of a Party (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969); Horowitz, pp. 198-233.

14 N.H. Chi and George C. Perlin, "The New Democratic Party: A Party in Transition" in Hugh Thorburn, ed., Party Politics in Canada (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 3rd ed., 1972), p. 177; T. Surich, "Purists and Pragmatists: Canadian Democratic Socialism at the Crossroads" in H.R. Penniman, ed., Canada at the Polls (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1975), pp. 121-48, 178-79.

15 Recent electoral returns have shown a higher percentage of support in the rest of the province.

16 Chandler and Chandler, pp. 54-55, 57. Their findings are supported by Frank McKinnon (on Prince Edward Island),

Murray Beck (on Nova Scotia), P.J. Fitzpatrick (on New Brunswick) and Susan McCorquadale (on Newfoundland). The degree to which a system is a two-party system is calculated by combining the share of votes or seats held by the two largest parties. (Ibid., p. 55.)

17 Wearing, pp. 89, 92.

18 For example, the 1979 total was halved when only 23 of 52 possible seats were contested in 1982.

19 Chandler and Chandler, pp. 64-65. The other party to attempt inroads has been the Parti Acadien. In 1978 their support was 4 percent; in the 1982 general election this stood at .86 percent. See Philippe Doucet and Harley d'Entremont, "The 1982 New Brunswick Election," panel paper, Canadian Political Science Association, Vancouver, British Columbia, June 1983, pp. 2-3. (Including Table 1, p. 3.)

20 Chandler and Chandler, pp. 65, 92.

21 P. Smith and M. Eagles, "Third Parties/Movements in Atlantic Canada," paper for the Conference on Atlantic Canada Political Development, Queen's University, Kingston, Ontario, July 1981, pp. 14-21; F.C. Engelmann and M.A. Schwartz, Canadian Political Parties: Origin, Character and Impact (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 1975), p. 90.

22 D. Bellamy, "The Atlantic Provinces" in D. Bellamy, J. Pammett, and D. Rowat, eds., The Provincial Party Systems (Toronto: Methuen, 1976), p. 3; J.M. Beck, "Nova Scotia: Tradition and Conservatism" in M. Robin, ed., Canadian Provincial Politics (Toronto: Prentice-Hall, 2nd ed. 1978), p. 177.

23 Beck has concluded that "the conservative nature of the society has caused some undesirable political practices to endure. This is particularly true of patronage." As an example, the governments of Nova Scotia and Newfoundland both broke with long established international tradition in the appointment of their current ombudsmen: both were recently defeated candidates of the Government party. In the instance of Nova Scotia's current appointment, the decision was made by the Premier when the House was not in session--breaking with a further tradition that the ombudsman is an officer of the legislature. In Newfoundland the Official Opposition sought to make an issue of Ambrose Peddle's appointment, with little success. In Nova Scotia Premier John Buchanan's decision occurred virtually without notice; in a province which changes Department of Highways crews by political stripe

(as long as they are Liberal/Conservative stripes), and where the price of doing business with the provincial liquor commission has been "kickbacks" to the governing party, the political executive making a patronage appointment to the office of Ombudsman must have seemed normal. The 1981 appointment of Judge Robert McCleave, and the unusual behaviour of this former Tory in his capacity as head of the Uranium Inquiry in Nova Scotia suggests concerns about competence and other ongoing implications for public policy formation in such situations. (See, for example, Donna Smyth, "Nova Scotia's Uranium Inquiry," Probe Post, V, 6[April 1983], pp. 8-10.)

24 R. Simeon and D. Elkins, "Provincial Political Cultures in Canada" in Elkins and Simeon, table 7, p. 45; J. Wilson, "The Canadian Political Cultures," Canadian Journal of Political Science, VII, 3(September, 1974), pp. 438-83; Patricia Peppin and George Perlin, "Political Alienation in the Atlantic Provinces: Some Preliminary Observations," paper for the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Moncton, New Brunswick, October 1981, p. 32.

25 R. Simeon and D. Elkins, "Regional Political Cultures," Canadian Journal of Political Science, VII, 3(September, 1974), pp. 397-437; George Rawlyk, "The Maritimes and the Canadian Community" in Mason Wade, ed., Regionalism in the Canadian Community, 1867-1967 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1969), p. 103; "Quebec's Separation and the Atlantic Provinces" in Richard Simeon, ed., Must Canada Fail? (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 1977), pp. 89-92.

26 Chi and Perlin, p. 182; Michael Clow, "The Overthrow of Orthodoxy: The New Literature on Maritime Underdevelopment," paper for the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Sydney, Nova Scotia, October 1980, p. 1; E.R. Forbes, "The Origins of the Maritime Rights Movement", Acadiensis, V, 1(Autumn, 1975), pp. 55-66; "Misguided Symmetry: The Destruction of Regional Transportation Policy for the Maritimes" in David Bercuson, ed., Canada and the Burden of Unity (Toronto: Macmillan, 1977), pp. 60-86; The Maritime Rights Movement, 1919-1927: A Study in Canadian Regionalism (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University, 1979); Gregory Kealey, Ian McKay, and Nolan Reilly, "Canada's 'Eastern Question': A Reader's Guide to Regional Underdevelopment" in "Report on Atlantic Canada", Canadian Dimension, XIII, 2(1978), p. 37; Barry Cowling, Rex Tasker, and Kent Martin, Empty Harbours, Empty Dreams (National Film Board of Canada, 1979).

27 Clow, pp. 2, 17.

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30 Apostle and Pross, Appendix.

31 R. Brym, "Political Conservatism in Atlantic Canada" in Brym and Sacouman, pp. 59-79.

32 The data collection in Nova Scotia involved 173 officers in the eleven federal constituencies--sixty-two of these were New Democrats, a response rate of approximately 70 percent for the self-administered, mailed questionnaire. For a more complete discussion of the methodology and data collection see P. Smith and M. Conley, "Political Recruitment and Party Activists: British and Canadian Comparisons," paper for the International Political Science Association, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, August 1982; "Political Threshold and Political Recruitment: Legislative Candidates and Party Activists in the Maritime Provinces of Canada," paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Halifax, Nova Scotia, May 1981; "Federal-Provincial Campaign Congruence in the Maritime Provinces of Canada: Perspectives on Integration," paper for the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Moncton, New Brunswick, October 1981.

Some of the Ontario findings have been reported elsewhere. See H.J. Jacek et al., "The Congruence of Federal-Provincial Campaign Activity in Party Organizations: The Influence of Recruitment Patterns in Three Hamilton Ridings," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, V, 2(June, 1972), pp. 190-205; "Social Articulation and Aggregation in Political Party Organizations in a Large Canadian City," *Canadian Journal of Political Science*, VIII, 2(June, 1975), pp. 274-98.

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34 These figures of NDP voluntarism conform also to Kornberg, Smith, and Clarke's Winnipeg data. (Allan Kornberg, Joel Smith, and Harold Clark, Citizen Politicians --Canada: Party Officials in a Democratic Society [Durham, North Carolina: Carolina Academic Press, 1979], pp. 96-99, especially Tables 4.6 and 4.7.)

35 For the Winnipeg patterns see ibid., Tables 4.4 and 4.5, pp. 90, 92. These indicate a higher significance accorded to ideology in the western NDP vis à vis their Liberal and Conservative opponents.

36 P.B. Clark and J.Q. Wilson, "Incentive Systems: A Theory of Organizations," Administrative Science Quarterly, VI (1961), pp. 129-66; M. Conley and P. Smith, "Political Recruitment and Party Activists: British and Canadian Comparisons," International Political Science Review, IV, 1(1983), p. 53.

37 For a more complete discussion of roles and attitudes and regional differences see Conley and Smith, "Political Recruitment," cited above pp. 53-54, and their IPSA paper on the same subject, Tables 6a-6g, 7.

38 See M. Conley, "Political Recruitment: The Selection of Candidates for Provincial Office in Canada" (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Exeter, 1980).

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40 See also P. Smith and M. Conley, "Post Clientist Perspectives on Atlantic Canada: Changing 'Mid-Elite' Structures," paper for the Canadian Political Science Association, Guelph, Ontario, June 1984; P. Smith, "Post Clientism and Centrality vs. Clientism and Marginality: The Atlantic Canada Political Development Debate Revisited," paper for the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, Antigonish, Nova Scotia, October 1984. "There is evidence for the central contention of this essay, namely that if 'change' has occurred, it will find reflection in the party structures of the region" (p. 7).

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